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MANAGING INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: 
LEADERSHIP, PARADOX, AND POWER 








This empirical qualitative study—of four interorganizational nonprofit networks 
promoting immigrant rights in the U.S—contributes to the interorganizational network 
management literature by focusing on the management of two inherent paradoxical 
tensions: unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation.  Four leadership activities—
activating, facilitating, framing, and capacitating—are found to generate unity and 
maintain diversity. Unity and diversity, together, build the networks’ power: 
conceptualized as “power to” and as four power bases, namely, knowledge, financial 
resources, legitimacy, and access. In turn, the networks’ power together with two other 
leadership activities—strategizing and mobilizing—is found to be used by the 
immigration nonprofit networks to both cooperate and confront with powerful state 
actors. By using paradoxical tensions inherent to networks as its focus, this research 
further develops both the network leadership and network power literatures, and also 
aims at providing reflexive practitioners with a guiding conceptual framework.
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I think that there’s power in that we’re able 
to bring such a diverse group together.  It’s 
hard, it’s really hard. 
A program officer at one of the interorganizational 
immigrant networks. 
DIFFICULT TO MANAGE, POPULAR, AND UNDERSTUDIED  
Interorganizational networks are difficult to manage, as the above quote indicates. It is 
well known that managing interorganizational networks is an inherently difficult task and 
by no means an easy option (Human and Provan 2000). Scholars of business alliances 
estimate that more than 50% of alliances fail (Kelly, Schaan, and Jonacas 2002; Park  and 
Ungson 2001). Failure rates are not available regarding public or nonprofit networks, but 
Huxham and Vangen (2000b) have identified how collaboration often succumbs to what 
they term as collaborative inertia. Networks are difficult to manage because they are 
complex. Scholars suggest that failures and the difficulty in managing interorganizational 
sets arise due to managerial complexity (Park and Ungson 2001), and the complex, 
dynamic, and ambiguous nature of collaborations (Huxham 2003).  
 
Although they are inherently difficult to manage, networks are popular mechanisms of 
interorganizational governance. This popularity can be attributed to today’s complex 
world, which demands an organizational form of individuation and dispersed power but 
also unification (Agranoff McGuire 2001, Mendoza 1991). Moreover, problems are 
nowadays “wicked” (Rittel and Webber 1973). Not only do they require complex 
solutions, but problems themselves are ill-defined, generating ambiguous situations 




   2
However, despite the rising popularity of networks and their inherent challenges, network 
management and leadership is an understudied field (Ebers 1997; Ebers and Jarrillo 1997; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994)—in particular, public and nonprofit network management 
(Isett and Provan 2006). This lack of research is even more surprising when considering 
that interorganizational networks fail due to poor management (Meyer 1999) and that 
leadership is a central factor for network success (Bardach 1998). That 
interorganizational network management demands more research requires little 
justification: interorganizational network management is in search of its paradigm 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001), and until it develops one, network management will 
continue to have its short-comings, and hence networks will continue to fail. 
UNPACKING THE DIFFICULTIES 
This research wants to contribute to the network management literature, and in particular 
to the network leadership literature. It does so by exploring the difficulties in network 
management. More specifically, it focuses on the inherent paradoxical nature of networks 
and how this affects network management. As Bouchikhi (1998) states, management 
research is not about negating paradoxical tensions, but asking questions about how 
tensions are managed. In this dissertation I look at how networks manage inherent 
tensions. 
 
Networks fail and are difficult to manage because of their complexity. 
The difficulties in network management are due to inherent paradoxes implied by 
networks, in particular the need to be simultaneously united and diverse. Based on the 
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claim that managing in collaborative contexts requires addressing inherent paradoxes that 
emerge from the complex collaborative nature itself (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; 
Huxham 2003), this project’s research topic is the inherent paradoxes in network 
management. The main research question is: how is paradox managed in successful 
networks? 
 
The network management literature in general implicitly points towards paradox—on a 
duality of coexisting contradictory goals, and or processes—and suggests that the 
management of paradoxes has an impact on the network’s success. More explicitly, 
Ospina and I identified, in previous research, two paradoxes: the paradoxical tension of 
unity and diversity regarding the internal management of the network, and the 
paradoxical engagement of the network with external actors with whom the networks 
combine confrontation and cooperation (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005).  
 
Yet, inter-organizational network and collaboration theorists have ignored paradoxes. I 
believe that a focus on paradox offers great potential for developing theory and 
knowledge in the organizational studies field and can help scholars understand the nature 
of networks and their management. I also believe this research contributes directly to 
practitioners by providing some useful concepts that do not obviate the complexity but 
that serve as guiding frameworks. 
 
I have set out to empirically explore paradox in networks to unpack network leadership. 
My research focuses on paradox in four interorganizational networks in the U.S. 
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immigration sector. More specifically it focuses on how these networks’ manage 
contradictory goals and or processes. The networks are collective action 
interorganizational networks dedicated to advance the rights of immigrants. The networks 
are all formalized, all have a central coordinating unit, and carry out joint advocacy 
activities. The networks are: New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), Coalition for 
Asian, African, European, Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), National Day 
Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), CAUSA – Oregon’s Immigrant Rights 
Coalition.1 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation builds on and unites two strands of literature dealing with collaboration 
and network management that so far have walked separate lines. These are the public 
network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2001) and collaborative advantage theory 
(Huxham and Vangen 2005). By unpacking two tensions, unity/diversity and 
cooperation/confrontation, and by understanding how they are managed, I propose a 
network leadership model. The model describes how the coordinating units of the 
networks manage these two paradoxes.  
 
Figure I illustrates a simplified version of the model I propose. What I have found is that 
the network’s coordinating units sustain unity and diversity in the network by executing 
four leadership activities (activating, framing, facilitating, and capacitating). Having a 
united yet diverse network increases the overall power of the network. The coordinating 
                                                 
1 Note how three out of the four networks call themselves “coalitions.” Throughout the study, following 
Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 2003), I use the term network to refer to these interorganizational sets. 
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unit then uses the power of the network to execute two more leadership activities 
(strategizing and mobilizing), which allow the coordinating unit to manage the network’s 
cooperation or confrontation with an external actor.  
 




By uniquely combining previously identified leadership activities with new power and 
leadership constructs, the study provides an explanation as to how the coordinating units 
manage the network. This study also finds some differences between the networks 
depending on their size, governmental target, culture, and geographic dispersion. 
OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
Chapters 2 and 3 are theoretical chapters. In Chapter 2 I clarify my definition of 
interorganizational network and situate this study in relation to previous research on 
interorganizational networks. The last part of the chapter justifies this dissertation’s topic 
and primary research question: how is paradox managed in successful networks? In 
Chapter 3 I review the literature on the unity/diversity and the confrontation/cooperation 
paradoxes.  I also review the network leadership activities prescribed by collaboration 
theory, policy network theory, and public network management theory. Last, I construct a 
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The next two chapters are methodological. For the first part of Chapter 4, I describe the 
research’s design, including topic, claim, main question, secondary questions, 
propositions, units and levels of analysis, the approach, the sampling and data collection, 
and the data analysis. In Chapter 5 I present a historical summary of immigration in the 
U.S. and describe the four cases according to their mission, activities, origins, and 
structural characteristics.  
 
In chapters 6, 7, and 8 I analyze my data and start building my conclusions. Chapter 6 
shows how the internal paradox was present in all four networks, and in Chapter 7 I 
describe the leadership activities involved in managing the internal paradox of the 
network and why this paradox must be sustained. In Chapter 8 I show how the 
cooperation/confrontation paradox is present in all four networks. Then, I look at how it 
is managed: which activities and power resources are used to manage the cooperation and 
confrontation paradox and how it contributes to the network’s effectiveness.  
 
The study ends with Chapter 9 summarizing the findings and answering the general 
research question. I then outline the research’s more general contributions and conclude 
discussing the research’s limitations and proposing future research. 
 
 
2. INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: DEFINITIONS, 
APPROACHES, AND EARLY FINDINGS 
En un planeta que se mundializa por 
momentos, la política tiende a ser cada vez 
más, y de forma más apasionada y 
consciente, local. 
Zygmunt Bauman. “Confianza y temor en la ciudad.” 
 
The first part of this chapter clarifies what I mean by interorganizational network and 
characterizes my object of study by mapping it with respect to an interorganizational 
network typology. The second part of the chapter situates this study in relation to the rest 
of the research on interorganizational networks. The last part summarizes the exploratory 
study and the empirical basis of this dissertation’s topic and primary research question. 
DEFINING THE OBJECT OF STUDY: INTERORGANIZATIONAL 
NETWORKS 
Prior to any study on networks, it is imperative to define specifically what is meant by the 
term network, given people’s huge proclivity to use that word in all aspects of academic 
discourse as well as in life. Organization studies use network to refer to both an analytic 
perspective and a logic of organizing (Knight 2005; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994; 
Wellman 1988).  
  
Network as an analytic perspective emphasizes the relational aspects of actors, and uses 
the term as a metaphor for conceptualizing and understanding social reality (Dowding 
1995). This use of the term is exemplified by—but not limited to—the social network 
analysis methodology and supports the idea that actors may be best conceptualized as 
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embedded in a network of social relations (Granovetter 1992). This use of the term has 
been applied to all kinds of actors—individuals, organizations, and groups of either. 
 
As a logic of organizing, networks have been contrasted to traditional forms of markets 
and hierarchies (Powell 1990). These latter two forms have been the main conflicting 
images of governance modes (Williamson 1975)—the means to govern the relationships 
between the different organizations (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). The market governs 
relationships automatically; the hierarchy does so by authority. 
 
The three governance modes—markets, hierarchies, and networks—may be roughly 
characterised by governance through competition, direct governance, and governance 
through cooperation (Hewitt 2000), or as markets, bureaucracies, and clans (Ouchi 1980). 
In this study, I use network as a concrete interorganizational governance mode.   
Markets, hierarchies, and networks 
The market has a first stage that consists of a competitive interaction between actors 
(buyers and sellers, in general terms) who bargain over opportunities over exchange of 
resources. In the second stage, actors agree over the bargaining and exchange the agreed 
resources (Ebers 1997). The market governance mode relies on contracts and property 
rights to function, and its principal means of communication is price. The resolution 
mechanism of conflicts between organizations in this mode is to resort to legal courts, 
and the commitment between parties tends to be low. Organizations are assumed to be 
totally independent actors (Powell 1990). 
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In contrast, interorganizational relationships in hierarchical governance modes are based 
on employment relationships, and the main communicative means is routine. The conflict 
resolution mechanism used is administrative fiat (i.e. orders given by those holding 
authority), and the commitment among parties tends to be medium or high.  With 
hierarchical governance modes, organizations are clearly dependent on each other 
(Powell 1990).  
 
The third interorganizational mode, the network, is often thought of as a flat 
organizational form, which implies the idea of relations based on kin, friendship, or 
gender and on those of loyalty and cooperation (Frances, Levacic, Mitchell, and 
Thompson  1991). Using his own key features to describe hierarchies and markets, 
Powell (1990) describes networks as governance modes that use reciprocity and 
reputation as their main conflict resolution mechanism. The means of communication 
between organizations is relational, and the commitment between parties is medium-high. 
The network mode implies complementarity and mutual adjustment between 
organizations which are interdependent (Powell 1990). The table below summarizes the 
characteristics of the three governance modes. 
 
The definitions regarding the different governance modes presented above by Powell 
refer to ideal-typical modes. Different governance modes do in fact simultaneously 
govern the relationships among a given set of organizations (Grandori and Soda 1995;  
Kickert and Koppenjan 1997;  Marsh 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Thompson et 
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al., 1991; Ysa 2004). Three organizations may in fact relate to each other primarily 
through a network governance mode such as via mutual adjustment, with high inter-
dependencies, relational interaction as the main communication channels, and all actors 
having high commitment among themselves; these organizations’ interrelationships also 
may include features characteristic of other governance modes, such as incorporating 
contracts into the relationships and delegating authority to one of the parties.  
 
Table I. Summarised comparison among different interorganizational governance modes 
Key Features Market Hierarchy Network 








Prices Routines Relational 
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms 




Low Medium – high  Medium – high 
Dependence between 
organizations 
Independent Dependent Interdependent 
Based on Powell (1990) 
Different network definitions 
Despite the fact that the work by Powell (1990) has been a cornerstone of the 
interorganizational network literature, a high variety of definitions of what a network is 
do exist. Not only do these differences appear among different bodies of literature, such 
as alliance literature, public-private partnership literature, or policy network literature, 
but substantial terminological differences are found within a given body of literature. 
However, the literature seems to share some common characteristics for defining 
networks. First, networks are composed of organizations with independent decision-
making, in the sense that the different organizations do not have a common ownership 
(Bruijn and Heuvelhof 1997; Ebers 1997; Jarrillo 1993;  Esman 1991;  Gomes-Casseres, 
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1994;  Grandori and Soda 1995;  Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjan 1997a; Kickert and 
Koppenjan 1997; Marsh 1998;  Mohr and Spekman 1996;  Park 1996;  Powell 1990;). 
Second, a network relies primarily on negotiation and mutual adjustment (Ebers 1997; 
Gomes-Casseres 1994; Grandori and Soda 1995;  Jarrillo 1993; Kickert, Klijn and 
Koopenjan 1997a; Park 1996; Marsh 1998). Third, the interaction between network 
members is repetitive, where organizations hold stable and continual relationships among 
themselves (Ebers 1997; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997).  Last, networks are composed by 
actors who are resource interdependent (Bruijn and Heuvelhof 1997; Kickert, Klijn and 
Koopenjan 1997; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; Powell 1991).  
 
Therefore, the definition of interorganizational network I use in this work is: a set of 
interdependent organizations, with independent decision-making mechanisms, who 
negotiate and mutually adjust to each other, where relationships between organizations 
are continual.   
Different types of interorganizational networks 
Although we have identified some basic commonly shared attributes of 
interorganizational networks, there still are major differences between different network 
types (Agranoff 2003a; Grandori and Soda 1995). From a public and nonprofit 
perspective, some networks may be policy-adjusting engines (Agranoff 2003b; Kickert, 
Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997b), while others may be implementing policy. Some may try to 
achieve common aims, while others may not. Some may be formalized into specific 
structures, whereas others may be informal. While defining the type of network studied is 
an essential task in order to determine the generalizability of the findings, a commonly 
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accepted typology of interorganizational arrangements is painfully lacking in the 
literature2.  
 
Networks may vary according to the function or content of the relations between actors—
the building blocks of networks—and according to the form of those relations (Grandori 
and Soda 1995; Knoke and Kuklinski 1991)3. The content of the relations is determined 
by the type of interaction between actors. Actors may coordinate, cooperate, or 
collaborate. Coordinating organizations simply take into account other actors, 
cooperating organizations interact only to achieve their own mission, and collaborating 
organizations work together to achieve a meta-mission unreachable by acting individually 
(Huxham and Macdonald 1992)4.  
 
In a parallel manner, networks may be based on informal and interpersonal relations or 
formal and role relations (Grandori and Soda 1995; Knoke and Kuklinski 1991; Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994) and may be more or less centralized (Grandori and Soda 1995)5.  
                                                 
2 From different disciplines and perspectives some authors have proposed different typologies. For 
example, Brinkerhoff (2002) proposes a typology based on identity and dependence, Austin (2000) on level 
of engagement, complexity, and interaction among others, Schopler (1994) on group origin and task 
structure, and Keast, Mandell, Brown, and Wookock (2004) on formality and intensity of interaction. 
Laumann, Galaskiewicz, Marsden (1978) distinguish between competitive, mandated cooperative, and 
contingent cooperative relations, and Alter and Hage (1993) between symbiotic and competitive 
collaboration. See Borzel (1998) for an excellent review of proposed policy network typologies. Also, see 
Mingus (2001) for an interesting comparison between different network   research models (issue, policy, 
intergovernmental, public, and intergovernmental networks).   
3 See 6, Goodwin, Peck, and Freeman (2006) for typologies drawn along other dimensions such as 
function, institution, and node. However, these alternative typologies overlap with the described above. 
4 There are many other typologies of relational contents.  
5 According to Grandori and Soda (1995), social networks involve personal relations between actors, 
informal governance mechanisms and no common governance unit. Bureaucratic networks involve both 
role and personal relationships between actors and informal and formal governance mechanisms. Finally, 
proprietary networks, are bureaucratic networks but include a common governance unit. 
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Combining both aspects of form and content, Agranoff (2003b) builds on Alter and 
Hage’s (1993) population-ecology grounded typology composed of exchange, concerted 
action, and joint production—or limited, moderate, and broad cooperation. Agranoff 
(2003b) distinguishes at one end networks that only exchange information, which he calls 
Informational Networks, and at the other end Action Networks, which are interagency 
adjustments that formally adopt collaborative courses of action. In between, his typology 
differentiates among those networks that deal with information exchange combined with 
education and member service, known as Developmental Networks, and Outreach 
Networks, which exchange information, sequence programming, exchange resource 
opportunities, and pool client contacts. The four types of networks—Informational, 
Developmental, Outreach, and Action—deal incrementally with exchange, capacity, 
strategy, and decision (Agranoff 2003b), as well as incrementally formalizing and 
centralizing their functioning.   
 
As we will see, the network type this study refers to is Action Networks—see Figure II—
where organizations have a formal centralized coordinating unit (or what Human and 
Provan [2000] call network administrative organization, NAO), and sometimes but not 
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Figure II. Network type to which this study refers to (source: own, based on Agranoff [2003b] 
and Huxham and Macdonald [1992]) 
 
 
SUBFIELDS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK RESEARCH 
Faulkner and De Rond (2000) divide research on interorganizational networks into 
formation and structure, process, and management6. I suggest a fourth area of study 
which has recently emerged and is rapidly gaining attention: network performance 
(Gulati 1998; Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006). Research so far has tended to 
concentrate on network formation and structures (Ebers 1997; Ebers and Jarrillo 1997; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). In fact, most theories coming from the economic 
discipline—such as strategic management (market power) theory, transaction cost, 
resource-based view, agency theory, and game theory—are best suited to explain network 
                                                 
6 Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston (2006) propose an interesting alternative contextualizing network 
research combining both temporal and topical research. 
 
 
   15
formation and static network configurations (Faulkner and De Rond 2000)7.  Similarly, 
theories grounded in political science, such as resource-dependence theory, and public 
choice and rational choice, are more suited to explain structural configurations and 
strategic moves rather than process aspects of network collaboration. Theories 
approaching interorganizational networks rooted in organization studies are in general 
more behavior-friendly. In this sense, the interorganizational relations field has been one 
of the most relevant predecessors of present-day interorganizational network 
management (Benson 1975; Levine and White 1961; Whetten 1981). Organizational 
learning has also contributed to our understanding of network management (see for 
example Doz [1996]), as has the structurationist perspective, which is the basis of the 
renowned work of Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997c). Network theory, on the other 
hand, is quite dynamically oriented, but best suited to explain variance rather than 
process (Kenis and Oerlemans 2004).8  
 
Given both the still growing stage in which research on network management finds itself 
and the complexity inherent to networks, in this study I will be drawing on several 
theories (Agranoff 2004). I will draw from public network management (Agranoff and 
McGuire 2003), inter-governmental relations (Agranoff and McGuire 1999), public 
private partnerships (PPPs; European Commission 2003; Vernis 2000; Ysa 2004), and 
                                                 
7 An exception is Zeng and Chen’s (2003) social dilemma (public good game) approach to partnership 
management. However, even then the prescriptions are focused on enhancing collaboration between 
partners rather than managing the process of collaborating.  
8 Variance research focuses on how independent variables causally affect dependent variables through time 
(Van de Ven 1992), while process research looks at how, and why, the network actually evolves from ‘t1’ 
to ‘t2’ (Kenis and Oerlemans 2004). 
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policy networks (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997b) grounded mainly in political 
science—but also in economics and sociology (O’Toole 1997).  From within organization 
studies, another source is the collaboration management literature (Gray 1985, Huxham 
and Vangen 2005). Also, I will draw on the classic interorganizational field (Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994; Whetten 1981), and the business alliance (Doz 1996) and business 
network literature (Ebers 1997; Gulati 1998), which have drawn from resource-based 
view (and the closely related organizational learning), strategic management, transaction-
cost economics, game theory, and social network analysis. Notwithstanding that partners 
in business alliances, unlike many nonprofit and public networks, do not come together to 
solve a common issue or problem, but rather join together to achieve their own missions 
(Mandell 2001); the business literature, greater in quantity to the nonprofit and public 
management, may prove to contribute special hindsight in this research. The figure below 
maps the four midrange research fields I am mainly drawing from and how these in turn 
are related approximately to more general theories in economics, sociology and 
organizations studies, and political sciences. The figure is approximate and must be 
interpreted as such. Theories and midrange fields below are not discrete nor 
impermeable, and even within them different streams exist9. 
                                                 
9 As an example, within the policy networks different approaches exist. See Marsh and Smith (2000) and 
the subsequent debate in Political Studies (Dowding 2001; Marsh and Smith 2001; Raab 2001). 
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Focusing on the management of the network, my research addresses two major research 
priorities simultaneously (O’Toole 1997): focus on network management and empirically 
focusing on the network as unit of analysis. Despite my principal focus on network 
management, given the interrelatedness of the four different areas of study a brief review 
of network structure and formation, performance, and process follows.   
                                                 
10 6 et al (2006) interestingly divide theoretical approaches to networks into two groups: those that see 
systems as resources (such as Transaction Cost Ecconomics, Agency Theory, Resource Dependence 
Theory, Exchange Theory, Behavioural Theory) and those that emphasize meaning: Institutional Theory, 
Organizational Culture, Reflective Practitioners, and Organizational Learning. 
 
 
   18
Network rationale: formation and structure 
At present, more is known regarding the factors influencing the emergence of networks 
than regarding the other three areas of network study  (Das and Teng 2002; Ebers 1997; 
Oliver and Ebers 1998). Research, using many of the above theories, has sought 
explanations for network formation and structure at an actor level, at the level of pre-
existing actor relationships, and at the institutional level (Ebers 1997). Research at the 
first of these levels, the actor level, has concentrated mostly on how motivations of actors 
lead them to network formation, while the other two levels have been more concerned 
with contingent factors motivating network emergence.  
 
Actors may form or join a network to increase efficiency and effectiveness (Ariño and de 
la Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Ebers and Grandori 1997; Jarrillo 1993; Kanter 1994; Oliver 
1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Businesses—and perhaps nonprofits and public 
organizations in some cases—may increase their efficiency and effectiveness by binding 
competitors into allies, improving the use of resources, accessing complementary 
resources, and reducing costs due to economies of scale and scope (Ebers 1997; and 
Grandori and Soda 1995) or due to social sanctioning substituting for formal legal 
contracts (Park 1996). In the public and nonprofit sectors, problem-solving effectiveness 
is another catalyser of network formation. Issues and problems dealt with are often not 
“decomposable,” but rather “wicked problems” (O’Toole 1997; Rittel and Webber 1973; 
Simon 1976). Such problems may generate challenges that cross political mandates 
(O’Toole 1997) and surpass the quantitative capacity  of single organizations, making the 
standard responses, such as top-down measures and information hyper-collection, too 
 
 
   19
simple and useless (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Reduction of uncertainties and risk also 
induces network formation (Oliver 1990; Thompson 1967), as does the need for 
legitimacy with regard to other stakeholders (Grandori and Soda 1995;  Oliver 1990).  
 
Contingent preconditions may also induce to network formation. At the institutional 
level, research has pointed out how legal, cultural, sectorial, and regional conditions, or 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985), impact on the likelihood of network formation (Ebers 
1997;  Kanter 1994).  Relational contingences such as social ties, resource dependency, 
and power relations have been found to induce network formation (Ebers 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Grandori and Soda 1995; Gray 1996; Jarrillo 1993; 
Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; Oliver, 1990; Park 1996). As I argue in the next chapter, 
both actor motives and relational contingencies are reasons behind the formation of the 
networks studied: individual pro-immigrant nonprofit organizations unite into networks 
to better fulfil their missions (furthering immigrant rights) and thus influence powerful 
state actors. The Table II summarizes the main factors at each level affecting network 
formation. 
 
Another popular aspect of network study is its focus on the adoption of specific structural 
designs, or structural characteristics.  Hence this area of the literature looks at not only 
why networks are formed but why they are formed as they are—in line with the 
typological discussion mentioned in the previous section. Analytic frameworks are 
composed roughly of: actors (or membership in formal networks); relations, including 
resources and activities; and the network, which includes the governance mechanism 
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(such as the coordinating unit and its decision-making) and its objectives—when it has 
any (Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006; Saz-Carranza, Vilanova, Ysa 200611).  
Although neither motives nor structural characteristics are the focus of this research, they 
play an important role in the management of the network. Understanding why the 
organizations come together, what decision-making mechanisms the networks use, and 
what membership requirements they apply are important issues that will come up in 
different network leadership activities. 
 
Table II. Factors affecting network formation 





• Increase in legitimacy 
• Decrease uncertainty 
and risks 
• Morally required 
• Regional: Institutions such as chambers 
of commerce and universities. 
• Sectorial: Spatial clustering, specialized 
know-how, context uncertainty, reciprocity in 
goals,  and structure of underlying game.  
• Legal: Regulation and legal frame. 
• Cultural: Traditionally 
interorganizational and inter-sectorial 
collaborative culture. 
• Social ties 
• Resource interdependency 
(intensity and complexity) 
• Vulnerable strategic 
position 
• Asymmetric power 
relations 
• Complementary diversity  
Source: own, based on: Ebers 1997; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Grandori and Soda 1995; Gray 
1996; Jarrillo 1993; Kanter 1994; Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjan 1997a;Oliver 1990; Park 1996.   
Evaluating networks: success, performance, and added value 
A disputed and developing arena on interorganizational networks is network performance 
(Mandell 2001), success (Mohr and Spekman 1996), evaluation (Provan and Milward 
2001), and added-value (Agranoff 2003b), since operationalizing network success is a 
multidimensional and complex enterprise (Mohr and Spekman 1996; Provan and 
Milward 2001). This aspect is important to this research since, although focusing on 
                                                 
11 Our review was based on: Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Bruijn and Heuvelhof 1997; Doz 1996; Ebers 
1997; Ebers and Grandori 1997; Gadde, Huemer, Hakansson 2003; Grandori 1997; Grandori and Soda 
1995; Huxham and Vangen 2000a; McGuire 2002; Mohr and Spekman 1996; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; 
Weiss and Visioni, 2003. 
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network management, a major assumption of this study is that the networks studied are 
successful. Moreover, as I will show, the networks behave as they do to be effective: that 
is to fulfil their mission. Networks may be evaluated at three different levels: member 
organizations, the network itself, and its larger environment or domain. Moreover, both 
outcome and process may be evaluated. 
 
At the network organizational member level, the network must be internally efficient 
(Ebers and Grandori 1997): the payoff of the game for all actors must be superior to 
going it alone (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Jarrillo 1993). Another type of 
efficiency, not so relevant in this study, is the external efficiency (Ebers and Grandori 
1997); that is, the efficiency of the network evaluated according to the well being of all 
the stakeholders affected by the network. External efficiency is relevant for macro/social-
level studies regarding the network’s contributions to society in general in terms of 
benefits and costs. 
 
At the network level, the network can be assessed with respect to its effectiveness, or 
depending on the degree of problem resolution achieved (Gray 2000). At this network 
level, success and performance are often, especially in the public and nonprofit sectors, 
difficult to capture. Hence, networks may be assessed regarding some intermediate 
outcome or regarding its process. 
 
Regarding some intermediate outcome, Gray (2000) proposes networks are often 
assessed according to trust generation, creation of shared-meaning, increased relational 
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density, and power redistribution. All of which apply at network level and are assumed to 
be conducive to network effectiveness. However, networks may also be evaluated 
regarding their process. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Doz (1996) identify equity as a 
criterion used to evaluate networks, which implies fair dealings based on reciprocity, 
which means neither equivalence nor equality. Network equity functions as a lower 
boundary for member efficiency and network effectiveness.  
 
A network may be then evaluated at least at three different levels (Provan and Milward 
2001; Saz-Carranza and Vernis 2006). While internal efficiency applies to the 
organization in particular, external efficiency applies to the society or sector as a whole. 
And network effectiveness and equity focuses on the network as a whole. 
 
Figure IV. Network evaluative criteria and levels of analysis (source: own, based on Saz-






   23
The above figure maps the different levels at which networks are evaluated and the 
criteria used. This becomes important in network management, as I show, since success 
must be managed, and both the network power base as well as the individual 
organizational members’ gains must be administered. 
Network process 
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) identify four types of process theories: linear-sequential, 
teleological (repetitive circular), evolutionary (driven by environment), and dialectical. 
With regards to research in network process, it is the first two which have been most 
popular: the linear sequential among Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scholars (European 
Commission 2003;  Lowndes and Skelcher 1998;  Koppenjan 2005; Osborne 2000; 
Osborne and Murray 2000; Ysa 2004)12, and the teleological circular within the alliance 
literature (Ariño and De La Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Saz-
Carranza and Vernis, 2006).  
 
Despite the differing terminology, linear sequential process theories are roughly 
composed of an emergence, evolution, and dissolution stage (using Ring and Van de 
Ven’s [1994] terminology). In the evolution stage, actors start the “housekeeping” and 
“learning” as the network starts functioning, implementation takes place, and the 
relationship solidifies. The actors then recognize failures or changes within the network, 
which either produce changes to the network’s agreements and functioning or may, 
                                                 
12 Larson (1992) and Kanter (1994) from the alliance literature, however, approach process using a linear 
sequential theory, while Hay (1998), using a cyclic approach, is an exception among PPP scholars. 
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ultimately, terminate it (European Commission, 2003; Larson 1992; Lowndes and 
Skelcher 1998; Kanter 1994).  
 
Teleology process theories complement linear sequential process theories in that they 
propose cyclical micro-processes that represent the cyclical interactions and dynamism 
present in all the linear stages. A cyclical approach consists of reiterative sequences of 
negotiation and commitment—where actors bargain and agree to rules—execution, and 
evaluation (Ariño and De La Torre 1998; Doz 1996; Hay 1998; Ring and Van de Ven 
1994). As new situations are encountered and problems arise, the actors enter again the 
negotiation stage and will modify only those aspects perceived as problematic while 
retaining the other previously reached commitments. Learning occurs throughout the 
cycle (Weiss and Visioni 2003).  
 
Linear sequential theories are deterministic (De Rond and Bouchikhi 2004) and do not 
incorporate the variance that may occur in reality. In fact, different scholars do produce 
different contradictory, albeit logical, linear processes (Saz-Carranza and Vernis 2006). 
Another type of process theory is dialectics. With a dialectic process approach, alliances 
are conceived as heterogeneous and plural phenomena, where performance is a social 
construct (i.e. subjective, not objective), and change occurs due to unintended 
consequences of action. Moreover, process theories assume a descriptive, pluralist 
epistemology leaving aside monist expectations of order (Rond and Bouchikhi 2004). 
Such process theories contribute to produce an in-depth analysis of network process and 
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also to generate and implement change in the network (Saz-Carranza, Vilanova, and Ysa 
2006).  Figure V below illustrates the three main network process theories. 
 
My research is not longitudinal and does aim at specifically developing or informing a 
process theory, however, as I show, concepts contributed by these process theories will 
be of use in my analysis. For example, dialectics is closely related to the concept of 
paradox I use and the continual (re)evaluation of the network proposed by the 
teleological theories will prove relevant in some leadership activities. 
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Network management 
Another gap in the literature on interorganizational network refers to the management of 
the network13. However, a set of network management dimensions may be slowly starting 
to emerge. 
 
Agranoff and McGuire put forward, either as conceptual research questions (Agranoff 
and McGuire 2001) or as future areas of study (Agranoff and McGuire 2003), the 
following areas of public network management: administrative tasks, decision-making, 
flexibility (structure or process), accountability, trust, power, and performance.  Huxham 
(2003) offers five conceptual themes in her (and Vangen’s) collaborative advantage 
theory:  common aims, power, membership structure, trust, and leadership; this latter 
theme includes activities along with leadership media, which in turn is composed of 
structure, processes, and actors. Both frameworks are relatively similar in that they 
include management activities, power, trust, and structure. Membership and objectives 
are implicit in Agranoff and McGuire’s framework in that they are embedded, 
respectively, in management activities (activation), and decision-making and 
performance. Accountability also has a high relevance in their work, since they study 
primarily networks in the public sector.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Social network theory, for example, does have a common set of analytic dimensions such as density, 
centrality, multiplexity, and so on (Provan, Veazie, Staten, Teufel-Shone 2005), and network structure, as 
mentioned in the previous section, seems to have a shared set of dimensions. A comparable equivalent is 
not present for the interorganizational network management subfield. 
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In this study I draw on all these six management themes but, as will become clear at the 
end of this chapter, with particular attention to power and leadership activities. I focus on 
leadership and power because my research model—which I develop in the next chapter—
essentially assumes that leadership activities help manage paradox, and hence build 
power. Figure VI conceptually sets my research focus in the larger context of network 
research: I am interested in networks as a concrete governance mode and focus on 
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Prior to developing my theoretical framework—based on leadership activities, power, 
and paradox in networks—which I do in Chapter 3, I briefly describe the preliminary 
findings of an exploratory study executed by Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) that 
refined my research topic and framed my research question. The findings of Ospina and 
Saz-Carranza’s (2005) study are the departing point of this dissertation and the study 
itself may be understood as a preliminary open and exploratory research cycle that 
together with this dissertation compose an overall research agenda into network 
management.  
THE PRELIMINARY STUDY 
In their preliminary study, involving two organizations that define themselves as 
coalitions—the Coalition of Asian, American, European and Latin Immigrants of Illinois 
(CAAELII) and New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC)—and that operate in the 
immigration sector, Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) set out to answer how are successful 
networks managed?  
 
The study draws on analytical memos and transcripts from interviews carried out using 
appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider and Srivasta 1987). Other documentation as well as 
ethnography and cooperative inquiry reports were also used. Ospina and Saz-Carranza’s 
(2005) analytical strategy combined both inductive and deductive development of codes 




   29
The preliminary study identifies two paradoxes that actors of immigrant coalitions 
encountered as they tried to do their work, along with some of the management factors 
that helped them embrace two paradoxes: one paradox regarding inward work of the 
network, the diversity/unity paradox; and another regarding the outward work, namely 
the confrontation/cooperation paradox. Embracing these two paradoxes facilitated 
effective collaboration14. On one hand, Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) identify three 
management factors that help generate the needed unity without threatening the needed 
diversity: nurturing and facilitating interaction, cultivating personal relationships, and 
promoting openness and participation. On the other, they identify three management 
factors that helped these coalitions embrace the confrontation/cooperation paradox so as 
to facilitate collaboration with influential targets. These factors are: maintaining the 
credibility of the coalition; continually acting at different levels, such as the local and 
national levels; and promoting a multiplicity of both personal relationships as well as 
institutional relationships. Figure VII below illustrates the preliminary findings. 
 
These findings support and deepen the insights offered from the social work literature on 
the paradoxical nature of interorganizational collaboration (Bailey and Koney’s 1996; 
Mizrahi and Rosenthal 1993). Ospina and Saz-Carranza’s (2005) assertion is therefore 
that, at least in the context of coalition work, leaders manage paradox to facilitate 
collaboration.  
                                                 
14 As a previous reviewer of the preliminary study pointed out, both paradoxes seem to have some parallels 
with the two major definitions of social capital. The unity/diversity internal paradox may be equivalent to 
bonding (Burt 2000; Coleman and Bourdieu 1991) while the external engagement paradox with the idea of 
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The two identified paradoxes in Ospina and Saz-Carranza’s (2005) study are quite 
different, as they emerged in two very different organizational contexts, one of inward 
work to maintain intra-coalition collaboration, and the other of outward work to pursue 
the coalition goals vis-à-vis the target.  The unity and diversity paradox represents a 
paradox of belonging—when social units (individuals, groups, or organizations) naturally 
strive for both self-expression and collective affiliation (Lewis 2000). But the 
confrontation and cooperation paradox has to do with paradoxes of engaging, which 
resonate with the extensive literature that identifies tensions regarding the engagement of 
units as they interact with their environment, the most typical one being the tension 
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Despite the promising findings, the preliminary research has several limitations which 
make further research necessary. First, given the exploratory nature of the study, the 
research was necessarily ample and generally focused on successful factors of network 
management. Second, the data collected targeted neither paradox nor power, and focused 
on leadership in general rather than on interorganizational collaboration in particular. 
Given the promising findings and limitations of the research, my dissertation focuses on 
paradox to better understand network management and leadership. This dissertation, then, 
focuses on the role of paradox in network management, paying special attention to 
power. Within the topic of the inherent paradoxes in network management, my research 




3. NETWORK MANAGEMENT: PARADOX, LEADERSHIP, AND 
POWER 
We all knew the truth but we insisted on 
distorting things to make it seem…that first 
and foremost there are two sides to 
everything, when of course there were not; 
there was one side only, one side always: 
Just as this earth is round, the truth is 
round, not two-sided but round. 
Dave Eggers. “You shall know our velocity” 
 
The previous chapter has laid out my topic, namely the inherent paradoxes in network 
management, and my research question: how is paradox managed in successful 
networks? This chapter first reviews findings on paradox and its related terms in 
organization studies in general and in interorganizational settings in particular. Next, I 
define paradox and focus on the unity/diversity and the confrontation/cooperation 
paradoxes. Thereafter, I review network leadership activities, in particular collaboration 
theory, policy network theory, and public network management theory. Last, I briefly 
review and construct a power framework consisting of two dimensions. 
PARADOX IN NETWORKS 
The notion of paradox has gained considerable currency in organizational studies. The 
construct, itself, is complicated and used differently by various scholars, as it is only 
emerging as a subject of theoretical and empirical study (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005).  
For example, at a theoretical and abstract level, the concept of paradox is used to identify 
contradictory yet valid and coexisting theories regarding given phenomena, which help 
better understand organizational life (such as the structure/agency paradox developed in 
the structuration theory [Giddens 1984]). But paradox may also refer to a concrete and 
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identifiable phenomenon in organizational life, when contradictory findings are 
empirically documented (Poole and Van de Ven 1989)15.  
 
However, what is a paradox, in the context of organization studies? Lewis (2000) defines 
paradox as some “thing” that denotes contradictory yet interwoven elements (e.g., 
perspectives, feelings, messages, demands, identities, interests, or practices)—elements 
that seem logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously. 
 
It is conceptually worthwhile defining paradox with respect to other terms closely related 
to it and often used interchangeably. Dialectic and paradox are disputed terms which have 
been used with various meanings by different authors. For example, Plato, Fichte, Hegel, 
and Marx all used the term differently, and sometimes contradictorily (Evans 2001). A 
paradox is a duality—consisting of two parts—of opposing poles16, poles standing in 
contradiction, which create a tension or strained condition. Such a tension combined with 
an either/or linear reasoning implies a dilemma—the choice between two alternatives 
(poles), either of which is equally (un)favorable—since choosing one pole means not 
choosing the other. Regarding the term dialectic, in this study I understand dialectic as a 
research strategy as, for example, described in the previous chapter regarding theoretical 
approaches to network process.  
 
                                                 
15 These two authors point out, however, that both poles of the contradiction must occur either at an 
empirical or theoretical level. If one pole occurs at an empirical level and the other at the theoretical level 
they do not constitue a paradox: That is, an empirical finding contradicting a theoretical proposition is not a 
paradox. 
16 Poole and Van de Ven (1989) use the term horn instead of pole. 
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To further complicate matters, an empirically identifiable paradox may occur in a 
diachronic fashion, when opposing poles alternate, or it may happen synchronically, 
when poles occur simultaneously (Ford and Backoff 1988). Additionally, paradoxes may 
occur at different levels (Lewis 2000): at the micro-level of cognition, individuals, and 
groups  (Murnighan and Conlon 1991; Smith and Berg 1987); at the macro-level of 
organizations and interorganizational interaction (Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies 2003; 
Huxham and Beech 2003a; Mizrahi and Rosenthal 1993; Ofori-Dankwa and Julian 2004; 
Quinn and Cameron 1988; Tschirhartt et al. 2006); or even at the micro-macro cross-
level, for example individual-organizational (Ofori-Dankwa and Julian 2004).17 
 
The paradoxes identified by (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005) can be characterized as 
empirical macro-level paradoxes, “things” that occur when organizations collaborate and 
that generate demands which seem contradictory but must coexist. In this study of mine, I 
am interested in how contradictory goals and or processes are attended to in the context 
of work within a network of organizations. I define paradox as a duality of coexisting 
contradictory goals and or processes. While there is not much theoretical or empirical 
work addressing these specific interests, the organizational literature addressing paradox 
in general, as well as the collaboration literature addressing dynamic tensions in 
particular, offers insights to help frame this study and to guide it to offer relevant 
contributions to understanding the relationship between paradox and collaboration. 
                                                 
17 Ford and Backoff (1988) thus indicate that paradox may be vertical, occurring at different levels, or 
horizontal, when poles occur at the same level. 
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Paradox in organizational studies 
Dualities, dilemmas, and other related concepts are certainly not new in organizations 
studies. During the late ’70s, Benson (1977) and Zeitz (1980) used a dialectics approach 
to organizational theory and interorganizational relations, respectively. In the ’80s, Quinn 
and Rohrbaugh (1983) and Cameron (1986) were using a competing values framework to 
study organizational effectiveness, Eisenhardt and Westcott (1988) applied a paradox 
framework to Just-In-Time manufacturing, Astley and Van de Ven (1983) proposed to 
reconcile central debates in Organization Theory18 via a dialectical perspective, and 
Mintzberg (1983) grounded his work on structure on the intrinsic tension of all organized 
human activity: coordination/division of labor. A decade later, Nutt and Backoff (1992) 
proposed a dialectical approach to strategy, and Handy (1994) published his “Age of 
Paradox.” By the turn of the century, paradox in organizations studies was gaining 
considerable momentum. A special issue of the Academy of Management Review was 
dedicated to “paradox, spirals, and ambivalence” (Eisenhardt 2000) and paradox is used 
as an approach in quite diverse fields, such as the resource-based view of the firm (Lado, 
Boyd, Wright, and Kroll 2006), strategic management (Price and Newson 2003), 
leadership (March and Weil 2005),  and slowly in interorganizational networks (de Rond 
and Bouchikhi 2004) as well as in the public and nonprofit management fields (Stacey 
and Griffin 2006; Talbot 2005)19.  
 
                                                 
18 E.g.: Organizations as rational or subjective; change by  internal adaptation or environmental 
inducement; determinism or agency; organizational or population-level action; and populations as simple 
aggregates or something more than the sum. 
19 Moreover, dialectics has also recently been applied to policy networks (Evans 2001; Marsh and Smith 
2000) and institutional theory (Seo and Creed 2002). 
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Using an individual and interpersonal psychological perspective, Smith and Berg (1987) 
argue that group life is inherently paradoxical. They identify several instances where 
individuals pursue contradictory goals and get involved simultaneously in contradictory 
processes, both of which are equally relevant for engaging effectively in organizational 
life. Examples of such paradoxes at the micro level of social action include detaching 
from the group and getting involved in it; strengthening individuality and connectedness; 
disclosing the self and protecting the self; and pursuing independence and dependence. 
At the same micro level, Murnighan and Conlon’s (1991) study of string quartets shows 
how members simultaneously combine the authority of the first violinist with a 
democratic structure that grants authority to all. The same authors as well as others 
(Tjosvold, Poon and Yu 2005) also identify the simultaneous use of conflict and 
compromise for effective team relations.  
 
Moving one level up to the organizational level, scholars like Ofori-Dankwa and Julian 
(2004) have identified the tension between internal diversity and similarity:  
organizations strive for diversity to enhance creativity, but simultaneously promote 
similarity to enhance productivity. Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies (2003) identify a similar 
tension created by the organizational need to promote collectivity and individuality 
simultaneously.  
 
At the interorganizational level—of particular interest here—Bailey and Koney (1996) in 
the social work field discuss paradoxical management in coalitions, to address tensions 
such as the need for the manager to be both responsive to and assertive with the 
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membership. Mizrahi and Rosenthal (1993) identify dynamic tensions in coalition work, 
such as the demand for individuals’ commitment to the coalition versus the commitment 
to their own organizations, and the tension between unity and diversity. Vangen and 
Huxham (2003) say that managing trust in collaborations is “dealing with many 
paradoxes inherent in collaborative activities” (23). Similarly, in the strategic alliance 
field, De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004), building on Das and Teng (2000), use dialectics to 
identify the tensions between vigilance and trust as well as between individualism and 
collectivism.  Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) also state that the managing strategic 
center of an alliance has to deal with the organizational paradox of flexibility/control  and 
discipline/creativity. Furthermore, the strategic management literature has coined the 
term “coopetition” for mixed strategies of both competition and cooperation 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996).  
 
Another dimension of paradox, apart from its level of application, is which aspect of 
organizational life it deals with. Lewis (2000) groups in three categories of interrelated 
paradoxes her extensive literature review of exemplary organization studies that have 
dealt with paradoxes: learning, organizing, and belonging.  In learning, paradoxes arise 
due to the old vs. new, construction vs. destruction tensions. Paradoxes often emerge 
when beliefs fail to keep up with changes. Paradoxes of belonging generate tensions as 
individual, group, or organization units strive for both self-expression and collective 
affiliation. Paradoxes in organizing emerge because organizing itself requires 
distinctions, and in particular due to the control vs. flexibility tension. The literature also 
has identified tensions regarding the external engagement of units, as these interact with 
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their environment. Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) propose a fourth type of paradox, 
that of engaging. Paradoxes of engaging involve the conflict vs. cooperation, or 
cooperation vs. competition tension.  
 
Table III. Paradoxes in organization studies 
Paradoxes of belonging Paradoxes of learning Paradoxes of organizing Paradoxes of engaging 
Unity – Diversity  Construction – Destruction Flexibility – Control  Cooperation – Confrontation 
Source: own based on Lewis (2000) and Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) 
The absence of paradox in network management research 
Focus on paradox as an object of network research is scant if not altogether nonexistent. 
The way paradox is experienced and managed, a context characterized by dynamic 
tensions remains a blind spot in an otherwise rich literature, which does acknowledge, at 
least indirectly, the presence of conceptual paradoxes, anomalies, and ambiguities of 
multi-collectivity behavior (Rainey and Busson 2001; Huxham and Vangen 2005). In 
fact, the basic idea of the network society (Castells 1996) implies the paradox of more 
fragmentation but also, simultaneously, more dependence (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
 
While theoretical discussions have not produced a robust body of empirical research on 
the topic, interest in paradox is not completely absent in the literature. For example, at the 
most abstract level of analysis, Berry et al. (2004) call for embracing Nadel´s paradox in 
public network management research, which highlights the dual nature of roles, as both 
relational and context-specific (DiMaggio 1992). While roles represent a generic 
category independent of who enacts them, at the same time “each particular role is 
defined by local expectations and understandings that make it fundamentally 
incomparable to others” (p.540).  
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Also at a theoretical level, public network scholars have engaged the sociological  
“problem” of the relation between structure and action and the ongoing query of which 
influences which in the context of network management. Building on Gidden’s (1984) 
structuration theory, Klijn and Teisman (1997), from the European policy network 
school, and Alexander (1995, 1998), from an interorganizational coordination 
perspective, highlight the duality in the action-structure relation. In this view, structure is 
a platform where games are played. Action is determined by this, but, in turn, structure is 
modified and enacted in action. Not yet framed as a paradox, this duality nevertheless 
points to the inherent tensions of network management (and management in general) and 
suggests new avenues to explore how this occurs in practice. 
Complexity and ambiguity in networks 
Insights about the factors that influence network formation, and the reasons why 
organizations decide to collaborate on or enter a coalition, point to the complexity of 
network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2003) with its intense resource 
consumption and inherent difficulties  (Human and Provan 2000; Huxham 2003; Huxham 
and Beech 2003a). Together, the variety of factors associated with network formation 
cited in the literature suggests that the resulting networks are the repository of a diverse 
and often contradictory set of expectations, aspirations, and goals (Huxham 2003; and 
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Huxham and Beech 2003a)20. Ambiguity and complexity point towards paradox in 
network management, as multiple diverse goals must be advanced. 
 
The relationship between common goals and the definition of success in a collaboration 
points to another source of tension: studies suggest that members of collaborations may 
hold diverse views about how to measure success (Provan and Milward 2001). Coalition 
members interviewed in Mizrahi and Rosenthal’s (2001) study defined successful 
coalitions in multiple ways, from achieving the goal or creating lasting networks and 
attaining longevity, to gaining or acquiring such resources as recognition from the target, 
community support, new consciousness of issues, or new skills. This divergence in a 
context that requires convergence represents yet another source of tension. 
 
The literature offers sufficient evidence on complexity as the source for dynamic tensions 
and contradictions to point to the paradoxical nature of networks and their management. 
For example, we know that collaborative efforts often arise to solve complex problems in 
dynamic social environments (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Borzel 1998; Gray 1996). 
Such problems involve uncertainty regarding not only the solution but also the definition 
of the problem itself (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004), and collaborative efforts set up to 
address them are usually complex themselves. We also know that complexity affects 
                                                 
20 Factors associated with the achievement of common goals include a sense of ownership over the goals 
(by the network, its members, and individual representatives), the openness of the aims (implicit, explicit, 
and hidden), and the means of achieving them (using the network, its members or particular individuals) 
(Huxham and Vangen 2000a). That achieving common goals is dependent on so many factors has practical 
implications too. For example, goal clarity may influence the tasks the network manager decides to 
undertake (McGuire 2003). 
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network features such as membership and size. For example, membership structure is 
ambiguous and dynamic, given the different linkages among actors inside and outside the 
partnership (Huxham 2003). Ambiguity in membership stems from the fact that the same 
persons may represent different organizations in different arenas, and the role a person 
may be representing at a given moment may be unclear.  Furthermore, members may not 
have clarity about who is executing a given activity at the moment: the network itself, 
one of its member, or even an individual acting independently from the network (Saz-
Carranza and Serra, 2006).   
 
There is a lack of consensus around the effective number of organizations required for 
successful collaboration in a network (Huxham and Vangen 2000a; Grandori and Soda 
1995; Kanter 1994; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997). Kanter (1994) suggests that as many 
people as possible should be involved to bridge interpersonal and interorganizational 
differences in structures, processes, and skills. In contrast, Huxham and Vangen (2000a) 
conclude that complexity must be kept low and hence membership numbers must be 
limited, siding with Klijn and Teisman (2000), who claim that strong trust relations may 
be maintained only with a limited number of actors. On the other hand Killing (1988) 
suggests that scope and structure complexity must balance each other out. 
 
The contradictory findings about trust in network relations represent yet another example 
of the existence of paradox in networks. Kanter (1994) and Larson (1992) argue that trust 
develops through personal and informal relations that later become formal and role-
based, an argument that follows traditional bureaucratic organization theory (Perrow, 
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1986). In contrast, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Ring (1997) suggest just the 
opposite causal logic in network relationship formation:  relationships are first based on 
roles, formal contracts, and agreements around network formation (fragile trust), which 
then turns into resilient trust as the network institutionalizes, giving way to personal 
relations, psychological contracts, and informal agreements and understandings that 
strengthen the networks over time and facilitate collaboration.   
 
In sum, theoretical discussions (such as the agency/structure duality and the network’s 
role generality/specificity), the relevance of complexity and tension in recurrent themes 
in the literature on network management—such as ambiguous membership, multiple aims 
and success criteria, and contradictory research findings on key themes such as 
membership size or relationships and trust—all highlight the potential benefits of 
attending to paradox to better understand and manage interorganizational collaboration. 
This road is promising, and some work is already underway, as demonstrated by a few 
studies that introduce paradox to understand coalition work. I build on Ospina and Saz-
Carranza’s (2005) previous findings and focus on two paradoxes to improve 
understanding of network management. The two paradoxes that guide my research are 
the unity/diversity paradox within the network and the confrontation/cooperation paradox 
between the network and external actors. 
Paradoxes of belonging: unity and diversity 
Paradoxes of belonging deal essentially with the tension between the self and the 
collective, exemplified by strengthening individuality and connectedness (Smith and 
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Berg 1987), striving for diversity to enhance creativity but simultaneously promote 
similarity to enhance productivity (Ofori-Dankwa and Julian 2004), or promoting 
collectivity and individuality simultaneously (Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies 2003). 
Similarly, March and Weil (2005) identify the intractable dilemma of unity and diversity 
in leadership, how variety and integration are necessary, or how people request autonomy 
(diversity) while demanding control of anything dependent on them (unity). Ybema 
(1996), in fact, argues that complexity of group membership, the ambiguity of rules and 
rituals, and the coexistence of contrasting differences and identities, are all reasons to 
expect both unity and division.  
 
Studying collaborations, Huxham and Beech (2003a) argue that the potential for 
collaborative advantage depends on the ability of each partner to bring different 
resources. This needed diversity is, however, a function of differences in organizational 
purpose, which produces inherent tensions for collaboration (Eden and Huxham 2001). 
Tschirhart, Christensen, and Perry (2005) identify the paradox of branding and 
collaboration among public and nonprofit service delivering organizations, where 
collaboration requires interdependence while branding independence. Mizrahi and 
Rosenthal (1993) identify an organizational tension between unity and diversity. 
Coalitions that are too unified resemble organizations and fail to achieve the essence of 
the coalition. However, diversity slows progress towards goals since adjustments, such as 
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The unity versus diversity tension may occur along different dimensions, according to 
Mizrahi and Rosenthal (1993). It may occur with goals either too broad, thus misleading 
participants and being difficult to apply, or too narrow to attract members. The expected 
outcome, in particular when successes are achieved and benefits must be shared, is 
another dimension along which the unity-diversity tension manifests itself. The tension 
may occur along the ideological dimension regarding goals as well as along the power 
dimension, where unity generates power for network but may be difficult to achieve due 
to power differences among members. Also occurring is a tension along the type and 
level of commitment dimension and the gender, sex, race, and class dimensions. Last, 
tensions also arise along the organizational and personal styles dimension.   
 
The unity/diversity paradox is inherent to networks, which must be diverse to have an 
added value with respect to hierarchies, but must be united to allow for concerted action 
of any kind, unlike markets. However, unity and diversity are not antonyms: unity is 
defined as the state of being united or joined as a whole (Oxford University Press 1989), 
and diversity as the state of being diverse or heterogeneous (Oxford University Press 
1989).  In fact, their respective antonyms are “division” and “similarity” (Oxford 
University Press 1989). Since diversity is usually accompanied by division, and unity by 
similarity, they imply a paradox in that they entail directing attention to contradictory 
processes.  
Paradox of engagement: confrontation and cooperation 
Research on teams has found the simultaneous use of conflict and compromise 
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(Murnighan and Conlon 1991) and cooperative conflict (Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu 2005). 
Scholars have found that interorganizational relationships often involve the paradox of 
competition and cooperation (Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies 2003; de Rond and Bouchikhi 
2004), or equal exchange and unequal exchanges (Zeitz 1980). Using an organizational 
ecology perspective, Barnett and Carroll (1987) find both mutualism and competition 
among telephone companies, however, at different levels. There is competition between 
companies at the organizational level, but mutualism takes place at a population level, 
where different communities of companies may strengthen each other under certain 
circumstances. 
 
In addition to findings in the for-profit sector, contradictory engagement modes have also 
been identified in the nonprofit and public sectors. Young (2000), at the inter-sector level, 
identifies a triad of alternating and mixed types of relations, namely supplementary, 
complementary, and adversarial. At the inter-organizational level, Najam (2000) 
identifies four types of nonprofit-government relations according to the similitude 
between their respective goals and strategies. These are cooperation, cooptation, 
complementary, and confrontation. Similarly, Hardy and Phillips (1998) identify 
collaboration, compliance, contention, and contestation as possible inter-agency 
engagement types. However, paradox as a research focus has not been used  in nonprofit-
public sector relations, unlike in the business sector, where scholars have identified 
competition and cooperation simultaneously, calling it coopetition (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff 1996), and the tension between competition and cooperation within alliances 
themselves (Zeng and Chen 2003).  
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Table IV. Summary of dualities 
Level Author Belonging Engaging 
Smith and Berg (1987) Giving meaning – getting 
meaning; Detachment – 
involvement; Individuality – 
connectedness; Constraining via 
boundary-drawing – non-
constraining; Disclosure – 
protection; Trusting – being 
trusted; Acceptance of self – of 
other; Independence – 
dependency 
 











Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu (2005)  Conflict – cooperation 
Ybema (1996) Unity – division   
March and Weil (2003) Unity – diversity; Variety – 
integration; Convergence – 
divergence 
 









Clarke-Hill, Li, and Davies 
(2003) 
Collectivity – individuality   
Brandenburger and Nalebluff 
(1996) 
 Competition –cooperation 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000)  Competition –cooperation 
Tschirhartt et al. (2005) Branding – collaboration  
De Rond and Bouchicki (2004) Unity – diversity Competition –cooperation 
Das and Teng (2000)  Competition –cooperation 
Saz-Carranza, Vilanova, Ysa 
(2006) 
Unity – diversity  
Zeng and Chen (2003)  Competition –cooperation 
Vernis et al. (2006)  Competition –cooperation 











Barnett and Carroll (1987)  Mutualism – competition 
 
Paradoxes, however, are usually interrelated (Huxham and Beech 2003a; Smith and Berg 
1987). A paradox of belonging, such as unity/diversity, has direct links to a paradox of 
organizing regarding the control/flexibility paradox. For example, as the coalition is 
striving for unity and diversity, this will affect how they determine their goals (either 
broadly to be inclusive or narrowly in order to be more unitary), and this will have 
implications for the control/flexibility paradox. Moreover, depending on the unit of 
analysis, the cooperation/confrontation paradox may actually reflect the unity/diversity. 
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For example, if we use the organization as the unit of analysis, it’s engagement in conflict 
and cooperation with other organizations may be framed as the cooperation/confrontation 
paradox. If, using the same set of organizations, we take the network of interacting 
organizations as our unit of analysis, the same interaction may be framed as a form of the 
diversity/unity paradox. Hence, the relativity of both types of paradoxes. Table IV lists 
the studies that have found contradictory dualities regarding belonging and engaging at 
the individual, organizational, and inter-organizational levels. 
Managing paradox 
Some research has been directed towards the management of paradox, dialectics, 
tensions, and dilemmas. One way of dealing with paradox is, simply, by favoring one 
pole over the other. This, however, reinforces negative cycles as pressure from the 
suppressed side is intensified (Surnamurthy and Lewis 2003; Johnson 1992). Another is 
to reach a balance between poles although this may reduce their potential. Nevertheless, 
Huxham and Beech (2003a), as well as Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001), propose this 
approach since according to them, in most practical situations, neither extreme of the 
tension is likely to be operationalizable.  
 
Another way to manage paradox is by alternating poles (Van den Ven and Poole 1988; 
Poole and Van den Ven 1989), furthering one pole with one subgroup and the other pole 
with another subgroup—as when two companies have their development departments 
cooperate in product design while overall they compete in product sales. Similarly, poles 
may be applied at alternate times according to a given situation (as in the literature on 
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situational leadership does [Heifetz and Sinder 1991a, 1991b; Hersey and Blanchard 
1982] or Crosby and Bryson [2005] do for leadership in cross-sector collaborations 
specifying different types of leadership according to the stage of the policy cycle).  
 
March and Weil (2005), on their part, call for the appreciation of leadership, where its 
inherent tensions are made apparent and accepted. Managing paradox entails exploring, 
not suppressing tensions, and involves a shift from planning and control to coping.  
Coping with paradox creates an edge of chaos, not settling for a bland halfway point 
between poles (Eisenhardt 2000). Likewise, March and Weil (2005) state that the 
potential for ambiguities is underestimated while rational action overvalued21. Coping 
with paradox, though, often requires reframing (Quinn and Cameron 1988), since specific 
mindsets and dispositions, in addition to competencies and skills, are necessary.  Kaplan 
and Kaiser (2003) also call for versatile leadership, an approach that requires comprising 
opposite approaches (e.g., forceful with enabling leadership, or strategic and operational 
leadership), and which may be reached only by what F. Scott Fitzgerald termed “first-rate 
intelligence,” which allows you to function while holding two opposites.  
 
In sum, considering the study of inter-organizational collaboration, networks seem to be 
fraught with paradoxes, and network management requires taking into account these 
phenomena. Paradoxes in network management may refer to different aspects of 
organizational life, organizing, learning, belonging, and engaging, and may take on 
                                                 
21 Unsurprisingly, James March was one of the authors of the garbage can decision-making model (Cohen, 
March, and Olsen 1972). 
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different forms as poles apply at different organizational levels and at different times. In 
the context of interorganizational network management, then, what are the form and 
nature of the paradox? More specifically, I develop the following two research 
propositions and secondary research question: 
RP1a: Network management requires taking into account paradoxes. 
RP1b: Paradoxes may be of different forms. 
RQ1: What are the form and the nature of the diversity/unity and 
confrontation/cooperation paradoxes in the context of network 
management?  
LEADERSHIP OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS 
Collaborative contexts require different type of leadership and management than 
traditional intra-organizational contexts, due to the boundary-crossing nature of 
collaborations (sector, organizational, and valorative boundaries), the lack of formal 
authority and hierarchy, and the blurriness of strategies (Chrislip and Larsson 1994). 
Leadership in collaborative contexts must be necessarily different, focusing largely on 
process, and has similarities to facilitative, transformative, and servant leadership: that is, 
to inspire commitment and action, to lead as peer problem solver, to build broad-based 
involvement, and to sustain hope and participation (Chrislip and Larsson 1994). A major 
clarification must be made at this point: my unit of analysis is the network, and the 
leadership I am interested in is that of the network, not that of a single organization 
within the network. Paraphrasing Dubin (1997), it is leadership of networks I am 
interested in rather than leadership in networks. 
 
In addition to the mentioned absence of paradox in network management research, the 
role of leadership in generating and maintaining effective interorganizational 
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collaboration has also been understudied (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, 2001)—indeed, 
Berry et al. (2004) question, provokingly, if networks really are managed at all. However, 
leadership in networks seems of outmost importance. As Heifetz and Linsky (2002) point 
out, adaptive challenges (those that can’t be solved with existing know-how) demand 
leadership, neither authority nor managerial expertise. In networks neither authority nor 
programmed routines (March and Simon 1958) are applicable due to fragmented power 
(Bryson and Crosby 1992) and outcome’s uncertainty due to the interaction of multiple 
autonomous actors (Huxham 2003). 
 
Defining leadership in general is already a disputed terrain: for example, Heifetz and 
Laurie (1997) state that getting people to do adaptive work is the mark of leadership, 
while Rainey (1991) defines leadership as the capacity of someone to direct and energize 
willingness of people in social units to take action and achieve goals, by drawing on 
legitimate authority. On my part, I follow Huxham and Vangen (2000b; Vangen and 
Huxham 2004) in defining leadership in more general terms as “mechanisms that make 
things happen in a collaboration” (Huxham, 2003). Such a definition of leadership, 
“mechanisms that make things happen in a collaboration,” obviously goes against authors 
that draw marked lines between management tasks and leadership activities, such as 
Alvesson (1992), who defines management as getting things done (via planning, 
organizing, monitoring, and control) without worrying about what people think or feel, 
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but who associates leadership with what people do think and feel22. However, I believe 
this distinction is far less useful in interorganizational networks given the shared-power 
setting (Bryson and Crosby 1992) and the inherently adaptive challenges (Heifetz and 
Laurie 1997) they imply, which strongly reduce technical tasks that may be dealt with via 
managerial expertise and authority.  
 
Traditional leadership studies based on trait, style, contingencies, and transformational 
approaches presume the existence of a leader and a follower and specified goals 
(Huxham and Vangen 2000b). The latter do not usually apply to networks, since it is 
usually a disputed terrain (Vangen, Huxham, and Eden 1994). If intra-organizational 
leadership involves a leader and a follower—indeed, Heifetz (2006) argues that most 
interesting leadership happens without anyone experiencing being a leader and foremost 
no one experiencing being a follower—interorganizational leadership hardly does so 
(Huxham and Vangen 2000b).  
 
Although I want to contribute to the interorganizational network management and 
collaboration literature, it is useful to situate my approach with respect to other leadership 
literatures. I am interested in looking at activities and actions that make things happen 
rather than at individuals, I do not draw a hard distinction between management and 
leadership, and see leadership as a collective phenomenon. Compared to other relational 
leadership streams, my approach falls under what Hunt and Dodge (2000) call systems-
                                                 
22 Moreover, in individual-centered leadership approaches, another way in which management and 
leadership are not distinguished is when the superior-subordinate relation is confounded with the leader-
follower one (Gronn 2002).  
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based (Wheatley 1999) and collective (Dachler and Hosking 1995) leadership and under 
neither social network analysis leadership (Brass and Burkhardt 1992) nor the leader-
member exchange perspective (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). While all focus on a set of 
individuals or groups and their relationships, important differences exist. Only the leader-
member perspective distinguishes between management and leadership, and both the 
social network analysis and leader-member approaches emphasize a leader and are not 
processual.  Systems and collective leadership are processual and the latter does not give 
any individual a specific relevance. Moreover, both these approaches challenge the 
epistemological and ontological foundations of mainstream leadership and organizational 
literatures breaking away from linear conceptions. Moreover, collective leadership does 
challenges post-positivist stances with its social constructionist groundings. Table V 
summarizes these differences.  
 
Table V. Comparison of relational leadership perspectives 
Characteristics Social Network 
Analysis 
LMX Collectivities Systems 
Leadership vs. 
management 
Similar Different Similar Similar 
Processual No No Yes Yes 
Timing Currently relevant Currently relevant Currently relevant Currently relevant 
Conceptual/ 
empirical 
Both Both Conceptual so far Conceptual so far 
Based on Hunt and Dodge (2000) 
 
However, I must add a major point here that applies to all four leadership approaches just 
mentioned: all approaches refer to organizational leadership, not interorganizational 
networks. Hence a major distinction between my approach and all the above is that I am 
situated at another level. Applied at the interorganizational level, these perspective would 
entail social network analysis where the nodes would be organizations, where systems 
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and collectivities would be made up of organizations, and where exchanges would 
happen among organizations. Again, I am interested in the leadership of networks. 
Leadership activities 
In their renowned article reviewing the state of the art of the public network management 
field and the questions yet to be answered, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) identified as 
major questions “what are the critical functional equivalents to traditional management 
processes, equivalent to the POSDCORB23?” In fact, these authors have provided a 
suggestive grouping of network management behavior and Vangen and Huxham (2004) 
propose a set of leadership activities. These two pairs of authors are my core theoretical 
framework. 
 
There seems to be some agreement on the type of activities—but unfortunately not on the 
terminology—that must be carried out to manage collaboration. The different types of 
activities deal with actors and resources, and with interaction and structure: including 
participants, ensuring that participants are committed to and advance the collaboration, 
putting at the participants’ disposal the necessary infrastructure, and managing the 
differences in influence among participants. 
Interaction and structure 
Network management implies managing the interactions between actors, the games 
where actors exchange resources and co-produce activities, and the overall network 
                                                 
23 Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting.  
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(Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997c; Klijn and Teisman 
1997; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; O’Toole 1997; O’Toole and Meier 2004)24. While 
distinct, these two levels continually feed back into each other: games are influenced by 
the network’s rules, membership, relations, and resources, and in turn influence the 
network by re-modifying the games.  
 
Facilitating is aimed at interaction among participants. It refers to managing the 
inevitable inequalities regarding participants (Vangen and Huxham, 2004) and motivating 
participation by network members.25 
  
Framing deals with network structuring. It is aimed at influencing institutions, including 
rules and values, and perceptions (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn and 
Koppenjan 1997b). Framing is about creating infrastructures for the collaboration—
empowering according to Huxham and Vangen (2000b)—and includes influencing rules, 
values, and perceptions and processes (Huxham and Vangen 2000b, Kickert Klijn and 
Koppenjan 1997).  
 
Two other management tasks seem relevant to network leadership. One deals with 
supporting actors who want to become members and with attracting those partners 
needed: activating  (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; embracing, Vangen and Huxham 
                                                 
24 Austin (2000) draws a similar distinction between drivers (of action) and enablers (of action), the former 
related to interaction, the latter to structure. 
25 Vangen and Huxham (2004) call this activity involving, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) refer to managing 
interaction as synthezising, Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997b) refer to it as game management, and 
O’Toole and Meier (2004) as behavioral networking. 
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2004). The other task deals with capturing the necessary resources and support for the 
network (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). This I call mobilizing. The use of the term differs 
from both Agranoff and McGuire (2001) and Vangen and Huxham (2004) in that it does 
not include activities focused on capturing the resources of members of the network. This 
is so because I have chosen to use the meaning that the networks studied give to this term 
and which arises as an in-vivo label from the data analysis. The following figure 
illustrates the four activities and how they refer to either member interaction or the 
network structure. 
 
Figure VIII. Network leadership activities (source: own, based on Agranoff and McGuire [2001]; 




Both activating and mobilizing modify the structure of the network rather than the 
interaction; more interestingly, both deal with the boundaries and exterior of the network, 
since actors are recruited or expelled and resources are looked for from without. This 
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points to a second distinction which may prove useful in our study: that between network 
and domain. 
 
IO network and IO domain 
Another management distinction that appears among the leadership tasks is whether they 
are focused at influencing the network itself or the network’s immediate environment, or 
domain (Hardy and Phillips 1998; Shortell et al. 2002; Thompson 1967; Trist 1983). An 
interorganizational domain is the set of organizations and the issues which brings them 
together. In this study, the domain is the interorganizational network and the related 
public and private organizations that affect and are affected by immigration issues. The 
distinction between managing inwards and outwards has been highlighted by different 
scholars. Most eminently, Moore (1995), in his famous book, divides public management 
into managing operations, managing the political environment, and, somewhere in 
between managing inwards and outwards, managing the strategy and vision. Building on 
Moore’s work, O’Toole, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2004) distinguish between 
managing inwards, outwards (the stakeholders and the environment), and upwards. 
Among municipalities, Agranoff and McGuire (1999) also distinguish between managing 
vertically with other level government agencies in order to acquire information or some 
discretional favor, and horizontally with other actors, both public and private, with whom 
no hierarchical relationship exists, to better develop policies, to exchange resources, or to 
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In all these examples, the mentioned authors, however, have as a unit of analysis an 
organization. This means that what they are terming as outwards management is, 
actually, inward network management in my analytic framework.  However, it has been 
found that networks not only manage formal member interorganizational interaction, but 
also manage the network’s exterior environment, or its domain (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 
2005; Shortell et al. 2002). In fact, from the policy networks field, Marsh and Smith 
(2000) have also suggested that one of the three guiding dialectics in policy networks is 
that composed by the network and its environment. Therefore, I am adding another layer 
to my analytic framework by including the domain. This seems necessary when dealing 
with formal networks such as the ones dealt with in this study since networks are affected 
by the environment but process the inputs in their own way (Kickert, Klijn, and 
Koppenjan 1997a). Luhmann (1986) puts it beautifully, stating that systems maintain 
closure in openness. 
 
Another reason for expanding my analytic framework beyond my unit of analysis to 
include the domain is not to take for granted the boundaries of the network (Berry et al.  
2004), since, in practice, it is difficult to tell when an interaction arena starts and finishes 
(Ostrom and Ostrom, 2004). Moreover, given the broad and indivisible problems 
(Aldrich 1976) the networks are dealing with—immigration in this study—introducing a 
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layer beyond the network itself, introducing the level of the domain (Trist 1983), seems 
necessary (Gray 1989; Hardy and Phillips 1998)26.   
 
In sum, network leadership activities include framing, facilitating, mobilizing, and 
activating. Moreover, two distinctions may be of analytic use: managing structure and 
interaction, and managing inwards in the network and outwards in the domain. A 
question that emerges, then, is how do these leadership activities help manage paradox? 
More concretely, the following research proposition and secondary question will guide 
my research: 
RP2: Network leadership activities include: framing, facilitating, 
mobilizing, and activating 
RQ2: How do leadership activities help manage the unity/diversity and 
confrontation/cooperation paradoxes? 
POWER OF NETWORKS 
Ospina and Saz-Carranza’s (2005) preliminary findings also hinted at the relevance of 
power: the networks united diverse members to build power. The central role of power in 
social change organizations is also highlighted in a meta-analysis by Ospina and Foldy 
(2005). They find how these organizations focus on building power and how a 
fundamental assumption in their work is that social inequalities arise due to power 
imbalances—which must be counter-balanced. However, power has long been 
overlooked in network and collaboration management research (Agranoff and McGuire 
2001; Huxham and Beech 2003b). 
                                                 
26 Pointing towards the need to enlarge the picture in which networks are set, albeit in a quite distinct 
approach, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) use the idea of arena, which bridges the network’s interaction with 
other networks and external actors. 
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Defining power 
Bertrand Russell defined power as “the production of intended effects” (1986, 19), Max 
Weber (1986) as a capacity to realize one’s will, and Dahl (1986) identifies power of A 
over B if A can get B to do something B would not otherwise do.  Many more different 
definitions of power have been put forward. However, Lukes (1986) finds common to all 
the different definitions of and approaches to power a focus on a difference being made 
to the world. 
 
In organization studies, the earliest approach to organizational power is Emerson’s (1962) 
exchange theory definition, where “power resides implicitly in the other’s dependence 
[on oneself]” (32)—power of A over B is directly proportional to B’s dependence on A 
(Vernis 2000). This definition is relational, situational, and potentially reciprocal (Scott 
2003). Since then, other conceptualizations and definitions have been added to this one, 
and the approaches to and foci on different aspects of power are far more in number. 
Power of the network 
Building on Emerson’s idea of interdependence, network management scholars see 
resource dependence theory as one of their core perspectives (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 
2006): if two organizations are dependent on a more powerful third one, the two weaker 
ones may join to counterbalance the stronger organization (Emerson 1962).  
 
In the immigration policy sector, to which this dissertation’s cases pertain, pro-
immigration rights organizations that aim at advocating are clearly dependent on state 
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actors—since immigrants are highly impacted by legislation and its execution. Hence, 
these organizations unite into networks to build enough power to fulfill their mission 
(furthering immigrant rights), which unavoidably obligates them to try to influence 
powerful state actors.  
The sources of the power of networks 
Now the resources a network builds, captures, or coopts, can be thought of as bases or 
sources of its power. Since French and Raven (1959) first proposed five bases of 
power27—reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert power—many more have 
been put forward. Moreover, while many referred to bases (Hickson et al. 1971; Salancik 
and Pfeffer 1974), others haven’t. Gray refers to types28 of power, Agranoff and McGuire 
(2001) and Huxham and Beech (2003b) refer to sources, and Hardy and Philips (1998) 
refer to aspects of power. Similarly, what constitutes a resource also varies. While Hardy 
and Clegg’s (1996) see resources and the capacity to use them as bases of power, Pfeffer 
(1992) distinguishes between power and the skills to use it. In addition, few 
conceptualizations regarding networks have attended the differentiation of the concept of 
resource (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2006).  
Table VI. A summary of sources of power 
resource scarcity/ utility or control of resources 
essential skills 
control of information 
acquisition of knowledge from a partner 
strategic importance of the relationship to one party 
availability of alternatives or credible sanctions 
formal authority  
network centrality 
the structure of a relationship 
closeness of HRM practices 
discursive legitimacy and discursive power 
Source: Huxham and Beech (2003b) 
                                                 
27Their definition of power is clearly “power over.” 
28 These types are: legitimacy, stakeholder capacity or power over domain, power to mobilize, to organize, 
to strategize, control of information, and power to authorize. 
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Power to 
Just as with leadership scholars, which have looked at leadership in networks rather than 
leadership of networks, scholars using “power over” and resource-dependence 
perspective have mostly looked at a single organization’s power in a network. As Pfeffer 
(1987) emphasizes, the resource-dependence perspective’s unit of analysis is the 
organization—not the inter-organizational set, or in our case the network. 
 
While “power over” is useful to understand why organizations join a network and why 
the network requires to build its own power bases, “power to” conceptualizations may be 
also very helpful to understand the network’s power. “Power to” refers to having the 
capacity to do something, rather than over someone (Stone 2006). Using this concept, 
Agranoff and McGuire (2001) define network power as the “ability to get action by 
partners or organizations under circumstances where actors are under dual responsibility 
roles to both organizations and networks” (315).  This definition resembles Hannah 
Arendt’s (1986) definition of her communicative power: the "human ability not just to act 
but to act in concert"(64). Network power understood as such also resembles Perrow’s 
(1987) “power with” where actors jointly increase their power, making the power game 
nonzero-sum. The “power to” type is closer to the etymological origins of the word 
"power," to be able (Oxford University Press 1989), and in shared power settings (Bryson 
and Crosby 1992; Gray 1989) of ultra complexity it may characterizes situations better 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001)29. Together, “power to” (as the ability to get action by 
                                                 
29 Perrow (1987), along a similar line of reasoning, differentiates between power in zero-sum games and 
power in a nonzero-sum game. 
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network members) and the bases of power, may be helpful in informing how networks 
are managed. 
 
From the above discussion, and defining power as “power to” and power bases, two 
secondary questions follow: how does managing paradox contribute to the 
interorganizational networks’ power? And how does the power built affect the network’s 
effectiveness? Again, I develop the following research proposition and secondary 
question in more formal terms: 
RP3: Interorganizational networks aim at building their power to be 
effective. 
RQ3a: How does managing the unity/diversity and 
cooperation/confrontation build the network’s power? 
RQ3b: How does the power built affect the network’s effectiveness? 
A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK 
MANAGEMENT 
In the above sections of this chapter I have developed specific research propositions and 
questions. Putting all three sections together, I can construct a research framework. First, 
interorganizational networks are fraught with inherent paradoxes, which may be of 
different form and nature. Second, I showed that network leadership draws on different 
activities. Third, networks aim at building power to be more effective and fulfill their 
mission.  
 
Now, if networks imply inherent paradoxes, then network leadership must somehow 
address them. Therefore, network leadership activities must manage paradox. Moreover, 
if networks aim at building power, then managing paradox must aim at building this 
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power. In other words, network leadership aims at addressing paradoxes to build network 
power. The following graph illustrates my research model. 
 






4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Gli Stati Uniti allora e per molti anni a 
venire apparivano agli europei la Mecca 
della scienza...il 19 settembre del 1947... mi 
imbarcai sulla nave. 
Rita Levi Montalcini. 
 
The first part of this chapter describes the research’s design, including topic, claim, main 
question, secondary questions, propositions, and units and levels of analysis. Thereafter, 
the research methodology is explained, in particular the sampling and data collection, and 
the data analysis.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Topic and main question 
Managing in collaborative contexts requires addressing inherent paradoxes that emerge 
from the complex collaborative nature itself (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Huxham 
2003). Hence, this project’s research topic is the inherent paradoxes in network 
management. The main research question is: how is paradox managed in successful 
networks? 
 
That interorganizational network management demands more research requires little 
justification (Agranoff and McGuire 2001)—network management and process is under-
researched in general (Ebers 1997; Ebers and Jarrillo 1997; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) 
and in the public and nonprofit in particular (Isett and Provan 2006). It is also well known 
that managing interorganizational networks is an inherently difficult task and by no 
means an easy option (Human and Provan 2000). Scholars of business alliances estimate 
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that more than 50% of alliances fail (Kelly, Schaan, and Jonacas 2002; Park  and Ungson 
2001). Failure rates are not available regarding public or nonprofit networks, but Huxham 
and Vangen (2000b) have identified how collaboration often succumbs to what they term 
as collaborative inertia30. Scholars suggest that failures and difficulty in managing 
interorganizational sets arise due to managerial complexity (Park  and Ungson 2001), 
poor management (Meyer 1999), and the complex, dynamic, and ambiguous nature of 
collaborations (Huxham 2003). In fact, Bardach (1998) suggests that leadership is a 
central factor for network success. Hence, more research regarding management and 
leadership in interorganizational networks is called for. 
 
As I have tried to set out in the previous two chapters, the claim that managing in 
collaborative contexts requires addressing paradoxes is both normative and theoretical, as 
well as empirically based. It is normative and theoretical in that interorganizational 
network and collaboration theories point towards the existence of paradox. Chapter 3 
showed how critical factors identified in the literature, such as common aims, size, 
formalization, and trust, point to potential contradictions managers confront. My 
preliminary research has identified paradoxes in the context of successful coalitions. In 
particular, Ospina and I identified, in previous research, two paradoxes: the paradoxical 
tension of unity and diversity regarding the internal management of the network, and the 
paradoxical engagement of the network with external governmental agencies with whom 
the networks combine confrontation and cooperation (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005).  
                                                 
30 While there isn’t any empirical evidence that network failure is in fact higher than individual firm failure 
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Yet, inter-organizational network and collaboration theorists have down-played 
paradoxes. I believe that a focus on paradox offers great potential for developing theory 
and knowledge in the organizational studies field and can help scholars understand the 
nature of networks and their management.  
 
In this research I use paradox as a guiding framework (Lewis 2000; Quinn and Cameron 
1988) and empirically as a subject of inquiry (Lewis, 2000). First, after having come 
upon paradox empirically in my study with Ospina (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005), I 
developed a theoretical framework to encompass the paradoxes of both unity and 
diversity within the network, and cooperation and confrontation externally. Second, I 
have set out to explore empirically paradox in networks in order to unpack network 
leadership. I instrumentally focus on paradox—to advance knowledge on collaboration. 
More specifically it focuses on how the network manages both contradictory goals and 
or processes of the unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation paradox.  
Rationale and significance 
My research aims at contributing to theoretical and practical knowledge of inter-
organizational collaboration, and thus at being useful to both scholars and practitioners 
(its significance [Booth, Colomb and Williamson 1995; Marshall and Rossman 1995]). 
The rationale behind this research is to advance the knowledge of network management 
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This research has a dual purpose. Focusing on paradoxical tensions and contradictions 
may contribute to forward the under-researched field of network management, besides 
breaking ground in an unexplored topic, the relationship between paradox and successful 
inter-organizational collaboration.31 Using paradox, paradoxical tensions, and 
contradiction has been useful in furthering knowledge in the fields of, among others, 
organizational effectiveness (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983), strategy (Nutt and Backoff 
1992), and leadership (March and Weil 2005)—as explained in Chapter 3. At the same 
time, in terms of practice, given the practical implications of both the research question 
and the field in which this research is a part of, public and nonprofit management, the 
research is also applied, in that it aims at illuminating a societal concern: a better 
understanding of paradox can offer new management techniques, models, and approaches 
with direct relevance to the practice of non-profit managers.  
 
Findings produced by a paradox approach may therefore be directly significant to inter-
organizational managers, since preliminary research has shown the existence and 
importance of paradox (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005), and since in other fields, such as 
group behavior (Smith and Berg 1987) or change management (Cameron and Quinn 
1988), it has proven to be extremely useful. A paradox approach may provide reflective 
practitioners (Schon 1983) with useful conceptual handles (Huxham 2003)—or guiding 
dimensions and reference points—and may helps to avoid both extreme simplification 
and complexities. Table VII below summarizes the basic scheme of the dissertation. 
                                                 
31 Therefore, this is a “basic” research aiming at contributing to fundamental knowledge and theory (Patton 
2002), as opposed to applied research or evaluation research. 
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Table VII. Basic scheme of dissertation 
Topic The inherent paradoxes in network management. 
Question How is paradox managed in successful networks? 
Rationale Increase knowledge of network management by exploring paradoxes faced by and created 
by networks. 
Significance Provide reflective practitioners with useful conceptual handles for managing networks.. 
Secondary questions and propositions 
As explained, in a preliminary research Ospina and I (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005) set 
out to answer how are successful networks managed? And in so doing we identified two 
paradoxes, one regarding inward work of the network, the diversity/unity paradox, and 
another regarding the outward work, namely the confrontation/cooperation paradox. In an 
effort to build on previous research, the further exploration of these two paradoxes will 
guide the research question: how is paradox managed in successful networks?   
 
To do so, my first task has been to further explore the nature of these paradoxes and to 
answer the secondary question: what are the form and the nature of the diversity/unity 
and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes in the context of network management? The 
research propositions (or guiding hypotheses [Marshall and Rossman 1994]32) that served 
as theoretical departing points (Yin 1994) for this secondary question were, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, that network management requires taking into account paradoxes and that 
paradoxes may be of different forms. Based on this I want to first determine the form and 
nature of the paradoxes I am studying. While these propositions help give direction to the 
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research, they do so with enough flexibility to avoid constraining the inquiry in any way 
(Eisenhardt 1989).  
 
Having explored the nature and form of the paradoxes, my next task was to look at a 
second secondary question: how do leadership activities help manage the unity/diversity 
and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes? A research proposition developed in Chapter 
3 is that network leadership draws on different management tasks: framing, facilitating, 
mobilizing, and activating. Hence, how do these activities relate to managing the 
paradoxes? 
 
Finally, with insights about the nature of the paradoxes, how they are managed, I was 
ready to explore the implications of managing these paradoxes. More concretely, how 
does managing the diversity/unity paradox contribute to build the interorganizational 
networks’ power? And how does the power built affect the network’s effectiveness? 
Interorganizational networks aim at building their power to be effective. At the core of 
collaboration among organizations is the expectation that doing so will enhance their 
capacity to achieve their mission—in the cases studied here, to reframe a reality by 
influencing state actors. Power then may be understood as a proxy to explore the link 
between the management of paradoxical tensions and successful networks. In this sense, 
as I show in my analysis, member organizations make explicit that a major reason to join 
these collaborative networks is to build power for the immigrant rights movement. 
Furthermore, there is a need to further look into the role of power in collaboration and 
network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 2003; Huxham and Beech 2003b).  
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The proposition related to this secondary question, then, is that sustaining the internal and 
external paradoxes increases the network’s power and effectiveness. The following figure 
summarizes the study’s logic: from propositions and research questions to expected 
contributions. 
 
Figure X. The study’s logic (source: own) 
 
  
Units and levels of analysis 
My unit of analysis, the network, is consistent with my propositions and research 
questions (Yin 1994). The interviewees involved in my research are vehicles to capture 
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aspects of the network properties and its management. In this sense, I transition from 
individual to network (micro-macro) but, in so doing, I do not assume that the network is 
merely the aggregation of individuals nor that network level phenomena are always 
predicted, perceived, or intended by individuals (Coleman 1990; DiMaggio and Powell 
1991; Knoppen 2006). 
 
Throughout the research my unit of analysis is the network, as demanded by many 
scholars (Berry et al. 2004; O’Toole 1997), and the level of analysis is broadly inter-
organizational. However, the specific level in which I am interested in varies because 
interaction between actors in network management may occur at different inter-
organizational levels: I distinguish three. First, interaction may occur between the 
network coordinating unit and the organizational members. Second, interaction may 
occur among network members. Third, interaction may occur between the network as a 
whole, via the coordinating unit or a member on behalf of the network, and external 
actors. 33 As explained in Chapter 3, this third level, the domain, is relevant to my 
analysis. This research focuses, then, on two levels of analysis: on the interaction 
between the coordinating unit and the members, and on the interaction between the 
network as a whole and the external actors. These two levels of analysis deal respectively 
with the internal management of the network and with managing outwards (Shortell et al. 
2002).  Figure XI illustrates the different levels and the unit of analysis.34 
                                                 
33 It may be argued that a fourth level exists, that which includes interaction between individuals within the 
network coordinating unit. However, this level of analysis is out of my broader interorganizational level. 
34 In fact, the research literature has been surprisingly silent regarding the distinction between these two 
concepts. Although oftentimes the unit and level of analysis coincide, they may vary. Example of such non-
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Furthermore, I have discarded looking explicitly at inter-member interaction, since 
covering these interactions qualitatively is not realistic given my time and resources, and 
the number of organizations in these coalitions (from 20 to over 150)35. I was able, 
nevertheless, to capture inter-member interaction by focusing on coordinating unit-
member interaction as well as during my observations of network-wide events. 
                                                                                                                                                 
coincidence is Williamson’s (1981) work on Transaction Cost Economics. In this work, his unit of analysis 
is the transaction—which is also his independent variable while the governance structure is the dependent 
variable—and the dyad is the level of analysis. 
35 This could have been captured using social network analysis but would not have informed my questions. 
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RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative methodology 
Given the complex, dynamic, innovative, under-researched character of my research 
topic and informal nature of paradoxes, a deep, rich, in-depth qualitative study is 
undoubtedly the most appropriate research methodology (Agranoff and Radin 1991; De 
Rond and Bouckchikhi 2004; Kenis and Oerlemans 2004; Marshall and Rossman 1995).  
 
Additionally, research on paradox seems to imply a qualitative methodology. Lewis 
(2000) points out how one of the challenges in researching paradoxes is to identify, or 
bracket down, the paradox. This, according to her review, has been done using narrative 
techniques, psychodynamic techniques, and a multi-paradigmatic approach—for a well-
known examples of this latter strategy, see Allison’s (1971) essay on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. In fact, Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2005) came across paradox in their research by 
using a qualitative narrative technique. To further understand paradox and network 
management, I also use a qualitative narrative technique (Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy 
2005; Ospina and Dodge 2005a, 2005b), since a quantitative operationalization of 
paradox did not seem feasible. 
 
But, not only does paradox require the use of qualitative approaches, so does the incipient 
field of network management. The analytical appropriateness (Silverman 2000) of the 
qualitative approach chosen is justified since the network management research is 
process-oriented and focuses on the content of the interactions (Borzel 1998). 
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Furthermore, qualitative research allows to better understand the issues underlying the 
theory of collaboration (Ariño and de la Torre 1998). Given the limited knowledge 
regarding the process and interactions within a network, extensive observation and in-
depth interviews are required (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). 
 
This research’s approach is explanatory, since the research is interpretative and aims at 
generating explanation (Miller and Crabtree 1999), and since an exploratory preliminary 
study already identified the two paradoxes (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005). Multiple 
cases are used, since evidence from such designs is often considered more compelling 
(Yin 1994) and is better suited for explanatory research (Marshall and Rossman 1995), in 
particular regarding complex managerial processes (Agranoff and Radin 1991). The 
research is mainly interpretivist in that it aims at explaining a causal mechanism (Lin 
1998), namely the mechanism of network leadership. However, the multiple-case design 
allows it to see some patterns across cases, and hence also mixes into the research a more 
positivist approach as well.  
 
Although this study uses cases—the networks—it is not a case-study as defined by either 
Eisenhardt (1989), Stake (1994), or Yin(1994). It is not a case-study in that the analysis 
does not go into detailed depth and historical background of each network. I do not 
elaborate broad contextual descriptions of each network. Also, as I show next, the 
primary data sources are interviews, supported by observation and documents. These 
latter sources, though, are secondary in importance. This study is, then, a comparative 
interview study of four cases of network management: a qualitative study of four cases 
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that uses interviews and grounded theory-type analysis (Creswell 1998; Marshall and 
Rossman 1995 Miles and Huberman 1995).  
The cases  
The term case is not well defined and isn’t homogeneously used in the literature (Ragin, 
1992a). The cases here used primarily refer to the networks, the units of analysis, but also 
incorporate the domain in which the networks are embedded. This highlights the duality 
of the term case: the specific capital letter “Case,” which refers to the unit of analysis, or 
the general and broader small letter “case” (Ragin 1992b), which includes both the unit of 
analysis and the context. The “case” in this sense has a blurry boundary which can hardly 
be precisely drawn (Miles and Huberman 1995).  
 
Using a theory-driven and replication sampling strategy (Charmaz 2000; Miles and 
Huberman 1998; Yin, 1994), I used three criteria to select all four cases. First, all 
networks had to be associated to a Leadership for a Change World program (LCW) 
awardee36. Second, all networks had to be inter-organizational action networks (Agranoff 
2003) or coalitions composed of independent organizational members working together 
to tackle common issues—as defined in Chapter 2. Third, networks dealt with 
immigration issues, a criterion included to enhance comparability among the cases since 
most networks in the LCW program focused on immigration. This has two direct 
                                                 
36 All networks were the primary organization for which the awardees were recognized. In the case of 
CAUSA, the awardee was primarily recognized for his work with Northwest Treeplanters and 
Farmworkers Union (PCUN), but CAUSA (Oregon’s immigration coalition) played a decisive role in his 
selection. Moreover, as will be shown in the description of the case itself, CAUSA is closely related to the 
awardee organization, PCUN, and is perceived as very successful. 
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implications on the external validity of my research. It makes analytic generalization 
(Firestone 1993) within the policy sector more robust but also more constrained to 
networks dealing with immigration issues.37  
 
The four networks here were associated with an awardee from the Leadership for a 
Changing World program. Awardees of this Ford Foundation funded program undergo a 
rigorous selection process which begins with 1000-1500 nominations per year, whittled 
down to the 17-20 individual or teams of awardees by national and regional selection 
committees.38  (The research team plays no role in the selection process.)  Selection 
criteria state that award recipients are leaders or leadership teams who are tackling and 
challenging critical social problems with effective, systemic solutions which, though 
largely unrecognized outside their field or community, would, if recognized, inspire 
others. In addition, LCW seeks to recognize leadership that is strategic, brings different 
groups of people together, is sustainable beyond any individual effort, and gets results.  
Given the high nominee-to-awardee ratio (at least 50:1), the rigor of the selection 
process, and the selection criteria, these organizations can be considered leadership 
exemplars (Foldy, Goldman, Ospina 2004)39. I derive a major assumption of my research 
                                                 
37 Nevertheless, I do not assume that paradox is exclusive of network management in the immigration field. 
38 The process begins when individuals and teams are nominated by colleagues or supporters.  A national 
committee selects about 250 top candidates, who move on to one of six regional selection committees.  The 
regional committees, using newly submitted essays from each nominee, select 5 primary and 4 secondary 
regional finalists.  The Advocacy Institute and the Ford Foundation choose 36 semi-finalists and conduct 
site visits. A national selection committee reviews all the materials from the semi-finalists, and by 
consensus recommends 24 finalists, 17 to 20 of whom will make the final cut. 
39 Foldy, Goldman, and Ospina (2004) note that there might be a sampling bias in the LCW program’s 
selection process since it emphasizes tangible accomplishments, which could potentially under-select 
nonprofits working in particularly challenging contexts whose accomplishments are less easily captured. 
This however, does not seem to affect my research but may affect the external validity of the conclusions. 
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from this point: that all awarded networks in LCW are successful. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, a network’s success may mean many different things depending on the 
criterion used and the relative level of the evaluation. Throughout this study I understand 
network success as the network’s degree of accomplishment of its mission. Hence I am 
using the network as the relative unit of evaluation and effectiveness as the criterion of 
evaluation. In the next chapter I describe in more detail these network’s achievements 
and provide evidence of their effectiveness. 
 
King, Keohane, Verba (1994) advocate for a post-positivist qualitative methodology 
where the dependent variable, is not constant in order to allow for causal inferences. 
Although I do not necessarily assume that all networks are equally successful, I do not 
compare networks according to their success. In this study, four “exceptional” cases 
(Stake 1994) are used to produce initial theory, using an interpretivist logic, and cross-
case comparisons are done along dimensions other than success (e.g. size). This is not a 
study identifying either success in networks or successful networks but rather about 
identifying leadership practices of networks that have already been identified as 
successful. In this sense, then, all four cases are “exceptional” (Miles and Huberman 
1995) since successful networks are not commonplace (Huxham 2003).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Moreover, the Ford Foundation’s ideological leanings did introduce bias into the sample.  Only 
progressive, social justice organizations were selected as awardees. Conservative social change 
organizations are not included 
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The fact that all networks were part of a research program led by the Research Center of 
Leadership in Action40—of which I am part—guaranteed continued access to the cases 
(Marshall and Rossman 1995—see Appendix 1 for the proposal used to contact cases). 
The networks are41: 
• New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC) – New York 
• Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII) – 
Illinois 
• National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) –  U.S. 
• CAUSA – Oregon’s Immigration Coalition 
 
The next chapter describes each in detail. For now, Table VIII summarizes their main 
characteristics. 
Table VIII. Basic characteristics of cases 






164 To provide a forum for the immigrant community to 
discuss urgent issues and provide a vehicle for collective 





16 To promote immigrant rights and well-being, and to 





20 To improve the quality of life for immigrants and refugees 
and to ensure dignity and respect by organizing and uniting 
communities through education, leadership development, 
and direct services, and by promoting the voice of 






30 To strengthen and expand the work of local day laborer 
organizing groups, in order to become more effective and 
strategic in building leadership, advancing low-wage 
worker and immigrant rights, and developing successful 
models for organizing immigrant contingent/temporary 
workers. 
                                                 
40 Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University. 
41 Note how three out of the four networks call themselves “coalitions.” Throughout the study, following 
Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 2003), I use the term network to refer to these interorganizational sets. 
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The research cycle 
As mentioned, this research builds on the following model constructed from both the 
literature reviewed and the preliminary study carried out by Ospina and Saz-Carranza 
(2005).  
 




Based on Marshall and Rossman (1995) and Miller and Crabtree (1999), the research 
cycle illustrated in Figure XIII, depicted as a spiral of the two moments in the research—
the preliminary exploratory study and  this second explanatory study—illustrates the 
circular and ongoing nature of such a qualitative study. Moreover, the first cycle of 
research was carried out with a “looser” design while the second cycle, the research 
presented here, has a “tighter” design (Miles and Huberman 1994) since it is more 
focused both regarding the two specific paradoxes studied and the secondary research 
questions. In neither cycle, however, was “inductive” purity proclaimed (Miles and 
Huberman 1994), since even the first exploratory study approached the data with a broad 
and deep knowledge of the literature in mind. 
 
Although two networks already were part of the preliminary study (namely NYIC and 
CAAELLI), all four networks were involved in the same data collection process. This is 
so because the data collection method of the preliminary study by Ospina and Saz-
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Carranza was open and appreciative, which produced data regarding general management 
(Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005)—quite different from the one needed in this research. 
 
Figure XIII. Research cycles (source: own, based on Marshall and Rossman [1995] and Miller 




During the data collection and analysis of my dissertation—Data collection 2—I 
cyclically iterated between both tasks. Before reentering the field to collect more data, I 
analyzed some of the already collected data (Miles and Huberman 1994). Such 
interrelation between data collection and analysis is typical of qualitative studies 
(Eisenhardt 1989). In this research the flexibility allowed me to focus my data collection 
as the data analysis advanced (Table XII and Table XIII below show how the codes 
evolved during the analysis).  
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Data collection 
The primary data are the transcripts from in-depth interviews with members of the 
coordinating unit of each network, involving voice-recording. I triangulated these data 
collection methods with other forms of data—observation and documents—(Huxham 
2002; Marshall and Rossman 1995) to shed light from different angles and visions (Fine, 
Weiss, Wessen, and Wong 2000), and to reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation by 
achieving redundancy of data using multiple perceptions (Stake 2000).  
 
In this research, I use both source triangulation, with respect to interviewees, and method 
triangulation, between interviews and other data (Janesick 2000; Miller and Crabtree 
1994; Richardson 2000). The sampling of data sources involves settings, events, and 
people (Marshall and Rossman 1995; Miles and Huberman 1994—see below for 
justification of source sampling). Moreover, as mentioned, multiple cases were 
considered, as depicted in Figure XIV. 
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Interviewee sampling 
The interviewees were selected with a theoretically driven within-case sampling strategy, 
allowing for enough flexibility to account for the rolling quality of such within-case 
sampling (Miles and Huberman 1994).  Initially, the design included four sets of 
interviews per case: one individual and three group interviews. Representatives from the 
network’s coordinating unit (the network manager and other staff) and from member 
organizations were interviewed. In total, I carried out 22 interviews involving 31 
interviewees: 5 managers42, 12 staff of the network’s coordinating unit, and 13 
organizational members were interviewed in 7 group, 11 individual, and 3 telephone 
interviews.   
 
Table IX. Interview summary 
 Interviewees Interviews 
Network Manager Staff Member Total Group Indiv. Teleph. Total 
CAAELII 1 6 2 9 2 4 0 6 
CAUSA 3 1 6 10 3 2 1 6 
NDLON 1 1 4 6 1 2 2 5 
NYIC 1 4 1 6 1 4 0 5 
Total 6 12 13 31 7 12 3 22 
 
The preliminary study that served as a basis for this one involved four group interviews 
with two managers, four staff, and six organizational members (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 
2005). 
 
                                                 
42 CAUSA was undergoing a manager transition during my field visit, so I interviewed both the outgoing 
and incoming managers. Moreover, the incoming manager was interviewed twice, in a group interview and 
in an individual one. 
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Because these are all formalized inter-organizational networks, their well-defined 
coordinating units are extremely valuable research sources for my purposes43. Also, since 
these networks are second-level inter-organizational sets, the constituencies are dealt with 
by the member organizations and are, hence, less aware and involved in the management 
of the network.  For this reason, although constituencies were included in the fieldwork’s 
observations, they were not interviewed.   
 
The rationale behind this sampling is to triangulate the different perspectives of actors 
strongly involved in the network management, but simultaneously to focus on the 
network manager. This actor provided most of the data related to network management, 
regarding the two paradoxes and around the relation between the paradoxes and 
management (in particular, leadership activities and power).  The staff of the coordinating 
unit offered information that complemented and checked for the network manager’s 
opinions and interpretations. Selected organizational members offered a limited but 
insightful perspective from the organizations’ standpoint. The following matrix 
summarizes the contributions expected from each interviewee group. As I mention ahead, 
I did not find differences among these groups of respondents. However, I did find that the 
network manager offered the most informational depth, while the organizational member 
representatives the least. Other staff of the coordinating unit were somewhere in between.  
                                                 
43 While in networks with low formalization and no centralization at all, no sole actor may have an 
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Table X. Actor sampling matrix 
Actors U/D U/D & mngt C/C C/C & mngt 
Coordinating unit (manager & staff) ***  *** ***  *** 
Organizational members ***  ** ** ** 
U/D = Unity and/or Diversity; U/D & mngt = internal paradox and its effect on management; C/C = 
Cooperation and/or Confrontation; C/C & mngt = external paradox and its effect on management.  
***very relevant, **relevant, *slightly relevant. 
Types of interviews 
Both group and individual interviews were used. All interviews with coordinating unit 
components were in-person. All other interviews were carried out during field visits and 
in-person, except for three telephone interviews with two NDLON members and one 
CAUSA member. No systematic research has been carried out comparing telephone and 
in-person interviews, but it seems that the latter tend to elicit more thoughtful responses 
given their slower pace, to generate higher comfort due to face-to-face interaction, and to 
capture better, more complex issues (Shuy 2002).  I used telephone interviews only with 
those interviewees whom I had met during a fieldwork but with whom I had not been 
able to set up an interview at the time. Hence, these interviews were more focused—since 
I had already carried out many more before them—and high degree of comfort on both 
sides existed, given that I had previously met the interviewees.  
 
The group interviews used are what Frey and Fontana (1991) define as “field formal 
group interviews”44 since they occurred in the network’s site, were loosely directive (see 
below for the general scheme of the interviews and Appendix 3 for the detailed protocol) 
and hence semi-structured. The advantages of such group interviews are, apart from their 
                                                 
44 As opposed to the focus group, brainstorming, nominal-delphi, or field-natural types. 
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obvious cost and time efficiency, that they provided insight into the relationships between 
interviewees, took advantage of the group dynamics as they reflect on each other’s input 
during the interview, and made the interview more polyphonic (Frey and Fontana 1991). 
Group interviews’ main characteristic is to make explicit interviewee-interactive insights 
leading to greater emphasis on the participants’ points of view (Morgan 1997). However, 
it demands specific skills from the interviewer, who has to be capable of maintaining 
focus. In my group interviews, the number of interviewees was kept to a maximum of 
three (Fontana and Frey 2000), since size becomes an important factor increasing the 
difficulty for the interviewer and decreasing the time for each interviewee to intervene. 
 
Moreover, combining both group interviews with staff, board, and non-board members, 
and individual interviews with the network managers allowed me to strike a trade-off 
between breadth in the interviewee sampling and depth and nuance in the data produced 
by the interviewees. 
 
The total amount of interviews and interviewees varied per case due to logistical and 
operational matters on the field; the maximum amount of data was always collected, 
hence providing uneven data among cases. However, I believe the data covers a 
minimum for all four cases. 
Content of interviews 
The interviews had four sections (see Appendix 3 for the detailed interview 
questionnaire). First, the interview started with opening questions about the interviewee’s 
work. This first part was an appreciative inquiry (Srivastava and Cooperrider 1990) and 
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gave the opportunity to the interviewee to explain his/her work and point out its positive 
aspects45. Thereafter, challenges regarding the internal management of the network were 
discussed. The third section included questions regarding the interaction between the 
network and external target state actors (e.g. United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services). Fourth, the interviewees were consulted regarding the unity/diversity and 
cooperation/confrontation paradoxes and regarding other tensions and paradoxes in their 
networks. Since managers are often so embedded in their actions that they are not aware 
of the paradoxes they are confronted with or of the paradoxical nature of their actions, 
only in this last part of the interview was the concept of paradox made explicit to avoid 
drawing their attention to it46. Obviously, each interview had a tailored protocol.  
 
The four parts of the interview were structured in a tree-and-branch fashion—interview 
divided into equal parts, and each covered by a main question—to obtain similar degrees 
of depth, detail, vividness, richness, and nuance (Rubin and Rubin 2005)47. The main 
interview questions were derived from the research questions and propositions, except for 
the first main question, which was broad and suggested the interviewees guide me 
through their role in the network and through the network itself. Follow-up questions 
focused on interesting ideas that arose or on unclear matters, while probes were used to 
                                                 
45 Stamp and Lipnack (2004) actually suggest that appreciative inquiry and network theory are intertwined 
in theory and practice and propose this method as a very suitable option for the latter. 
46 Moreover, the qualitative interviewing literature does not recommend posing the research problem 
directly at the interviewees: see Rubin and Rubin (2005). 
47 These authors identify two other types of interview structures: opening-the-locks, which is used to 
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keep the interview focused on my level and matter of interest without constraining the 
interviewee (Rubin and Rubin 2005).  
 
While not using exact wording, I followed Rubin and Rubin’s (2005) advice regarding 
the wording of the questions. I was cautious in imposing, in any manner, my assumptions 
on the interviewees, questions did not encourage yes-or-no answers or abstract 
rationalization of the interviewees’ motives, actions, and experiences (i.e. “why” 
questions), and I avoided academic jargon.  
 
For each interview, I also observed nonverbal communication modes, such as the use of 
inter-personal space to communicate attitudes (proxemic) and body movements or 
postures (kinesic) (Fontana and Frey 2000). This was recorded in a post-interview log 
(see Appendix 4), as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Observation and documentation 
As another data collection method, I used observation, which complemented interviews 
by exploring possible differences between what people do and what they say (Huxham 
2002) and by capturing both social interaction and the particular settings where these 
occur. The data collected through observation were recorded in an observation log (see 
Appendix 5) and included quotations, and researcher’s commentaries and check-lists 
(Angrosino and Mays de Perez 1994; Huxham 2002). As soon as possible, the jottings on 
the log were transcribed and expanded, considering observations, interpretations, and 
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Alongside data collected from interviews and observation, I analyzed documentation. I 
collected as much documentation as possible, particularly that regarding all external 
activities which implied interaction with the public sector and other actors, as well as 
documentation regarding their internal management, such as strategy documents, 
mission, statutes, and minutes of assemblies or meetings. I went over more than 100 
documents (see Appendix 8 for a full list) and observed over 15 major events. Rallies, 
strategic meetings, and annual assemblies, among other events, where observed. 
Appendix 7 lists the more relevant events, however, the list is only illustrative since I 
would spend several days uninterrupted with these organizations making it difficult to 
distinguish when an event started and ended. Table XI below illustrates the sampling 
logic of observations and documents. Observation of a major activity as well as analysis 
of a document contributed to illuminate the context that characterized either paradox. 
Observations also allowed for better understanding of the context that influences how 
both paradoxes are managed.  
 
Table XI. Document/observation sampling matrix 
 U/D U/D & mngt C/C C/C & mngt 
Observation  ***  ** ***  ** 
Documents ***  * *** * 
U/D = Unity and/or Diversity; U/D & mngt = internal paradox and its effect on management; C/C = 
Cooperation and/or Confrontation; C/C & mngt = external paradox and its effect on management.  
***very relevant, **relevant, *slightly relevant. 
Data analysis 
The research primarily analyzed texts—transcribed interviews and observation notes, and 
documents—considering some basic additional information about context such as the age 
of the network, the budget, and the organizational charts. Using the interview transcripts 
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as a window to the interviewee’s experience (Silverman 2000) and knowledge (Dodge, 
Ospina, and Foldy 2005), I used initially very broad codes guided by the research 
questions—see Table XII. However, I remained open to new “invivo” and “open” codes 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998) making my approach to the data mixed top-down and bottom-
up (Miles and Huberman 1995).  
Codes, memos, and matrices 
Because of the focus on paradox, I phrased the codes as “statements relating to…” (rather 
than “statements reflecting…”) in order to include both the construct I was looking for as 
well as its negative. For example, the code regarding diversity captured both “willingness 
for diversity” as well as “unwillingness.” This then allowed me to capture the actual 
antonyms of diversity and unity, similarity and disunity, respectively. 
 
Table XII. Initial set of codes used 
Code Statements related to… 
Diversity 
 
• willingness to include heterogeneous organizational partners 
• real involvement of heterogeneous organizational partners 
Unity • feelings of belonging to the coalition 
• commitment to the coalition 
Confrontation  • confrontational challenges towards external target agency 
Cooperation • cooperative relations with external target agency 
Source • why one (or both) of the poles of the paradox is required or necessary 
Implications • how managing the paradoxes affect the management dimensions (both positively 
and negatively) 
Awareness • acknowledgement of contradictory requirements  
Managing • how networks cope with the management of paradox 
Power • power to mobilize, organize, strategize, control information, authorize action, 
and/or influence access to decision-making processes  
 
As analysis advanced, certain issues emerged and others faded. Building primarily on my 
analysis but also the literature reviewed, I introduced new codes, modified others, and 
 
 
   91
eliminated the ones that did not seem relevant. The final codes were grouped in four 
meta-codes: activities, dimensions, power, and tensions. The tensions, activities, and 
power codes referred respectively to paradoxes and tensions, leadership activities, and 
aspects of power, as reviewed in Chapter 3. The dimensions codes referred to other 
salient management dimensions, beyond power and activities, as reviewed in Chapter 2: 
trust, membership, structure, and objectives. Table XIII illustrates the final set of codes 
used—the evolution with respect to the initial set of codes is evident. 
 
Table XIII. Final set of codes used 
Code Statement referring to… 
Activities 
MngtA-Activation Recruiting members 
MngtA-Facilitation Managing interaction between members 
MngtA-Framing The network’s structure, process, and collective meaning-making 
MngtA-Mobilizing Gathering support outside the network  
MngtA-Nurturing Nurturing the network 
MngtA-Strategizing* Making strategy, including goals, objectives, and tactics 
Dimensions 
MngtD-Membership Member charactristics, including individuals’ charcateristics 
MngtD-Objectives/Issues Objectives, strategies, and tactics 
MngtD-St-CoordUnit The network’s coordinating unit 
MngtD-St-Open* Openness of network’s structure and process 
MngtD-Structure Rules, processes, structure, including different tiers and working groups. 
MngtD-Trust Trust 
Power  
PwrBaseK Knowledge, skills, and access to information 
PwrBaseL Legitimacy and reputation 
PwrBaseR Resources in general, including access and position 
PwrCapacity* Building capacity for members 
PwrDecision-making Decision-making, both internally and externally, and including agenda-setting 
and non-decision-making 
PwrOver Power over someone or something 
PwrTo Power to 
Tensions 
T-ConfCoop Confrontation and/or cooperation 
T-Diversity Diversity, including division 
T-OtherTensions* Other tensions and interaction between the unity/diversity and 
confrontation/cooperation 
T-Unity Unity, including homogeneity  
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Transcripts were analyzed continually using Atlas-Ti qualitative coding software, in 
order to refine the data collection process as new aspects emerged in the analysis48. Cases 
were first analyzed independently of each other, using matrices. A within-case concepts-
ordered matrix was set up for each meta-code (Miles and Huberman 1994), see table 
below. These matrices consisted of a code and some of its most relevant supporting 
quotations. These quotations were then grouped in subconcepts or claims relating to push 
and pull factors (Silverman 2000) linking between concepts or sub-concepts. 
 
Table XIV. Example of conceptual within-case matrix 




• We do, go, go after some groups to bring into  our coalition,[…] One example is that we 
are weak in the Bronx and so we're trying to get groups in the Bronx to be involved […] so a 
couple of times we've been trying to present our work to them. So, you know, in some cases 




• So depending on the issue, a different group of outside agencies will come to the table 
because some, you know, some issues appeal to a wide range of agencies.  They come with a 
sense of urgency embedded, a sense of injustice.  If  government is proposing to cut benefits 
that’s something that stirs people up a lot more than trying to organize people to expand 
benefits. 11-54  
• … 
… • …  
 
For each case, a draft narrative and causal map were spelled out in an effort to build a 
tentative explanatory model (Ryan and Bernard 1994). Similarities and differences were 
noted, and a final, cross-case comparative matrix was constructed for each meta-code 
(Table XV below illustrates such a matrix). A final analysis took place during the writing 
of the findings themselves.  
                                                 
48 Additionally, prior to constructing the matrix of the coded data, a preliminary co-occurrence matrix (see 
Appendix 9) was constructed as a guiding tool. A symmetrical code-by-code matrix summed up the 
number of times a code co-occurred (overlapped to some degree) with another code. This very broadly 
hinted at some relations between codes. 
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Table XV. Example of conceptual cross-case matrix 
Subconcept Evidence (quotation) 
 NDLON CAUSA CAAELII NYIC 
Unity & 
Diversity 
• ultimately there’s a 
really strong focus that 
unites us all in focusing 
on worker development 
30-17 
• …  
• Sometimes different 
messaging or a different 
way of framing things.  
It’s a predominantly 
immigrant-based coalition 
so…  A lot of it has to do 
with geographic diversity 
as well, not just diversity 
of communities. 21-36 
• … 
• I think they come 
together and they discuss 
their different efforts, 
their different campaigns 
and they get a sense of 
being part of a larger 
group or a larger effort, 
and I think it inspires 
them. 24-11 
• …  
 
 
• But the ones we 
might not agree on, I 
think we agree to 
disagree.  So it’s not a 
perfect solution but I 
think we all understand 
that if we don’t work 
together there’s no way 
that we can move this 
forward.  I think it’s in the 
back of everybody’s 
mind. 35-19 
• …  
… • … • … • … • … 
 
Throughout the research, I was involved with “memoing,” or note-taking, especially 
regarding codes and theory construction, but also regarding operational matters (Ryan 
and Bernard 1994). Highlights and interesting facts from observation notes and post-
interview log forms were also developed into memos. I incorporated memos into my 
analysis while coding and constructing the matrices, as well as during the final write-up.  
ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Given my topic, the inherent paradoxes in network management, I am obligated to 
consider a few brief epistemological and ontological issues. The varied theoretical 
sources I draw on in this research situate it in what Lewis and Kelemen (2002) call 
multiparadigmatic research, which uses divergent paradigm lenses to contrast varied 
representations and explore plurality and paradox (e.g. Lewis and Grimes 1999; Ybema 
1996). 
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This research draws from post-positivist, critical, and constructionist paradigms49. 
Ontologically, this research assumes a “real” reality but one which is only imperfectly 
apprehendable and approachable through both measurable and unmeasurable phenomena 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994). The focus on power situates this research also within the 
boundaries of critical theory (Crotty 1998), while its consideration of meaning as 
collectively generated brings it close to constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1967; 
Schutz 1967; Searle 1995). This research, however, breaks away from post-positivism by 
incorporating contradictions and paradox and not considering falsification or null-
hypothesis rejection (Popper 1972) as the only valid research strategy (Quinn and 
Cameron 1988; Teunissen 1996), and by making the assumption that social reality can be 
illuminated even when its elements cannot be directly “measured.”   
                                                 
49 Following Guba and Lincoln (1994) and Heron and Reason (1997), I refer to post-positivist, post-
modernism, critical theory, constructionism, interpretivism, and constructivism as paradigms which imply a 
certain ontology and epistemology. Other authors refer to them either as an epistemology, a theoretical 
perspective, or an ontology. In fact, Crotty (1998) considers constructionism as an epistemology, but 
interpretivisim and critical theory as theoretical perspectives grounded in constructionism. 
 
 
5. IMMIGRATION AND NONPROFIT NETWORKS  
Ni citoyen ni étranger, ni vraiment du côté 
de Meme, ni totalment du côté de l’Autre, 
l’«immigré»se situe en ce lieu «bâtard» dont 
parle aussi Platon, la frontière de l’etre et 
du non-etre social.  
Pierre Bourdieu 
 
This chapter introduces the immigration policy field in the U.S., to which all four cases 
pertain, and locates these cases within this field. I first present a historical summary of 
immigration followed by the current debate regarding immigration in the U.S. In the 
second part of the chapter, I briefly describe the four cases according to their mission, 
activities, origins, and structural characteristics. I conclude the chapter with a comparison 
matrix highlighting differences and similarities across the cases, which will aid my 
analysis in the following chapters.   
IMMIGRATION: CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE U.S. 
As Spain beats its record on daily entries of undocumented immigrants (733) (Pardellas 
2006), and Paris’ immigrant periphery is under continual tension (Jimenez Barca 2006), 
the U.S. Congress is immersed in a heated conferential debate on immigration in general. 
Although all three situations deal in general terms with different immigrant groups—
Spain with illegal entries of African migrants, Paris with second-generation immigrants 
of North African descent, and the U.S. with undocumented residents—the extremely high 
relevance of immigration as a political and social issue is evident.  
 
According to the United Nations Population Division (2005), since 1960 the number of 




million to almost 191 million in 2005, constituting 3% of the world’s population50. 
Among these only 13.5 million of world migrants are refugees (7%)51. The countries 
receiving these immigrants also have changed. While during the’60s 57% of all migrants 
lived in the less developed regions, nowadays 64% of all migrants live in the developed 
world—Figure XV illustrates these different trends52. Three quarters of the migrant 
population are found in 28 countries, led by the United States with 38.4 millions (20.2% 
of all migrants and 12.9% of its population)53. This phenomenon has increased relevance 
of the immigration policy sector in U.S. internal affairs and, hence, also exemplifies the 
increased challenges and opportunities faced by U.S. nonprofit networks and their 
increased overall importance in the American society.  
                                                 
50 However about a fifth of this increase is the result of the transformation of internal migrants into 
international migrants—mainly due to the change in borders in the former Soviet Union. 
51 The definition, and hence the total number, of refugees is still under dispute. The United Nations only 
considers as refugees those migrants that trespass a national border and are reported by national 
governments. Other agencies also consider internally displaced people (IDPs) as refugees. (IDPs are forced 
migrants but that do not trespass a national border.) The Jesuit Refugee Service, for example, estimated the 
total number of forced migrants to be over 40 million people. (www.jesuitrefugeeservice.com) 
52 The United Nations Population Division considers all of Europe plus Northern America, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Japan as more developed regions, while the less developed regions comprise all regions of 
Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America, and the Caribbean, plus Melanesia, Micronesia and 
Polynesia. 





Figure XV. International migrants as a percentage of the host country population (source: 
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A brief history of immigration in the US 
According to Tichenor (2002), all eras in U.S. history have had strong debates on the 
economic, cultural, and national security effects of immigration, as native-born 
mythologize their own past. However, during the early decades of the U.S. Republic, 
since its founding in 1776, the governmental policy was fairly laissez-faire.  
 
The first immigration acts appeared at the end of the 19th Century, first barring prostitutes 




restrictions on immigration started at the beginning of the 20th Century: the national 
quotas were introduced in the ’20s. In 1940 the Immigration National Service (INS) was 
transferred from the Labor to the Justice Department. Later comes the first Bracero 
Program (1943)—a guest-worker program with Mexico, British Honduras, Barbados, and 
Jamaica—and the Chinese exclusion act is repealed in favor of meager quotas.  
 
Expansive immigration policies took over during the second half of the 20th Century, 
when the political debate was not along the conservative-liberal divide but between the 
rights-oriented expansionists and market-oriented expansionists (Tichenor 1994). In 1965 
the Hart-Celler Act dismantled national quotas systems and established preferences 
criteria with emphasis on family re-unification, while pro-immigration reached its highest 
mark with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which opened the possibility 
for citizenship to more than three million undocumented immigrants. This expansion may 
be explained by the enfranchisement of immigrants by the late 20th Century combined 
with democratic elections (Tichenor 2002). However, by the turn of the 21st Century, bills 
restricting immigration were being passed at both the national and state levels, in 
particular several 1996 acts that limited immigrant access to public benefits. These bills 
were nevertheless counter-fought effectively and quickly by pro-immigration forces, 





Table XVI. Overview of major U.S. immigration legislation54 
Legislation/Year Major provisions 
Immigration Act 1875 Bars prostitutes and criminals 
Chinese Exclusion Act 1882 Excludes Chinese  
National Quota Law 1921 Limits immigration of each nationality to 3% of the number of foreign-
born of that nationality living in the U.S. in 1910 
Immigration Act 1940 INS transferred from Labor to Justice Department  
Bracero Program 1943 Guestworker program with Mexico, British Honduras, Barbados, and 
Jamaica 
Act of December 17,1943 Repeals Chinese exclusion in favor of meager quotas 
Refugee Relief Act 1953 Grants permanent residence to 214.000 European refugees  
Cuban Refugee Act 1960 Begins Cuban Refugee program 
Bracero Re-Authorization 
1964 
Terminates Bracero program 
Hart-Celler Act 1965 Dismantles national quotas systems; establishes preferences criteria with 
emphasis on family re-unification 
INA Amendments 1978 Establishes worldwide ceiling on annual immigrants (290.000) 
Immigration Reform and 
Control Act 1986 
Amnesty to 3 million undocumented; establishes weak employer 
sanctions; and introduces immigration anti-discrimination agency 
Personal Responsibility Act 
1996 
Limits immigrant access to public benefits 
Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Individual Responsibility 
Act 1996 
Strengthens border enforcement; expedites deportation; establishes 
exceptions for non-citizens 
Patriot Act 2001 Confers vast and unchecked powers to the Executive branch, suspending 
many civil liberties and removing immigrants’ constitutional protection 
Homeland Security Act 2002 Transforms the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the 
Department of Justice into the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services 
(USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Real ID Act 2005 Increases the necessary evidence required both to corroborate one’s 
identity and for states to issue a driver’s license. 
Source: own based on Tichenor (2002). 
 
During this early part of the 21st Century, anti-immigration forces have gained 
momentum, especially after 9/11, and produced restrictive bills such as the Patriot Act 
2001 and the Real ID Act 2005, which, respectively, confer vast and unchecked powers 
to the Executive branch for suspending many civil liberties and removing immigrants’ 
constitutional protection, and increase the necessary evidence required both to 
corroborate one’s identity and to receive a driver’s license. The Homeland Security Act 
                                                 




of 2002, which transformed the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the 
Department of Justice into the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) a unit 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), exemplifies the political climate now 
dominant. The table below summarizes major U.S. Immigration Legislation. Of particular 
importance to us are those bills passed during the 80’s and onwards. The networks here 
studied were created in response to the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, the 
Personal Responsibility Act, or the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual 
Responsibility Act of 1996. And all have been active in combating the regressive acts 
posterior to the year 2000. 
 
Figure XVI. Annual Immigration to the United States:  Fiscal Years 1820-2004 (source: United 






















Closely following the political moods and bills passed in congress, legal immigrant 
entries to the U.S. have been rising steadily since the 40’s. Almost uninterrumptedly 
since 1986, annual legal entries have surpassed the 800.000 figure (as Figure XVI 
illustrates), highlighting the significance of the work of the immigration networks here 
studied. 
 
Figure XVII. Immigration to the U.S. in terms of origin (source: United States Department of 




















































































In terms of national/cultural origins, the immigrant flow to the U.S. has varied (as Figure 
XVII shows).55 Europeans predominated during the 19th Century and reached a peak in 
1910. From the mid 20th Century onwards, Asians and North Americans (mainly 
Mexicans) have become the main immigrant groups.  
Immigration today in the U.S. 
Immigrants, as defined by U.S. immigration law, are “persons lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the United States” (United States Department of Homeland 
Security 2005, 4). Except for when referring to figures provided by the USCIS, the 
definition of immigrants I use in this research is the one used by the networks I study, 
which also includes foreign individuals living in the U.S. without authorization—see 
Table XVII for some immigration-related official definitions. Currently, aliens may 
become immigrants by applying from abroad, or by filing from within the U.S. an 
application with the USCIS for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence.  
 
U.S. law gives preferential immigration status to persons having a close family 
relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, persons with needed job 
skills, or persons who qualify as refugees. Caps per category exist for all except refugees. 
Family-sponsored preferences are limited to 480.000 immigrants per year, employment-
based preferences to 140.000. Moreover, there is a diversity immigration quota of 55,000, 
which promotes diversity immigration calculated from a formula based on immigrant 
                                                 
55 Prior to independence in 1776, what is known today as the U.S. were a set of European (mainly French, 
English, and Spanish) colonies and Native American tribes—these latter are believed to be descendents of 




admissions during the preceding 5 years and the total population of a region. Per-country 
limits also apply and are set at 7% of the annual total (United States Department of 
Homeland Security 2005). 
 
Table XVII. Official definitions regarding immigration 
Immigrants  are persons who have been granted lawful permanent residence in the United States. 
They are also known as legal permanent residents (LPRs) or “green card” recipients. 
Refugees and 
asylees  
are persons who sought residence in the United States to avoid persecution in their 
country of origin. Persons granted refugee status applied for admission while outside the 
United States. Persons granted asylum applied either at a port of entry or at some point 
after their entry into the United States. 
Nonimmigrant 
admissions  
refer to arrivals of persons who are authorized to stay in the United States for a limited 
period of time. Most nonimmigrants enter the United States as tourists or business 
travelers, but some come to work, study, or engage in cultural exchange programs. 
Naturalizations  refer to persons ages 18 and over who become citizens of the United States. Most legal 
permanent residents are eligible to apply for naturalization within five years after 
obtaining LPR status. 
Enforcement 
actions  
include the apprehensions, investigations, detention, and removal of foreign nationals 
who are in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. These actions occur at the 
borders of the United States, in the interior of the country, and at designated sites 
outside the United States. 
Source: United States Department of Homeland Security (2006) 
 
Among the 38.4 million immigrants presently living in the U.S., there are between 11 and 
12 million undocumented. Since 2000, 850.000 unauthorized immigrants have entered 
the U.S. each year, raising 185% the total number of undocumented, from 3.9 million in 
1992 to 11.1 million in 2006. In parallel, during the same period, the number of border 
patrols rose almost by the same percentage, 179%, to 11.380 officers (Passel 2006). Of 
the estimated 11.1 millions undocumented immigrants, 7.9 million work (constituting 
4.9% of all workers—148 million) in sectors such as farming, fishing, and forestry 
(24%), cleaning (17%), construction (14%), food preparation (12%), manufacturing 




Europe and Canada (6%), Latin America (78% [Mexico 56%]), Asia (13%), and Africa 
and other locations (3%) (Passel 2006).   
 
Extraordinarily, U.S. immigrants concentrate in five states, which account for 60% of the 
nation’s total immigration:  California (8.9 million), New York (3.9), Texas (2.9), Florida 
(2.7), and Illinois (1.5).  Twenty-two other states are new growth areas, among them 
Oregon, with 290,000 immigrants in 2000 (United States Department of Homeland 
Security 2005; Capps, Passel, Lopez-Perez, and Fix 2003). Most immigrants come from 
Latin-America, Asia (China, India, Korea, and Philippines), and the Caribbean 
(Dominican Republic, Haiti, and West Indies). Figure XVIII illustrates, by region of 
birth, immigration to the four regions related to the networks included in this research: 
the three metropolitan area with most immigrants (Los Angeles-Long Beach, New York 
City, and Chicago) and the Willamette Valley in Oregon, including Portland which ranks 
28th. 
 
Currently, the U.S. has the most diverse and the largest number of immigrants in its 
history (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001a). Since the ’60s there 
has been a continual flow of immigrants due to the post-industrial economy’s voracious 
need of immigrants workers, along with family reunification policies, social forces such 
as transportation and communication, and conflicts and tensions abroad. Indeed, the third 
pillar of globalization, in addition to financial markets and communication systems, is 
immigration (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001a). Driving this 




the structural dependency on inexpensive labor, trans-nationalism, and international 
politics—as in the case of Cuba and Southeast Asia—all play an important role 
(Cornelius 2001; Portes 2001; Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001b).  
 
Figure XVIII. Immigration to metropolitan statistical areas by region of birth56 for 2004 (source: 
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More importantly perhaps, immigrants are today blended in families and communities of 
undocumented immigrants, citizens, permanent residents, and legal immigrants—3 
million children with U.S. citizenship are estimated to have at least one parent living in 
the U.S. illegally (Passel 2006). In fact, one of the networks studied here, CAAELII, has 
                                                 




among its specific advocacy activities the reunification of divided families due to 
deportations. 
 
Although the U.S. has thrived on immigration, it still causes plenty of anxiety (Suarez-
Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001d): according to recent public opinion 
poles, between 59-36% of surveyed—depending on their level of education—considered 
immigrants a burden, while between 56-35% considered them a strength (Kohut et al. 
2006)57. According to another poll—a bipartisan poll commissioned by the National 
Immigration Forum—illegal immigration was ranked as the sixth most worrying issue 
behind the Iraq war, the economy and jobs, terrorism, moral values, and health care58. 
Anxiety occurs mainly among those that support the idea of an Anglo-Saxon monolithic 
nation, as opposed to a multicultural diverse nation which does not require homogeneity 
to ensure its long-term viability (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 
2001d). In Bourdieu’s words, such anxiety arises from understanding the State as an 
expression of the Nation or, in other words, confounding citizenship with the cultural and 
linguistic (and even racial) community (Bourdieu 1991). 
 
There are three areas of policy and scholarly dispute regarding economic effects of 
immigration (Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001c). First, there is the 
fiscal question: does immigration cost more than what it pays the system? Most 
                                                 
57 Similarly, in Spain immigration is considered the second most important problem, preceded, in fact, only 
by unemployment (El Pais 2005). 
58 Preliminary results are available at http://www.tarrance.com/Immigration_Presentation.pdf (accessed 




responsible economists would concur that fiscal costs of immigration are outweighed by 
the gains (Tichenor 1994, Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001c, 
International Organization for Migration 2005). The second question regards labor: does 
immigration depress native-workers’ wages? Some scholars have highlighted the relative 
decline of immigrants’ skills and low earnings (Borjas 2001), while others point out that  
low-skilled immigration increases the “intractable” black problem (poverty and social 
exclusion among African-Americans) by competing with African-Americans for the low-
skill jobs (Tichenor 1994). To the contrary, the preponderance of evidence suggests that 
immigration has not affected the fortunes of native-born workers (Suarez-Orozco, 
Suarez-Orozco, and Quin-Hiliard 2001c). Last, there is the issue of the opportunity 
structure: how immigrants advance economically. Here, there seems to be evidence that 
the immigration assimilation pattern is dimorphic: some immigrants thrive, while many 
others struggle to survive (Portes and Zhou 2001). Furthermore, second-generation 
immigrants often decline on the economic and social ladder as they are unwilling to pick 
up jobs carried out by their parents and, hence, go on to join other excluded minorities in 
their fate (Gans 2001). 
The current debate 
The debate of two bills currently occurring in conference between the two chambers of 
Congress has been named by the New York Times (Swarns 2006b) as “the most 
substantial overhaul of immigration law in 20 years.” While the House passed legislation 
in December 2005 that offered no provision for citizenship, the Senate debated during 




which the networks studied are central actors as I show next—promoted and successfully 
carried out several rallies during March and May as the headlines of the day-after editions 
of major newspapers proved (Monge 2006)59: the New York Times called it “the largest 
effort made by immigrants to influence public policy in recent memory” (Archibold 
2006). 
 
In between, President Bush, while initially in favor of the bill in the House, seems to have 
now positioned himself in a middle path (Davey and Blumenthal 2006) unsatisfying 
many on both flanks. In fact, President Bush must walk a fine line between the House bill 
supported by the conservative base, which are border-focused, and the Senate bill, 
supported by democrats, moderate republicans, and Hispanic voters, which is in favor of 
providing a legalization path to the eleven million undocumented (Davey and Blumenthal 
2006)—see Appendix 11 for tabulated summary of debate.60 
FOUR CASES OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION IN THE 
IMMIGRATION POLICY FIELD: UNITING IMMIGRANTS61 
This chapter’s second part describes the four cases and situates them in the immigration 
policy context. The section proceeds thematically by describing comparatively all four 
                                                 
59 Even the satirical newspaper “The Onion” covered these events in its frontpage (The Onion 2006) as did 
the New York City’s liberal Village Voice (2006).  
60 The New York Times’ editorial of may 21st (New York Times 2006) pointed towards the issues that the 
immigration reform has to tackle if a reasonable progressive solution is to be reached, which included 
among others: avoid fixation with the border and not treating immigration as a pest control problem, 
decreasing the vulnerability of the undocumented immigrants by increasing enforcement in employees and 
avoiding a guest-worker program, and seriously facing the xenophobic climate prevalent in the House.  
61 Descriptive information here produced comes from interviews, internal documents, and the networks’ 
website: www.thenyic.org; http://www.open.org/~mano/eng_causa.html; www.caaelii.org; and 




cases per theme—such as mission, origin, area of work, and so on—rather than entirely 
reviewing each case in sequence. Nevertheless, in order to give some depth and nuance to 
each case, I start off—in Table XVIII—with a brief vignette (Marshall and Rossman 
1995) of each network. 
Table XVIII. Vignettes of the four cases 
 
New York Immigration Coalition: NYIC 
Following the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which made eligible 3 million 
immigrants for legal status, NYIC was founded to provide a forum for the immigrant community to discuss 
urgent issues and provide a vehicle for collective action in addressing these issues.  The three million 
immigrants eligible to citizenship provoked an increase in demand for immigrant services, such as 
education to prepare the citizenship exam, and administrative support in registration processes. In 1987, 
these broad changes fuelled discussions among a small group of immigration reform advocates, who began 
working to create a locally based advocacy organization: the New York Immigration Coalition. Initially 
composed and led by large non-immigrant service providing organizations, NYIC slowly started 
incorporating immigrant community based organizations—as the larger organizations shared their power—
to reach its current large/small immigrant/non-immigrant balanced membership. 
Civic and voter participation is one of NYIC’s issue areas. The NYIC builds immigrant voting power 
through its nationally-known New Citizen Voter Registration Project. The largest voter registration project 
in New York State and the most successful initiative of its kind in the country, the project has registered 
more than 220,000 new citizens to vote over the past eight years. The secret of NYIC’s success in this area 
has been its continued outreach and presence at nearly all citizenship swearing-in ceremonies in the New 
York metropolitan area and a cadre of over 300 well-trained, highly-committed volunteers from all walks 
of life. NYIC volunteers don’t just register people to vote—they talk to them about the democratic process 
and the vital importance of exercising the franchise. The underlying message is a simple one: get out and 
vote, it’s the only way to make life better for your family and community! 
 
CAUSA: Oregon’s Immigrant Rights Coalition 
CAUSA—whose mission is to promote immigrant rights and well-being, and to counter the growing anti-
immigrant agenda in Oregon—was formed in 1995 to challenge a bill that would deny welfare to 
immigrants in Arizona, a bill similar to the one that passed in California a year earlier. Different groups—
including the Northwest Treeplanters and Farmworkers United and the Rural Organizing Project—joined to 
defeat anti-immigrant ballot measures then being prepared for circulation to Oregon voters. The measures 
sought to deny benefits, driving privileges, and public education to undocumented persons, and to deputize 
public officials, police, and educators as immigration agents. CAUSA was set up to combat this bill and 
ultimately contributed to its failure.  
Apart from including other areas of work in their agenda, CAUSA has kept doing advocacy and lobbying. 
In the Oregon State legislature, during 2003 CAUSA defended the annual cost-of-living increase for 
Oregon’s minimum wage, immigrants’ access to a driver’s license, and together with allies as the American 
Civil Liberties Union preserved the Oregon statute that prohibits local police from collaborating with 
immigration authorities. In 2005, CAUSA worked with allies to beat back over 18 anti-immigrant/anti-
worker bills in the Oregon State Legislature, again preserving immigrants’ access to a driver’s license, the 
annual increase to the minimum wage, and defeating anti-farmworker legislation. In addition, to break the 
post 9/11 inertia, CAUSA led, together with other civil rights organizations, a one-week 70-mile march 
involving more than 2500 people. Named the Walk for Truth, Justice & Community, the march went from 
Salem to Portland and called for the rights of children, the rights of immigrant workers, the rights of the 






Coalition of African, Asian, European, and Latino Immigrants of Illinois: CAAELII 
In 1996, in Chicago, CAAELII was formed propelled by the anti-immigrant tone of the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility Act. A handful of immigrant groups (such as the Arab American Action Network and 
Chinese Mutual Aid Association) began to meet informally to discuss ways to work together to enhance 
their voice in immigrant policy and politics, and coalesced around the problem of poor and slow service of 
the local Chicago Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)62 office.  Its mission is to improve the 
quality of life for immigrants and ensure dignity and respect by organizing and uniting communities and by 
promoting the voice of community in public policy. CAAELII began as an avenue for agencies to pool 
resources and ideas when teaching citizenship classes to immigrants and refugees seeking to apply for 
citizenship, recruiting and training volunteer citizenship teachers, and advocating for immigrant and 
refugee rights. 
One of CAAELII’s major areas of work is the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB). A study conducted by 
CAAELII in 1999 documented 1,031 cases of abuses and mistreatments of the former Chicago District INS 
Office.  CAAELII discovered that many of the errors stemmed from basic problems, such as lost files and 
failure to update a simple change of address.  An independent accountability council, the Independent 
Monitoring Board, was established thereafter to address the needs to the local community. Since its 
inception, the IMB has grown from a local grassroots initiative to reach national scope as it impacted 
change in policy with the creation of a national immigration ombudsman within the new Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). 
 
National Day Labor Organizing Network: NDLON 
In July of 1999 after a football match, a group of day-laborers from different day-labor centers (both 
independent centers and centers organized by pro-immigrant nonprofits) initiated the formation of a 
network of day-labor centers. The network would develop the collective capacity to analyze and address 
the systematic issues of exploitation and injustice that disempower day laborers and other low-wage 
immigrant workers, since most of the issues that day laborers confront are not just local issues, requiring 
instead broader implications and broad-based strategizing, organizing, and solutions. In 2000, the Coalition 
for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles and the Central American refugee nonprofit CASA of 
Maryland, among others, found NDLON “to strengthen and expand the work of local day laborer 
organizing groups, in order to become more effective and strategic in building leadership, advancing low-
wage worker and immigrant rights, and developing successful models for organizing immigrant 
contingent/temporary workers.” In the last seven years, by creating structures and relations of coordination 
and mutual support, and forming a unified national agenda, NDLON has moved day laborers from 
invisibility to visibility; from lack of representation to self-representation, from oblivion to hope.  
One of NDLON’s area of work is ensuring day-laborers’ civil and human rights. Because of associated 
with the deterioration of the neighborhoods in which they seek employment, day laborers are extremely 
vulnerable to violations of their constitutional rights: in particular, the criminalization of seeking 
employment. Many municipalities around the country have promoted ordinances that prohibit seeking 
employment on public property and restrict perspective employers’ ability to hire day laborers from public 
areas. Because NDLON strongly believes that looking for work is not a crime, it has joined up with other 
non-member human rights organizations to initiate a campaign challenging these laws in Federal Court, 
particularly in those municipalities that do not offer alternatives for day laborers to earn a living. In fact, 
NDLON’s first success, in 2000, was to repel an anti-solicitation bill passed in Los Angeles.  
 
A century ago, urban political machines provided institutional support to new 
immigrants—often in unsavory ways such as offering jobs for votes—as did the religious 
institutions and some of the nation’s most respected nonprofit organizations, for example 
                                                 




through settlement houses (Dodge, Ospina, and Sparrow 2004). However, these efforts 
were limited given the sheer numbers and the charity orientation. A couple of decades 
ago, recent immigrant service and advocacy organizations focused on specific immigrant 
groups and specific services (e.g. legal assistance involving citizenship and work 
permits), and worked quite independently of each other. This was as true for the country 
in general as for New York City,   Chicago, and the Willamette Valley, Oregon.    
 
The work of all the networks here studied—the New York Immigration Coalition 
(NYIC), CAUSA (in Oregon), the Coalition of African, Asian, European, and Latin 
Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), and the National Day Labor Organizing Network 
(NDLON)—supports members of the immigrant communities in New York City, 
Oregon, Chicago, and country-wide, respectively.  
 
Table XIX. Mission of networks 
Name Mission  
NYIC 
(NY) 
To provide a forum for the immigrant community to discuss urgent issues and provide a 
vehicle for collective action in addressing these issues.   
CAUSA 
(OR) 
To promote immigrant rights and well-being, and to counter the growing anti-immigrant 
agenda in Oregon. 
CAAELII 
(IL) 
To improve the quality of life for immigrants and refugees and to ensure dignity and respect 
by organizing and uniting communities through education, leadership development, and direct 
services, and by promoting the voice of community in public policy. 
NDLON 
(USA) 
To strengthen and expand the work of local day laborer organizing groups, in order to become 
more effective and strategic in building leadership, advancing low-wage worker and 
immigrant rights, and developing successful models for organizing immigrant 
contingent/temporary workers. 
 
As Table XIX indicates, all four networks clearly focus on improving the conditions of 
immigrants; however, they all have slightly varying missions. NYIC’s highlights its 




the counteracting of the “anti-immigrant agenda.” Both CAAELII and NDLON highlight 
the organizing dimension, but the latter concentrates on the specific subgroup of 
immigrant temporary workers. 
Programs and areas of work 
To achieve their missions, these networks deliver different programs. 
The work includes education, both civic and technical—such as English and computing 
literacy—advocacy of immigration rights and well-being, and leadership development 
and organizing. Table XX summarizes these different areas of works. 
 
Table XX. Areas of work of networks 
Coalition Community education Advocacy Leadership development 
NYIC Civic & Voter Ed.   
Community Ed. 
Policy Analysis and 
Advocacy (in employment, 
education, housing, 
participation, and health) 
Immigrant Concerns 
Training Inst. 
Immigrant Advocacy fellows 
CAAELII English & Civics Ed. 







CAUSA Community awareness 
activities  
 











Community civic and technical education 
All networks carry out some educational and awareness-raising activities directly to their 
member organizations’ constituents, in addition to the organizing and leadership 
development of their member organizations. CAUSA, for example, tries to increase civic 
participation and awareness of civil rights among immigrants through Town Hall 




NDLON, to develop organizing and leadership, uses education as its fundamental tool, 
where day-laborers from one member group’s center are invited to visit another center, 
promoting cross-learning and multiplying it as each visiting day-labor returns to his or 
her  own center again.63 Another issue around which constituents are trained regards legal 
issues and how to respond when under legal or physical attack. 
 
NYIC helps “increase the political power” of immigrant and refugee communities 
through voter registration projects, with more than 100 voter education events each year,  
and voter mobilization efforts for elections, with more than 235,000 new citizens 
registered through its New Citizen Voter Registration Project. Moreover, NYIC develops 
educational materials (more than a million copies of dozens of brochures and fact sheets) 
in as many as twelve languages on important issues such as new developments in 
immigration law, the citizenship process, school registration, health care access, and 
voting rights; NYIC also works with ethnic and mainstream media outlets to disseminate 
important information to immigrant families. 
 
CAAELII provides integrated English literacy and civics education to immigrant and 
other limited English-proficient populations to encourage community members to 
become active. Moreover, through its Computer Technology Project, CAAELII tries to 
bridge the Digital Divide for its partner agencies while providing curriculum for low 
literacy English students. 
                                                 
63 In NDLON’s case in particular, distinguishing between member organizational leaders and constituents 





NYIC focuses on laws, policies, and practices that affect immigrants and the 
communities in which they live. Current priorities include fighting for broad legalization 
and comprehensive immigration reform measures; increasing the availability of 
integration services such as English programs, legal services, and citizenship classes; 
ensuring civil rights; and improving immigrants’ access to quality health care, education, 
and safe and affordable housing. 
 
Countering nativism and scapegoating by raising public awareness of immigrants in 
Oregon and responding to legislative attacks against immigrant rights and benefits are 
CAUSA’s main lines of action regarding advocacy. These actions are done in the form of 
campaigns, such as the Dream Act, the Congressional Immigration Reform, the Mexican 
Consulate Campaign, and regional campaigns. 
 
NDLON’s advocacy work focuses on legalization for undocumented immigrants by 
advancing towards a new legalization program providing for undocumented day laborers 
legal immigration status that would alleviate many of the labor and civil rights abuses as 
well as many of the needs and problems of immigrant communities in the United States. 
NDLON is part of the existing national legalization campaigns (via its members—see 
below) to ensure that whatever policy is created will facilitate the integration of day 
                                                 
64 According to the 1979 Lobby Law and the Internal Revenue Service, the difference between advocacy 
and lobbying is that the latter tries to influence a specific piece of legislation while the former specifies a 
position on a general policy matter. While in the U.S. nonprofits are allowed to lobby, they have to limit it 
either to an “insubstantial” part of its activity or to a maximum of 5-20% (depending on the total amount) 




laborers into the larger American society65. Moreover, based on the need to defend basic 
human rights, particularly the right to work and/or solicit employment, NDLON fights to 
enforce the existing labor laws and for new policies with better protections for workers. 
In NDLON’s advocacy, public awareness and media play an important role in changing 
public perception of day laborers. 
 
Beyond its specific actions focused at punctual legislation, with the support of 44 
endorsing organizations, CAAELII’s Independent Monitoring Board serves as an 
independent, nongovernmental watchdog to ensure that the USCIS treats the public with 
fairness and in a professional and timely manner.66 
 
One of the primary institutional targets of all networks are the public agencies addressing 
immigration policy at the local, state, and federal level:  city councils, state legislatures, 
congress, and USCIS.  Because all focus on issues of quality of life, they also aspire to 
influence other public institutions associated with education, health, and welfare, for 
example Department of Health, or law enforcement agencies. 
                                                 
65 This is an important point since in many negotiations between pro- and anti-immigrants, according to 
many day-laborers the first subgroup to be “sacrificed” by the pro-immigrants are the day-laborers 
themselves. In fact, as the New York Times’ editorial of July 10th 2006 pointed out, the day-laborers have 
nothing to win from the current debate in the U.S. Congress, not even from the Senate’s more liberal bill 
(Downes 2006). 
66 According to information provided by USCIS itself (United States Department of Homeland Security 
2005), at the end of fiscal year 2003, there were 1,200,000 adjustments of status cases pending a decision; 
the number of persons granted lawful permanent residence in the U.S. declined 34% to 705,827 in fiscal 
year 2003 from 1,063,732 in fiscal year 2002, due primarily to security checks that affected application 




Leadership development and organizing 
Through its Immigrant Concerns Training Institute, The New York Immigration 
Coalition offers a full calendar of workshops and seminars on topics critical for 
organizations, social service providers, and attorneys serving immigrant communities— 
the Institute also provides public education events covering immigration law and 
immigrant rights issues to the community at large. In addition, its Immigrant Advocacy 
fellows program helps immigrant leaders create “more powerful and politically relevant” 
organizations. CAUSA also focuses on building member leadership through its program 
CAPACES, its leadership development program. 
 
Regarding leadership building, NDLON strengthens existing, and helps create new, job 
centers to help protect the rights of all people involved67. Also, according to NDLON, “in 
order to achieve the unity necessary to resolve problems,” organizing and leadership are 
necessary. Organizing, or building power in NDLON’s own terms, also uses “cultural 
fusion,” such as a day-laborer band and soccer leagues: “The work isn't all about 
fighting,” says NDLON’s current manager. 
 
At CAAELII, the lead organizer works with the staff organizers from each participating 
agency to develop the community groups to work towards social justice for Chicago's 
immigrant and refugee communities. Moreover, modeled after Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 
                                                 
67 However, NDLON promotes only those centers that meet certain criteria: Centers must be visible, 
accessible, and close to where day laborers originally congregated; they must promote real participation of 




Highlander Center68, CAAELII’s Citizenship and Voter Training School (CIVITAS) 
creates a space for reflection where community leaders can join together with others who 
share their concerns.  
The networks’ origins 
All four networks were fueled initially by a real concrete challenge. NYIC arose to aid 
the legalization process following the 1987 IRCA. CAUSA was formed in 1995 to 
challenge a bill that would deny welfare to immigrants in Arizona, a bill similar to the 
one that passed in California a year earlier. In 1996, in Chicago, CAAELII also was 
formed to repel anti-immigration acts. Similarly, NDLON’s first action was to repel an 
anti-solicitation bill passed in Los Angeles.  
 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which made eligible 3 million 
undocumented workers and aliens and their families for legal status, broadened the 
services for immigrants and sparked collaboration among organizations.  This act altered 
the demographic landscape of the U.S. and changed the legal status of many immigrants.  
Heavily oriented toward refugees and their issues prior to the IRCA, most advocates 
quickly changed the focus to the new immigrant-citizens (or citizens-to-be). These were 
quite different from previous immigrant groups and required more assistance in language 
skills, workforce integration, training, and other social services.  In New York, these 
                                                 
68 The Highlander Center was founded in 1932 to serve as an adult education center for community workers 
involved in social and economic justice movements. The goal of Highlander was and is to provide 
education and support to poor and working people fighting economic injustice, poverty, prejudice, and 





broad changes fueled discussions among a small group of immigration reform advocates, 
who began working to create a locally based advocacy organization. They also wanted to 
respond to the downside of IRCA, which was passed to control and deter illegal 
immigration to the United States. In 1987, this group helped create the New York 
Immigration Coalition.  
 
Ten years later, in 1995, CAUSA was founded by different groups to defeat anti-
immigrant ballot measures then being prepared for circulation to Oregon voters. A year 
before the Personal Responsibility Act had been passed in California that limited 
immigrant access to public benefits. CAUSA was set up to combat this bill and ultimately 
contributed to its failure. The proponents of this restrictive bill did not manage to qualify 
it for the November 1996 ballot.  
 
A similar development occurred in Chicago, propelled by the anti-immigrant tone of the 
1996 Personal Responsibility Act. A handful of immigrant groups began to meet 
informally to discuss ways to work together to enhance their voice in immigrant policy 
and politics, and coalesced around the problem of poor and slow service of the local 
Chicago Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)69 office.  A grant issued to the 
group to study the problem in 1998 motivated Chicago immigrant activists to seize the 
moment, and CAAELII became a formal and proactive organization. 
 
                                                 




In July of 1999, after a football match between day-laborers from different day-labor 
centers, some day-laborer groups analyzed the strategy to create a national network to 
address some of the particular challenges all groups had in common in organizing day 
laborers. Most of the issues that day laborers confront are not just local issues, requiring 
instead broader implications and broad-based strategizing, organizing, and solutions that 
go beyond the local day-labor center. In 2000 NDLON was founded, and the first 
national session was held in Los Angeles in July 2001, where workers and organizers met 
and talked, and celebrated the overturn of an anti-day laborer ordinance in Los Angeles 
County.  
Major accomplishments of coalition work  
That these coalitions have been formed within the dispersed and isolated immigration 
environments is an achievement in itself. As one of the founders of the NYIC says: “It is 
quite astonishing that there existed no immigration coalition in New York prior to 1987.  
Moreover, the City of New York had no organizational reflection of immigration and 
immigrant issues until [around 1990].”  Similarly, a staff member of a CAAELII co-
founder organization recalls a comparable environment in Chicago prior to CAAELII’s 
existence:  "For 14 years we didn't meet with anybody," he said, and added that until then 
there was no connection with other immigrant groups in the city. Similarly, in Oregon no 
immigration coalition existed prior to CAUSA, nor was there any unifying body for day-
labor centers across states or the whole country. However, these networks have major 




Leadership for a Changing World Award—Table XXI lists some of these major 
accomplishments. 
 
Table XXI. Major accomplishments beyond the LCW awards 
CAAELII set up and runs the Independent Monitoring Board in Illinois. 
CAUSA has played a critical role in defeating more than 10 major anti-immigration bills in Oregon. 
NDLON has repealed several anti-solicitation ordinances, and coordinator selected as one of the 25 
most influential Latinos in the U.S. 
NYIC has played a critical role in defeating more than 10 major anti-immigration bills in New York 
State, has registered for voting more than 60,000 people, and has helped legalize more than 
200,000. 
 
An accomplishment of these networks is their sustainability and effectiveness, and the 
stability they all have shown for at least a decade—two in NYIC’s case. Their reputations 
and credibility are also strong.  For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, their 
executive directors70 received the Leadership for a Changing World award, which 
rewards leaders tackling critical social problems with effective and systemic solutions, 
enacting leadership that is strategic, bringing different groups of people together, and 
sustaining results beyond any individual effort.  Given the 50:1 nominee to awardee ratio, 
the rigor of the selection process, and the selection criteria, we may consider these 
organizations highly credible exemplars of success.  
 
In addition, each coalition can document mission-specific achievements. For example, 
CAAELII organized a petition campaign, with more than 19,000 signatures, for the INS 
reform, which resulted in the creation of an Independent Monitoring Board of 44 
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organizations that acts as a watchdog group and pushes immigration reform. So far, the 
board has sent approximately 800 documented cases to INS and to members of Congress, 
detailing the experiences of immigrants and refugees “caught in a seemingly endless INS 
backlog.” Since 1996, CAAELII has also facilitated the partnering of immigrant and 
refugee groups to jointly develop educational curricula, participate in teacher exchanges, 
and work together on common problems that affect immigrants and refugees.  
 
Likewise, NYIC enrolled over 60,000 members of immigrant families in an immigrant 
voter education and mobilization campaign for the 2000 elections, which resulted in the 
registration of more than 200,000 new citizens. NYIC advocacy campaigns have won 
millions of city and state dollars in recent years to expand legal services and English 
classes for New York's immigrants. The coalition played a critical role in the 1997 and 
1998 national campaigns to restore Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits to 
elderly and disabled immigrants and food stamps denied to immigrants by the 1996 
Personal Responsibility Act.  
 
CAUSA’s successes date back to its inception. Founded in 1995 to defeat anti-immigrant 
ballot measures then being prepared for circulation to Oregon voters, CAUSA 
contributed to the failure of the proponents to qualify any of the initiatives for the 
November 1996 ballot. Two years later, in 1998, the same initiative proponents re-
submitted two of the previously presented four measures, both of which were again 
defeated. In 1999 CAUSA defeated attempts by the Oregon legislature to pass an English 




2000, CAUSA celebrated a major victory by putting pressure on Oregon to end a harsh 
time-limit on receipt of food stamps by under- and unemployed adults.  In March and 
April of 2001, CAUSA defeated an attempt to end bilingual education in Oregon by 
mobilizing hundreds of people. On a national level, CAUSA has been at the forefront in 
leading the fight again re-introduction of the Bracero guest-worker program71.  In 2003 
CAUSA launched a major organizing effort to protect the immigrant community from a 
series of policies, measures, and laws attacking the immigrant community in the name of 
homeland security. CAUSA was a key partner in making the 2003 Immigrant Worker 
Freedom Ride a complete success. Fifty-seven CAUSA members adding up to 
approximately 1000 people took part in the immigrant worker Freedom Ride to New 
York. 
 
In 2000, NDLON struck down an anti-solicitation ordinance in Los Angeles County. 
Because of this victory, over 25,000 day laborers in Los Angeles continue to solicit 
employment in public places. NDLON has made four additional legal challenges to 
similar ordinances around the country and has played a fundamental role in the creation 
of seven day-worker centers funded by the City of Los Angeles. The network has also 
worked with the University of California, Los Angeles, to develop a first-of-its-kind 
national survey of day laborers (Valenzuela, Theodore, Meléndez, and Gonzalez 2006).  
NDLON is currently working with several members of Congress to secure the passage of 
the National Day Laborer Fairness and Protection Act, which would ensure safe and 
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healthy work environments for all day laborers. Also, NDLON is working with labor 
unions to improve relations with immigrants. Moreover, its executive director, Pablo 
Alvarado, was selected in 2005 by TIME Magazine as one of “The 25 Most Influential 
Hispanics in America” (Time 2005). 
 
In addition to the accomplishments summarized in the above table, in the current 2006 
debate on immigration reform taking place in the U.S. Congress, these organizations have 
spearheaded the progressive pro-immigration side. The impressive turnout in rallies 
promoted in part by these networks is revealing. In Los Angeles’ March 25th rally, up to 
500.000 participants were counted, and the Los Angeles Times (2006) quoted 
representatives from NDLON’s CHIRLA and CARECEN in its coverage (Gorman, 
Keller, and Suarez 2006)—the same turnout was registered on the May 2nd mobilizations. 
Moreover, in June only, NDLON has had two New York Times editorials dedicated to it 
(Downes 2006; Greenhouse 2006). CAAELI-led rallies brought together 100.000 and 
400.000 marchers on March 11th and May 1st, respectively, in Chicago.   Its member, the 
Korean American Resource and Cultural Center, was cited in the Chicago Tribune on 
May 2nd (Chicago Tribune 2006).  The CAUSA-led rally of April 9th in Salem drew 
20.000 people, while NYIC’s executive director was quoted in The New York Times 




Organizational and structural characteristics 
Membership 
CAUSA comprises sixteen organizations and more than sixty grassroot organizations, 
many of which are serving the neediest parts of the Latino immigrant population in 
Oregon, who tend to be poor and working class,  may have little or no education, and 
may not be literate in Spanish (due to speaking an indigenous language) or English. Its 
constituency is largely Latino—95% Mexican—encompassing a wide-range of 
experiences from pioneers who settled in the area several generations ago to recent 
undocumented immigrants. Member groups of CAUSA include a social service 
organization serving the local population, Oregon’s only farmworker union, and another 
organization which serves primarily immigrant day laborers (see Figure XXVII for a 
CAUSA’s organizational membership and regional and national affiliations). Political 
influences mentioned by many of the organizers and participants in CAUSA include the 
philosophy and work of César Chávez72; experience working in the solidarity movements 
which supported social movements and popular opposition organizations in Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico; and experience in farm-worker organizing. Some have 
engaged in community organizing and working with youth before coming to CAUSA. 
Participants in CAUSA articulate “immigrant rights,” “fighting racism,” “ending 
discrimination,” and “worker/labor rights” as some of their key points of struggle. 
 
                                                 





The other network based in the West, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network 
(NDLON), is a collaborative between thirty community-based organizations that organize 
day laborers in different parts of the country. Constituents are principally Latin-
American, but some Africans, Asians, and African-Americans are also present. To 
become a member of NDLON a group must, at a minimum, be community-based, have a 
mission of organizing day laborers, and promote the democratic participation of day 
laborers in the organization. Moreover, it must accept NDLON’s stated principles of 
solidarity, service to the day-laborer, faithfulness, honesty, strong conviction of the 
reasons of the “fighting,” (self)-criticism, gender parity, multiculturalism, pluralism, and 
self-determination. 
 
CAAELII serves immigrants and refugees throughout the Chicago metropolitan area 
through its 20 partner agencies’ sites in major ethnic communities throughout the city and 
suburbs. CAAELII specifically serves Arab, Bosnian, Cambodian, Chinese, Ethiopian, 
Indian, Korean, Laotian, Latino and Vietnamese populations with native language 
programs.  
 
NYIC is an umbrella policy and advocacy organization for approximately 150 groups in 
New York State that work with immigrants and refugees. The NYIC’s multi-ethnic, 
multi-racial, and multi-sector membership73 includes grassroots community 
                                                 
73 NYIC’s members fall into three different categories, organizational, governmental and individual 




organizations, not-for-profit health and human services organizations, religious and 
academic institutions, labor unions, and legal, social, and economic justice organizations.  
 
Appendix 12 includes the list of the four networks’ organizational members. It is worth 
noting here once again, though, that these networks have highly organizationally diverse 
members. CAAELII members include organizations serving from a couple of thousand 
clients a year to up to twenty thousand. In NYIC the range is even larger with some 
organizations serving more than 800,000 Latinos per year. Similarly, CAUSA includes 
PCUN, which serves thousands of farm workers, as well as Latinos Unidos Siempre 
(LUS), which is made up of a couple dozen young immigrant activists. NDLON’s 
membership is also highly diverse: it includes members who are simply an organized 
group of day-laborers, but also large organizations for whom organizing day-laborers is 
but one program. 
 
Moreover, these four networks—NDLON, CAUSA, NYIC, and CAEELII—are 
interlinked both via national umbrella movements as through organizational members74. 
For example, VOZ from Portland is both a member of CAUSA and NDLON. Similarly, 
different regional chapters of CARECEN are members of NYIC and NDLON (the 
California chapter is a member of the latter). Additionally, NYIC and CAUSA are 
members of the organizing committee of the Fair Immigration Reform Movement 
(FIRM), as are CHIRLA—one of NDLON’s founding member and its current fiscal 
sponsor—and the Northwest Federation of Community Organizations (NWFCO), a 
                                                 




regional network covering several Northwestern states of which CAUSA is part. Also 
supporting FIRM are several organizational members of NYIC and NDLON.  
 
CAUSA and CAAELII collaborate with the National Network for Immigrant and 
Refugee Rights (NNIRR), where NDLON’s Centro Legal La Raza (San Francisco, CA) 
and NYIC’s CAAAV Organizing Asian Communities (New York, NY) are members of 
the board of directors. Several other NDLON and NYIC members also support NIRR. 
 
Similarly, these networks interrelate again through the nation-wide New American 
Opportunity Campaign (NAOC) promoted by Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform’s (CCIR). In CCIR’s board of directors are NYIC, Pineros Campesinos Unidos 
del Noroeste (PCUN)—one of CAUSA’s founding members—and CHIRLA. In addition, 
CAAELII and NDLON’s Tonatierra (from Arizona), with others, have founded the 
national network Break The Chains, focused on labor rights. Lastly, the National 
Immigration Forum also interlinks all four networks, since CAAELII supports it and 
CAUSA’s PCUN, NDLON’s CHIRLA, and NYIC’s Hebrew Immigration Aid Society 
are members of the board of directors. Lastly, CAUSA, NYIC, and NDLON all come 
together in different ways in the national meta-alliance We Are America Alliance 
(WAAA), a newly-forming nationwide alliance of immigrant, grassroots, labor, local, 
statewide and national organizations. Figure XIX illustrates the multiple interrelations 










CAUSA’s fiscal sponsor is Mano A Mano Family Center since CAUSA is not a 
registered nonprofit 75. CAUSA’s board membership—made up of one representative of 
each organizational member—is 52 percent women, about 60 percent Latino, and more 
than 65 percent people of color.  The Board monitors the coordinator and has at present 
two standing committees: fundraising and internal development. At a state-level, CAUSA 
identifies new immigrant leaders through its four part-time regional coordinators, 
supporting individuals  to promote, mobilize, and educate around different issues (e.g. 
                                                 
75 A nonprofit needs to register with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under section 501(c)(3) to be tax-





legalization). The objective is to have a local community network in place in each of 
those regional areas. 
 
NDLON’s Annual Assembly is the highest decision-making body. The assembly sets the 
strategy and elects, via voting candidates per regions, the board of directors. Internally, 
NDLON has created a committee for each area of work. Each committee has a work plan 
that emerged from the ideas put forward and discussed at the national gathering. Regular 
telephone conferences and personal visits keep leaders informed. One of NDLON’s 
current goals is to develop its internal structure with its bylaws and internal policies and 
procedures, and register as a tax exempt nonprofit, since at present CHIRLA is its fiscal 
sponsor. As for CAUSA, NDLON’s staff structure comprises both regional and 
functional coordinators. NDLON’s employs five people in total: a National Coordinator, 
a West Coordinator, an East Coordinator, a Development Director, and a Legal 
Program’s Coordinator. 
 
CAAELII has a representative of each organization on the board and is currently 
registering with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as a tax exempt nonprofit; 
meanwhile, the member Chinese Mutual Aid Association is the fiscal sponsor.76 
Comprising nine employees, its structure is divided into three parts: Adult Education and 
Policy, which includes the CIVITAS programs; Communication and Development; and 
the Community Organization, which includes the Immigration Monitoring Board. 
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NYIC has currently 19 staff members and 22 board members, which are elected from the 
more than 100 organizational members. Under the executive director, the staff is divided 
into immigration and integration. The former is subdivided into training, legal issues, and 
civil rights. The integration aspect of the work is thematically divided into employment, 
education, housing, participation, and health.  
 
Figure XX. Networks organigrams77 (source: own) 
 
 
                                                 






NYIC has the largest budget, totaling slightly more than 2 million USD, followed by 
CAAELII with 1.6 million USD. With a far smaller budget comes NDLON’s 290.000 
USD, while CAUSA has the smallest budget, 195.000USD. These latter two do not 
accept government funds, while NYIC and CAAELII do, 25% and 63% respectively.   
 
Table XXII. Structural summary of networks 
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The four cases may be divided into different groups that facilitate the subsequent analysis 
of the collected data (Eisenhardt 1989). A first grouping of the cases puts CAUSA and 
NDLON in one group and NYIC and CAAELII in the other. The latter networks have a 
metropolitan reach, a more diverse constituency, are not based in the West, and have 
larger budgets (and accept governmental funding). In contrast, NDLON and CAUSA are 
based in the West, have a more homogeneous constituency, and their area of action is 
                                                 
78 PH: philanthropic institution; GG: government grants, OT: other, including membership dues, program 
fees, donations, and unspecified “in-kind.” 




larger: state-wide for CAUSA and nation-wide for NDLON. It may be added that, while 
all networks draw a lot from the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King Jr., 
NDLON and CAUSA draw perhaps more on the figure of Cesar Chavez for inspiration, 
probably due to their Hispanic culture and labor-oriented focus. 
 
Table XXIII. Comparison groups between cases 
Reach Metropolitan  State, National 
Constituency Diverse  Latino  
Headquarters West  East, Midwest 
Budget Large  Small 
Inspiration source 
CAAELII & NYIC 
M.L. King  C. Chavez 
CAUSA & 
NDLON 
Membership size Medium  Large 
Registered 
CAAELII, CAUSA & 
NDLON No  Yes 
NYIC 
Focus General  Specific 
Decision-making  
CAAELII, CAUSA & 
NYIC Board  Assembly 
NDLON 
 
Another grouping sets aside NYIC from the rest, given its registered status and large 
membership. Yet a third division differentiates between NDLON and the rest, since its 
ultimate decision-making body is the assembly, as opposed to the board, and it is focused 
in a specific sub-group of immigrants but over the entire country. 
 
 
6. THE INWARD MANAGEMENT OF THE NETWORK: UNITING 
IN DIVERSITY 
There is a big question about why the 
cultivation of singularity is so successful, 
given the extraordinary naivete of the thesis 
in a world of obviously plural affiliations 
Amartya Sen. “Identity and violence.” 
 
The next two chapters deal with the unity/diversity paradox. The first chapter addresses 
the first secondary question with respect to this internal paradox. It shows that the 
internal paradox was present in all four networks and looks at how each of the poles that 
constitute the paradox occurred. While all networks united around identity, vision, and 
the value of diversity, all are diverse regarding member size, member organizational 
culture, and member ideology among others.  
THE UNITY/DIVERSITY PARADOX: INDIVIDUALITY AND COLLECTIVITY 
A mural at one of CAUSA's member organization reads beautifully: "unity in diversity." 
CAUSA's coordinator adds, when commenting on the unity/diversity tension: “[Coalition 
work] is living in a state of constant tension.  Some tension is good” [21-43]. 80 
 
What I have termed the unity/diversity paradox—the duality of coexisting contradictory 
demands, goals, or processes due to having to generate unity and maintain diversity and 
avoiding homogeneity and division—is present in all four networks as the quotes above 
show.  For example, CAAELII's director told me: "every day we have to face that 
                                                 
80 I have favored exactness over readability when transcribing quotations. Some quotations may read 
grammatically incorrectly but are literal transcriptions of verbal communications. Quotes from interviews 




contradiction, that paradox.  […] it's stressful because then it's the same diversity and 
richness that gives us threat and at the same time gives us a lot of strength" [14-35].  
 
Using as an example a specific taskforce where one important organization withdrew, a 
NYIC program officer illustrates how difficult it is to generate unity while maintaining 
diversity in positions and ideology: 
I think that's really [generate unity while maintaining diversity], really 
hard because I think with the task force, that one group, that crazy group 
that withdrew, we needed them because they're such an important, they 
represent such an important community.  And so that really makes things 
really difficult in terms of bringing that unity together [9-79]. 
 
NDLON also faces tensions which may be conceptualized using the unity/diversity 
paradox. A national network made up of members focusing on local specific worker-
centers, NDLON has to identify which are the issues that are national and thus it will deal 
with as a network, and which are the local issues and are exclusive to the worker centers. 
The development director states: "Yes, there are tensions. Particularly in identifying what 
are the national things and what are the local things. Or what are the local things that 
have national implications. Those are kind of like the tensions" [30-7].  Again, "national 
things," and "local things with national implications," are dealt with by the network and 
require a united stance by members, while the network may be diverse regarding local-
specific issues.   
 
The paradox of unity and diversity is intrinsic to networks as an interorganizational 




either explicitly or implicitly, although not always using the same terminology. It is 
indeed what networks are about: they require unity among diverse actors to act 
collectively, in contrast to hierarchies, which favor the unity pole, and also in contrast to 
markets, which favor the diversity pole. Networks are an interdependent set of 
independent organizations (Gray and Wood 1991; Guo and Acar 2005; Powell 1990) that 
require centralized coordination of necessarily autonomous organizations (Astley and 
Van de Ven 1983; Blau 1963): hence the tension.  
 
The tension arises in that neither pole can be favored over the other in the long run and 
both have to be maximized. Unity cannot be favored over diversity, because diversity is 
part of its raison d’être. Moreover, given that all members are autonomous independent 
organizations where no hierarchical authority exists (although, as shown later on, in some 
instances the shadow of hierarchy may show itself), they may exit the network if their 
own organization is not valued and protected. Similarly, as a coordinating unit staff at 
CAAELII points out: "[Too much diversity] can also be a detriment because sometimes it 
feels like there's no unified direction, that everybody's kind of doing their own thing" [24-
4]. This suggests that there is a fine line between diversity and disunity. 
 
At NYIC, diversity turned occasionally into disunity when for example, "[deciding] who 
gets to speak to the media" [35-31], as an NYIC project officer highlighted. Indeed, 




identified by the alliance literature (Doz 1996; Jarrillo 1993)81 and the negotiation 
literature (Sebenius 1992). As I show further down, diversity occasionally turned into 
disunity in these networks. For example, at CAUSA, the coordinator told me that 
exceptionally disunity arose due to "working with a lot of different people who 
sometimes want different things or are on their own trips for one reason or another" [21-
62]. Additionally, an NDLON staff-member told me how divisions occurred due to 
different personal styles: "I think that the divisions have to do more with human 
dynamics. Like egos.  Personalities" [30:33].  
 
Huxham and Vangen (2000a) have pointed out how independent organizations come 
together to benefit from each other’s differences, but it also may transform into plain 
disunity as disagreement arise from differences in organizational purpose, procedures, 
and structure82. Indeed, scholars have found how increase in diversity increases the 
network's complexity (Kadushin et al. 2005).  
 
This seems to point at a phenomenon identified in groups and business alliances, where a 
diversity/performance curve seems to follow a U-shape (Goerzen and Beamish 2005). 
Diversity is welcomed until a certain point, after which more diversity starts reducing 
performance. Metaphorically, in economic terms, it is as if the marginal increase in 
complexity produced by the increase in diversity is superior to the marginal benefit it 
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82 This resembles findings regarding intra-organizational management, where the potential for conflict 
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produces. Unchecked diversity may generate disunity in turn hindering unity building, 
and hence collective action. Weick, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld (2005) argue that whether unity is 
a necessary condition for all collective action is still under debate. I believe the necessary 
condition is that disunity does not emerge. 
 
Answering my question how is paradox managed in successful networks?  requires 
considering this tension. The next subsection looks at what are the nature and form of the 
unity/diversity paradox, and how each pole is manifested in these networks. 
Diversity within the network 
These networks are all internally diverse, that is they are internally heterogeneous and 
incorporate differences. As mentioned in the previous chapter, organizational members in 
these networks vary in size: that is number of employees, number of immigrants served, 
and annual budget. Some NDLON members have budgets around 10,000$, serve 300 
laborers, and are made up only of volunteers, while other members have a budget of 
3.5million$ and serve 4900 laborers a year. At CAAELII, a program officer highlighted 
differences in capacity between "larger, more established agencies and the smaller grass-
root agencies” [15-19]. CAUSA includes Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste 
(PCUN), which serves thousands of farm workers, as well as Latinos Unidos Siempre 
(LUS), which is made up of a couple dozen young immigrant activists. NYIC's director 
highlights the diversity in the member's organizational size and its consequences: 
I think, is having a small group with like, two staff, and then having a big 
group with 200 staff, and in those cases, sometimes the smaller groups get 
a little frustrated …  because they're just not dealing with the 




and everybody commits to, alright, so we'll bring 20 people or whatever, 
and then the representative from big group goes back and it takes her two 
weeks before she can get to her executive director, because they have this 
huge bureaucracy, where this particular thing might not be the priority, so 
I think those kinds of differences, we just have to work into our planning 
[10-17]. 
 
Diversity runs also along the member organizations' priorities, specific issues, and the 
constituents they serve. Although the member organizations share the same general goal, 
they differ in specific sub-goals. At CAUSA, for example, the organizational members 
differ in specific sub-goals: some focusing on worker rights (PCUN), others on women 
issues (Mujeres Luchadoras Progresistas, MLP), and yet others on gay, lesbian, bi-, and 
trans-sexual rights (Rural Organizing Project, ROP). One of CAUSA's regional 
coordinators points at the diversity in organizational issues: 
So one of the things that happens when you try to diversify your group, 
you have to be willing to look at the issues that those diverse groups bring 
in.  For me the hardest thing is to get folks to see the connection between 
the issues [19:30]. 
 
Similarly, NDLON's membership is also highly diverse: it includes members who are 
simply an organized group of day-laborers, but also large organizations for whom 
organizing day-laborers is but one program. At NYIC, some groups focus only on 
immigration issues (Migration Policy Institute), other on all issues affecting a specific 
immigrant population (Afghan Communicator), yet others are concerned with some 
specific issue such as community development in Brooklyn (Fifth Avenue Committee).  
 
Geographic diversity of organizational members is high in CAUSA and NDLON. The 




although they are also part of nation-wide advocacy movements, CAAELII and NYIC 
work in Chicago and New York City, respectively. Organizational geographic diversity 
usually implies member differences along other dimensions, for example organizational 
culture or capacity. As CAUSA's manager indicated: "folks from Portland have a very 
different mode of operating, and the folks in Eugene have a different mode of operating" 
[21-24]. Similarly, NDLON's geographic diversity generates diversity regarding 
constituents, as a CASA-Maryland staff person and NDLON board member commented: 
“in Washington D.C., with CASA Maryland there is a group of Haitian day-
laborers...Here in the West coast almost all day-laborers—90% are Latinos from Mexico 
and Central America” [29-12—own translation]. 
 
Ideology represents another source of internal diversity in all four networks. Some 
members are more confrontational than others, and political tendencies also vary. 
NDLON's director said: "in our network, there are organizations that are more militant 
than others[, who] believe more in doing advocacy in a different way” [17:62]. Such 
diversity was visible during decision-making and strategizing—as I show below in this 
and the next chapters.  A program officer at NYIC describes how such differences are 
palpable:  
We're supporting a bill right now on the federal level, and a couple of our 
organizations on that working group are totally not supporting the bill, 
and they're really upset at the fact that the coalition has taken a stand on 
this bill and is, you know, going forward [9-31]. 
 
The above illustrates how NYIC is ideologically diverse, which in turn may block unity 





Cultural-national diversity is also present in all networks. An experience at the Social 
Forum described in an interview is illustrative of such diversity at CAAELII: “we started 
talking about the war in Iraq […] and it just came up that a lot of Latino communities 
supported the war over there.  That is one of those times when the tension across culture 
clearly came out” [15-21].  Such a diversity is very high at CAAELII and NYIC, whose 
members range across different nationalities, and less so in NDLON and CAUSA, where 
Latinos are dominant. The internal cultural-national diversity of the networks maps that 
of the areas in which they operate. As we saw in the previous chapter, the immigrant 
population of Chicago and New York is much more diverse than that of the West Coast, 
which explains the higher cultural-national diversity in NYIC and CAAELII than in 
CAUSA and NDLON. This also points towards the fact that diversity along one 
dimension implies diversity along another. Geographic diversity of the network may 
imply cultural-national diversity, which in turn implies diversity of organizational 
cultures in the network, and so forth. In fact, similarly, Sauquet and Jacobs (1998) find 
that teams that are nationally diverse often disunite due to misunderstandings and to 
assumptions and rules being different. 
 
Cultural-national diversity is highly visible in internal network communications, since 
different members may have "different ways of disagreeing" and different ways of saying 
"no," as a CAAELII organizer put it [23-12—own translation].  While national-cultural 
diversity is extremely high in NYIC and CAAELII—both include members serving 




diversity is also relevant for NDLON, as it includes Spanish-speaking immigrants from 
various nationalities. The quote below is illustrative: 
Yeah, you see, that's the other thing; that before creating the relationship 
with [actors external to the network], we have to work internally because 
in a given day laborer center or corner, you have workers from Mexico, 
from El Salvador, Honduras, South America, and we do not always get 
along [17-58]. 
 
Only in CAUSA's case this diversity seems least marked since 90% of its members' 
constituents are of Mexican origin. Nevertheless, many of these constituents are not 
Spanish-speaking and are from diverse indigenous cultures from within Mexico, making 
CAUSA less homogeneous than apparently expected.  
 
In sum, all networks are internally diverse. They are highly diverse in member size, 
member focus, member ideology, and member constituents' national-culture. In NDLON 
and CAUSA's case they are also geographically diversified. The type of diversity 
documented in these networks mirrors "dimensions" of diversity identified by scholars 
(Mizrahi and Rosenthal 1993). Diversity in member goal differences has been identified 
by Vangen, Huxham, and Eden (1994) and national-cultural differences have also been 
identified by cross-national business alliance scholars (Yan and Gray 1994). In fact, as I 
point out below, facilitating interpersonal and interorganizational differences constitutes a 
main network leadership activity.  
 
That the networks are diverse is in itself not very insightful, and may seem almost 




That they are diverse is not only expected, but it is at the core of the rationale behind 
networks. The important aspect is how are these networks internally diverse and how this 
compares to their unity. This shall allow me to identify some commonalities among these 
networks with regards to how they manage the intrinsic paradox of unity and diversity. 
Uniting the networks 
Precisely because of the documented diversity, “collective action networks” are set up 
consciously and explicitly to reach a common objective shared by everyone (Agranoff 
2003)—meta-objectives (to use Huxham and Mcdonald's term [1992]). Sharing a meta-
goal may help generate unity, but is in itself not sufficient. As Human and Provan (2000) 
state, in networks “there must be a sense of collective 'networkedness,' by which member 
firms see themselves as part of the network and are committed to network-level goals” 
(329). Consider the following quote by the coordinator of NDLON member Latin 
American Workers Project: 
Although we are all Latin, it is not easy to integrate us all. It is difficult 
because we carry our borders with us ... Some come from the rural areas, 
others from cities. [We have] different ways of viewing the world. The way 
we integrate everything has been to put on top of the table [that] here you 
are a day-laborer [28:6-own translation].  
 
This quote shows how NDLON generates unity, or “collective ‘networkedness´,” around 
the concept of day-laborer. Similarly, CAUSA's former coordinator told me that they 
used the idea of the "immigration movement" to generate unity among the different 
organizations. NYIC also frames their unity around the immigrant concept. A program 




We've brought people from totally distinct communities together and 
brought them all to one table where they can hear that the problems that 
they see day in, day out with their constituents are really shared problems 
across immigrant communities … if we choose to frame things in that way 
[11-21]. 
 
At CAAELII, in an open-day event of their curriculum development program, all 
participants had to share their experiences as immigrants. These common experiences 
refer primarily to feelings of exclusion or unfairness. As a program officer at CAAELII 
puts it, “up to the citizenship moment there's an amazing amount of unity of what goes on 
that they believe is unfair at a hundred different steps up to that point” [25-21]. 
 
For all four networks a major generator of unity is then shared identity or cause. The 
ultimate goal, improving the immigrants’ lives, unites the different organizations, and, in 
particular, it is the immigrant identity that catalyzes the unity—or, as in NDLON's case, 
the identity of the day-laborer subgroup. Although the immigration community in the 
U.S. is highly heterogeneous, the sense of immigrant identity is certainly strong among 
organizations in this policy sector. And as the above quote suggests, up to the citizenship 
moment, “there’s an amazing amount of unity.” Identity, the idea of belonging to a 
certain group (Hogg and Terry 2000; Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly 1992), is suggested to 
create unity within organizations in other policy and economic sectors, and Human and 
Provan (2000) also observed that common experiences served to unify networks in the 





The value of diversity, closely related to identity and common experiences, represents 
another dimension of unity. In fact, consistent with the nature of paradox, I found that 
diversity itself may be a value around which to unite: one of the "dimensions" among 
which networks are united is diversity. "Well, is it really necessary that we're all on the 
same page anyway” [21:24]? rhetorically asked herself CAUSA's coordinator when 
acknowledging the general diversity in her coalition. More than just tolerance, this 
appreciation for diversity is true for all networks. CAAELII's director, Dale, mentions: "I 
keep telling the staff, that you can't have everybody, altogether, dancing, everyone out all 
of us dancing the Salsa. It's okay it's chaotic; it's fine to be chaotic” [14-29]. 
 
At the different events I observed, all networks showed a high sensitivity to diversity. All 
events were multilingual and tried to encompass linguistic and cultural diversity. 
NDLON's annual meeting was bilingual, Spanish and English, and included traditional 
artwork from several areas of Latinamerica, and rituals from both Native Americans and 
the U.S. CAUSA's town hall meeting was bilingual, and CAAELII's citizenship event and 
NYIC supporter's annual event were trilingual—English, Spanish, and Chinese. At 
NYIC, diversity is consciously valued. A program officer describes: 
We're knowledgeable, and I think we're really diverse and we're really 
thoughtful about that, you know, that we don't just work with one 
particular immigrant group, that we really, we're really conscious in 
making sure that there are people from all different communities on our 
board and on our working force, you know, our task force and that we 
really hear from all populations [9-51]. 
 
Pablo Alvarado, NDLON's coordinator, goes a bit further and hints at how his network 




We don't see the diversity as being opposed to the unity part.  I don't 
know.  The diversity within our organizations doesn't really conflict with 
the unity part like how I think that the majority of our member 
organizations get it.  I think that they understand why they're doing the 
work and we're all sort of linked in that [30:31]. 
 
The above quote shows how these networks manage the paradox. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, unity and diversity are by definition not opposites, therefore the paradox only 
arises when an implicit premise is made: diversity implies disunity and unity implies 
similarity. Pablo Alvarado’s quote above shows how, by avoiding to frame unity and 
diversity as opposites, NDLON manages the network. I return to this in brief but, be it as 
it may, all above quotes show how these networks accept and enhance diversity as a 
value. Diversity as a value, as an organizational characteristic to be enhanced not 
reduced, is then a unifying factor. This resembles current trends in workforce diversity 
management, where the current paradigm neither assimilates nor differentiates diversity; 
rather it integrates diversity by valuing difference (Thomas and Ely 1996).  
 
The above factors, then unite these networks. Agranoff and McGuire (2001) ask what is 
cohesive factor that bonds independent organizations together into networks? In the 
studied networks, the cohesion factors of experiences, the value of diversity and identity 
may bond independent organizations together in networks, just as the legal-rational 
authority does among units within single organizations. 
Unpacking the unity/diversity paradox  
Smith and Berg’s (1987: 65) ground breaking work on paradoxes in groups illustrates 




A group often needs people who are different to fulfill its primary task. 
This means that differences must be brought into the group and then 
integrated in a way that provides unity while preserving difference. 
Difference alone is enough to provide a platform for conflict, but the need 
to unify in light of difference makes it almost inevitable that conflict will 
occur (Deutsch 1973). Under these circumstances, the very fact that 
individuals contribute differences makes it possible for the group to be 
effective, yet these same differences threaten the group’s capacity to 
function. 
 
Although the above quote refers to groups of individuals, the rationale also applies to 
groups of groups (as Smith and Berg themselves state), or interorganizational networks: 
diversity within the network is necessary for network effectiveness; unity of the network 
is necessary for network effectiveness; but diversity and unity undermine each other. 
 
This paradox of belonging (Lewis 2000; Smith and Berg 1987)—the tension between self 
and collective, between organization and network, between diversity and unity—is 
present in CAUSA, CAAELII, NDLON, and NYIC. An interesting question after 
documenting that the two poles of the paradox exist, is how they are present in all four 
networks, and how documenting them helps us to understand how these networks 
actually handle the tension arising from having to generate unity and maintain diversity 
which pull in opposing directions and generate tensions.  
 
Breaking apart the paradox and looking at its form and nature in detail, at how each pole 
applies, is important because it informs us how the coordinating unit, and the rest of the 
network, deal with this intrinsic tension and manage the network. Knowing along which 




better understand network management. As Ford and Backoff (1988) state, social science 
paradoxes are semantic paradoxes, not logical contradictions but rather “inconsistencies 
in levels of thought structures” (90). Such inconsistencies arise because of the collapse of 
levels, time, or dimensions. The paradoxical tension is becomes destructive when unity 
and diversity are not differentiated along different dimensions.  
 
It has already been stated that all four networks generated unity around purpose, identity 
and shared experiences, and around the value of diversity, while diversity existed around 
organizational size, organizational sub-purposes, organizational culture, type of 
constituents, and, for CAUSA and NDLON, geographical presence. All networks are 
diverse along the members' organizational characteristics and members' organizational 
culture. But not all are diverse along all dimensions. For example, NDLON is not diverse 
along the members' organizational sub-issue, CAUSA is not diverse along the members' 
constituents, and CAAELII and NYIC's diversity is low along the members' geographic 
base. The table below summarizes these findings. 
 
 
Table XXIV. Dimensions of unity and diversity in the networks 
 CAAELII CAUSA NDLON NYIC 
Diversity     
Organizational characteristics x x x x 
Organizational culture x x x x 
Organizational sub-issues x x  x 
Cultural-national x  x x 
Geographic base  x x  
Unity     
Meta-objective / vision x x x x 
Identity / Experiences / Problems x x x x 




From the results tabulated above, in the unity/diversity paradox each pole seems to 
operate differently. A closer look at the paradox allows us to go beyond the basic 
contradiction of the three premises that define the paradox: diversity within the network 
is necessary for network effectiveness; unity of the network is necessary for network 
effectiveness; diversity and unity undermine each other. The above table shows that the 
unity/diversity paradox is more complex than perceived at first sight. Both poles apply at 
the network level—the network is united and the network is diverse—but at a closer look, 
the poles apply along different dimensions.   
 
These networks seem to be managing the tension by clearly generating unity of the 
network around identity and experiences, meta-goals, and the value of diversity. 
Diversity also exists and is valued within the network around organizational 
characteristics and culture, and organizational sub-issues, geographic base, or culture-
nationality. This seems important in managing the tension because I believe it helps us 
understand the way the third premise is worked out: diversity and unity undermine each 
other.  
 
The above argument borrowed from Smith and Berg (1987) that diversity both is 
necessary for network effectiveness and also hinders network functioning has some 
implicit assumptions. Indeed, as Poole and Van de Ven (1989) state, social scientific 
paradoxes tend to be looser and poles are vague: “paradoxes in management are not, 
strictly speaking, logical paradoxes” (564). The third premise in the argument, “diversity 




as follows: diversity and unity may easily undermine each other by respectively 
generating disunity and similarity. Diversity per se does not necessarily need to generate 
disunity—the antonym of unity. In order to be effective, then, a network has to be 
diverse, be united, and, most importantly, avoid diversity turning into disunity.  
 
How do these four networks manage to avoid diversity turning into disunity? These 
networks are diverse and united, and avoid diversity turning into disunity by requiring 
and building unity around the immigrant (or immigrant day-laborer) identity and 
common experiences, around the network’s meta-goal, and around the value of diversity. 
None of these networks tolerated diversity among its members around the network’s 
meta-goal, the network’s idea of immigrant (or immigrant day-laborer), nor regarding 
valuing diversity. On the other hand, they all maintained and sustained diversity among 
its member’s organizational culture and characteristics, and its member’s constituents, 
sub-issues, or geographic location. Along these dimensions, they did not look for unity. 
And the fact that these networks built unity along certain dimensions and sustained 
diversity along others is, I believe, why they successfully coped with the paradoxical 
tension. Using these cases as “exceptional cases” (Stake 2000), we may propose that 
unifying around meta-goal, identity, and value of diversity, and maintaining diversity 
among other members’ characteristics, is key to successfully managing this tension and, 






Identifying the dimensions along which to generate unity and not diversity, and vice 
versa, avoids diversity turning into disunity: the immigrant identity unites, while national 
cultures strengthen diversity—Mexican versus Korean, for example. This is patent in 
NDLON director’s quote, “We don't see the diversity as being opposed to the unity part,” 
since—although in other instances he acknowledges tensions around achieving a unified 
advocacy strategy among the diverse members, tensions around what issues to generate a 
common strategy, and tensions due to personal style—he does not take for granted the 
premise that diversity necessarily generates disunity.  
 
In sum, these network successful manage the belonging paradoxical tension by valuing 
diversity—and hence not taking for granted the premise that diversity must turn into 
disunity—and by decoupling the dimensions along which unity and diversity are sought. 
By maintaining diversity along organizational characteristics and culture, and other 
dimensions, while building unity around identity and experiences, the meta-goal, and the 
value for diversity does not, however, resolve the paradox. The tension is still present in 
that the potential for diversity turning into disunity is always there: unity and diversity 
form a management paradox in that they imply equally necessary opposing forces that 
generate a tension.  
Building unity in diversity 
Building both on theoretical contributions and on the identified distinction between the 
nature of each pole, we could argue that diversity exists while unity is built. If diversity 




common goal must be built: unity is not intrinsically given from the outset, but is 
absolutely necessary for success.  
 
Understanding the different nature of each pole in the paradox aids to understanding why 
unity and diversity are intertwined. To the risk of sounding redundant, paradoxes are 
paradoxical according to Quinn and Cameron (1988): in fact, when we refer to unity we 
are also referring to diversity, and vice versa.  Diversity is only possible within some 
unity or unitary boundary. That is, without a commonality diversity has no meaning. 
Similarly, unity refers to two or more different parts being together but if they are not 
different, they cannot be united (Smith and Berg 1987). This is why when I refer to 
organizations having unity along the value or identity dimension, I am implicitly 
assuming differences among the member organizations along other dimensions. This will 
become apparent in the next chapter, where I describe how the coordinating units 
maintain diversity and build unity. 
 
The key lesson drawn is that, although unity entails some diversity and diversity entails 
some unity, it is important to know along which dimension to generate unity and along 
which to maintain diversity. It is not the same, say, to maintain diverse ideas of what the 
network’s meta-goal should be and unify the members’ organizational culture than to 
maintain the diverse members’ organizational culture and to unify the understanding of 





In brief, in all four networks, unity and diversity are sustained along multiple dimensions. 
Addressing, partially, my first secondary research question with respect to the internal 
paradox (what are the form and the nature of the diversity/unity paradox in the context of 
network management?), I find that in the context of immigrant networks, unity is built 
along the network's meta-goal, vision, identity, and shared experiences and problems, and 
diversity is maintained among the members' organizational characteristics, culture, and 
sub-issues, constituents served, or geographic base. The next chapter looks deeper at how 
the tension is managed, how the unity is built and how diversity is sustained along these 
different dimensions.  
 
 
7. SUSTAINING THE UNITY/DIVERSITY PARADOX 
In this chapter I use the unity/diversity paradox, inherent to networks, to further my 
understanding of how these networks are managed. In particular, I look at the leadership 
activities involved in managing the internal paradox of the network. I find that four 
activities contribute to manage the paradox. The four activities are member selection and 
attraction, facilitating interaction, framing structure, and building the members’ capacity. 
The last section explores how these networks sustain both unity and diversity to build 
power. Specifically, I argue that the unity/diversity paradox helps build the networks’ 
“power to” and the power bases, by contributing to develop knowledge, expanding access 
to key actors, further legitimating the network, and increasing financial resources. 
 
In successfully managing the internal paradox—the need for unity and the maintenance 
of diversity—I empirically identify four interrelated leadership activities which  appear to 
play a fundamental role and that affect networks’ power. All these activities are executed 
not solely by the network manager but mainly by the coordinating unit of the network, 
although other network members not pertaining to the coordinating unit also participated 
in them. In fact, in line with what Huxham and Vangen (2000b) find, the interviewees 
very rarely referred to the network manager as the “leader,” although they did used the 
term “leadership” when referring to “building” or “developing” the “leadership” of the 
movement or the constituents. The leadership activities refer to what Gronn (2002) calls a 
pattern of group functions constituting a leadership complex, where the “group” is the 




Managing the network 
The following section attempts to answer my secondary research question how is the 
unity/diversity paradox managed in the context of inter-organizational networks? I find 
that four leadership activities play an important role in sustaining the unity/diversity 
paradox. Unity is built around meta-goal, identity, and the value of diversity by framing 
both the formal procedures, and the values and norms. In contrast, the diverse members’ 
interaction is facilitated. Facilitation is most evident during decision-making, as the lack 
of authority disallows imposing decisions on autonomous actors who have the real option 
of abandoning the network. Indeed, the facilitated interaction that results in open 
decision-making aims at promoting the members’ voice rather than their exit from the 
network (Gray 2000, Hirschmann 1970).  
 
I find two more leadership activities in addition to facilitation and framing: activating and 
capacitating. While capacitating the members is clearly linked to framing common 
meaning-making, activating allows to maximize unity and diversity by properly selecting 
and attracting members to the network (or the working groups in NYIC’s case). The 









Some differences between networks also are apparent. First, network activation 
(attracting and selecting members to the network) is particularly relevant for medium-
sized networks, while game activation (attracting and selecting network members to 
specific working groups) is more relevant in larger networks with multiple working 
groups. Second, consensus is the main mechanism to ratify decisions for all networks 
except NDLON, where a strong voting culture exists.  
Activation: managing membership 
I think it [successfully managing the network] all starts off when an 
organization applies to be part of the network, there’s all the principles 
that we have to make sure that they believe and we see the work that 





The above is NDLON coordinator’s response to a question inquiring into how they 
managed to generate unity and maintain diversity. It suggests that selecting, attracting, 
and retaining the network’s organizational members is an essential management task.  
 
In NDLON, CAUSA, and CAAELII, an essential leadership activity for managing the 
unity/diversity paradox is the selection and attraction of organizational members. If 
activation is adequately done, only those organizations which share the network’s 
vision—a unifying factor—but are different along other certain dimensions, join the 
network. In managing the poles of the paradox (welcoming diversity along one 
dimension and unity along another), potential member selection and attraction seem 
important.  
 
CAAELII’s director describes his network’s criteria for selecting a new member: 
They have to be community-based…and also they have to have a deep 
commitment and they have to do activism and organize in their community 
first, before…not just providing services.  And that they have to be 
committed to leadership, intentional leadership [14-22]. 
 
A regional coordinator at CAUSA tells us how she incorporates new members into her 
local chapter: “I think the groups that I have decided to work with [are] groups that I 
think are doing relevant work around human rights” [19:14]. 
 
Member selection allows the network coordinating unit to select and attract members 




and value for diversity, but diverse around cultural-national origins, sub-issues, 
organizational culture, or geographic location. 83 
 
The leadership activity of identifying and incorporating the organizations needed to 
achieve the network’s goal has been termed activation by collaboration scholars. In a 
formalized network such as the ones studied here, activation deals primarily with 
building and attracting the network’s membership. While activating has been identified 
by different authors (Agranoff 2003; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn, and 
Koppenjan 1997c; McGuire 2003; Vangen and Huxham84 2004), the role of this 
leadership activity in sustaining the unity/diversity paradox has not been made explicit. 
 
CAUSA, CAAELII, and NDLON similarly focus on network activation—on selecting 
and attracting potential network members—but NYIC contrastingly has an unmonitored 
and fairly free-flowing network activation policy. Although NYIC does look for a 
specific type of member—“strong organization background … doing quality programs…  
that represent a strong constituent base” [9-57]—they have an “open-door policy,” and 
the acceptance of membership applicants is a “very basic process” [9-27]. Interestingly, 
this openness has not distorted the network’s functioning, nor has it drawn undesired 
members. The network manager talks about self-selection and describes it as follows: 
“some groups just know that if they join this bigger group, there’s no way they’re going 
to convince the rest of the group to support them…so they don’t bother coming to the 
                                                 
83 This type of entry-level selection has been observed also in informal ethnic networks and is termed 
parochialism (Bowles and Gintis 2004). 




coalition…it’s almost like a self selection” [10-20]. It is as if the sheer size of this 
network (over 150 members), compared to the other three (around 30 members), makes it 
much less vulnerable to cooptation by one of its members, making network activation 
less critical.  
 
However, that NYIC focuses less on network activation does not mean that activation is 
not important. The following quote by a program officer shows that selecting and 
attracting groups to the table is a critical activity: 
What we do is we send out an invitation to our member groups saying 
we're going to form this working group…Those organizations that want to 
work with us on achieving that goal come and join this task force…But 
what we do is once we have our first meeting, we look across the table and 
if we see that there are major partners now missing, we sort of go out after 
them…we try to be strategic about it.  We open it up for those that want to 
get involved but also we analyze it and see who really needs to be on 
board if we really want to, you know, get, achieve our goal or whatever 
the task force is. [9-18]  
 
The difference between NYIC and the other three networks is that NYIC attracts and 
selects network members to the working group. The operating structure of NYIC may be 
responsible for making network level activation less critical in this network than in the 
other three. The close monitoring of the members happens not at the network level, but at 
the working group or task-force level—at the game level (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 
1997c).  
 
NYIC functions with working groups. Borrowing from Agranoff (2003), working groups 




Chapter 3 between interaction and structure, or game and network (Kickert, Klijn, 
Koppenjan 1997; Scharpf 1997), is useful. Activating actors in the specific working 
groups, or game activation, becomes essential in large and diverse networks as NYIC. 
This is so because at NYIC—unlike NDLON, CAUSA, and CAAELII where all 
members generally partake in all projects and task forces—not all 150 members 
participate in all task forces all the time. Therefore, the selection and attraction occurs at 
the task force level. In order to unite around meta-goal, identity, and the value of 
diversity, and maintain member organizational diversity, in NYIC game activation is 
critical, rather much so than network activation. 
 
Activating also may include organizations in working groups or specific collaboratives 
without necessarily intending to include them in the network. Confirming Huxham 
(2003) that the membership of a collaborative is not clear-cut and is often ambiguous, 
CAUSA’s regional coordinators have set up local committees of groups that are not 
necessarily members of CAUSA. Similarly, CAAELI works with non-members in the 
USCIS watch-dog (the Immigration Monitoring Board), NDLON works closely with the 
non-member Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and 
other legal groups when strategizing, and 20% of NYIC’s task force participants are non-
members.  
Factors aiding activation 
What are the key factors that help networks attract and select members? The network’s 
legitimacy, relative to its impact, as well as to its procedural nature, helps to activate 




we’ve been able to rack up all these different victories.  People want to identify with that 
stuff.  People want to be part of it” [18:16]. NYIC’s director similarly highlights the role 
of being perceived as a successful network in activating members: “people see us as 
people who can get things done, can pass laws, and can get funding, and help them do 
this, help them do that, and people want to join successful coalitions” [10-49]. NDLON’s 
coordinator explains why resource-limited organizations only join networks that help 
them reach their goals and be successful: 
If you want to bull shit too much, it won’t work. Because its meaningless, 
why are you going to come and waste two hours in a national conference 
call for nothing?  Why are you going to be a member of a useless coalition 
that doesn’t have any impact in the political life and the lives of people out 
there in the streets.  That’s the secret. The networks have to be immersed 
in the local political realities.  Fighting along with the member 
organizations providing the support they need [30:37]. 
 
In fact, success builds trust (Alter and Hage 1993; Hakansson 1990), and trust is 
important for collaborative processes and is closely related to power and control (Vangen 
and Huxham 2003). The members’ continual evaluations of the network build the 
networks’ legitimacy and the members’ trust of it (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Hence 
success builds “past-based trust” (Vangen and Huxham 2003) and builds the legitimacy 
of the network, enhancing the coordinating unit’s capacity to activate important actors85.  
 
Another factor which aids the attraction and retention of members is the network’s 
openness and inclusiveness. NDLON’s inclusive structure seems important in activating 
                                                 
85 This has the flavor of “increasing returns” (Waldrop 1992), where success builds more success: in the 





potential members: “One of the main things that binds us all together is that we really 
believe strongly in democratic principles and initiatives that include workers in the 
decision making processes” [16-41], mentioned its development coordinator. Having an 
open structure also helped NYIC include members, as its director comments: “One thing 
about us is that it is very open, and we reward people who work hard, and who bring their 
community members, involvement into our work, so I think that’s the main part of it” 
[10-49]. Such an inclusive and open sentiment was also present in CAUSA as its former 
coordinator explained: “We have some organizations that are small.  Some are big…but 
they want to identify with this movement. Because this movement includes them” 
[18:31]. Being a united but diverse network also legitimizes the network internally, 
versus its members, as a program officer at CAAELII mentioned:  
We are asking the agencies to …come together and work together on the 
issues so we are more successful together on this than alone.  So…then we 
should also incorporate that into our structure. CAAELII should make 
decisions based on the whole [15-28]. 
 
The fact that organizations want to be part of an inclusive and participatory network is 
coherent with the equity or fairness criterion that, in addition to the efficiency and 
effective criterions, is used by members in (re-)evaluating the network and their 
membership to it (Doz 1996, Ring Van de Ven 1994). 
 
Another factor that aids the coordinating unit when activating potential members is the 
presence of existing current members. The relationships the potential members expect to 
build through the network help attract potential members. One of CAUSA’s regional 




them to be able to sit and meet other people and also stay updated on what’s going on 
around immigrant rights” [19:8]. In the same line of reasoning, CAAELII’s director 
justified how meeting other organizations and sharing experiences was one of the 
attracting factors for potential members: 
I don’t think there is only one answer…But some people might say, “Oh 
because I see the value of working across cultures.”  Or then you could go 
to the community leaders and they say, “Oh because I’ve been through 
these classes and I see deeply the similarities we all face.”  So you might 
not have one response…and I’m comfortable with that.  
 
Activating, then, plays an important role in sustaining the paradox since it allows 
selecting and attracting members who are diverse along specific organizational 
dimensions but that are united around the network’s meta-goal, identity and experiences, 
and value for diversity. Activating happens either at the network level for smaller size 
networks or at the game level for larger networks, and is enhanced when the network has 
legitimacy in the face of potential members; legitimacy which is in turn enhanced by the 
network’s success record and its procedural inclusiveness. The possibility to meet other 
organizations and share experiences also attracts potential members to the network. Last, 
although the networks studied are highly formalized, membership is nevertheless not a 
clear-cut issue.   
 
Once groups and organizations are attracted to the network, they start interacting and the 




Facilitation: managing interaction and decision-making in diversity 
Facilitating deals with interaction, in particular with decision-making. Regarding 
facilitation in general, the coordinating unit mediates and accompanies members and 
communicates with them. With respect to decision-making, the coordinating unit 
facilitates an open decision-making process among all members.  
Managing interaction 
Mediating and accompanying interaction 
The analysis suggests that there are a leadership activity executed by the coordinating 
units aimed at easing and assisting the interaction of the different members. Mediating 
between members was highlighted as an important activity by NDLON’s coordinator: 
The people who work in networks have to be peacemakers.  I know that 
between [two NDLON members] there are issues…People have different 
ways of doing things… some of our organizers focus more on developing 
relationships with the local establishment, police officers, politicians … 
and some may see this as “this mother-fucker is a sell out”.  … So those 
kinds of things, yes, they happen [30-36]. 
 
A junior leader of CAUSA member Voz Hispana Causa Chavista also pointed out as a 
success factor the presence in CAUSA’s coordinating unit of good “mediators” that “file 
roughness” between members [22:20—own translation]. CAAELII’s director also 
emphasized how confrontation easily occurs during interaction—hinting at how diversity 
turns into disunity if not facilitated—and how mediators are important: 
You can’t have a meeting without multiple confrontations… in a day-to-
day basis…I just have to hire staff that know how to manage and have 
lived experiences as well so that they know how to… respond and to 





A NYIC program officer also mentioned how she has to mediate conflicts in her daily 
work by focusing discussions on the goal and not on differences:  
And it's really challenging dealing, dealing with groups like that because, 
I mean, you have to keep reminding them that it's not about you, it's about 
this particular issue…It's like a therapy session [with] person-to-person 
phone sessions [9-53]. 
 
In addition to mediating, these coordinating units also simply support and accompany the 
members and their interactions. CAUSA’s manager tells us how she “nurtures” (Huxham 
2003) the network’s functioning: “If we have a major rally in Salem and we turn out, say, 
hundreds of people, and the folks from Medford come up in a van, they want recognition 
that they drove five hours to get here” [21:30]. At NYIC, while the board president 
highlights “the importance of managing the internal environment,” a program officer 
further describes how she supported the network’s action: “we play that coordinating 
role, supportive role, technical assistance role, but the bulk of the work, given the sheer 
size of the city, has to come from our kind of groups” [9-11]. Similarly, at CAAELII’s 
citizenship information day, the network’s staff only opened up the speech and then 
transitioned between speakers. During NDLON’s Annual Assembly the coordinating unit 
also supported and coordinated member interventions.  
 
The above activity, mediating and supporting member action and interaction, is similar to 




Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997c; Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 199586; Mandell 1994; 
Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005; Vangen and Huxham 200487). Facilitation, then, aims to 
motivate member participation as well as supporting work. Facilitating involves 
supporting members, mediating among members, and communicating to and among 
members. 
 
As Stone (2006) states, it is because of the complex power distribution and inter-
dependencies in networks, as opposed to the more linear and straightforward hierarchical 
dependences within organizations, that facilitation and not domination is pervasive. 
Facilitation, which designates behaviors that make the process of interaction among 
members easier, is an essential leadership activity closely associated with the diversity 
pole of the internal paradox. It is precisely because diversity may easily turn into disunity 
during interaction that facilitating that process is essential. A monolithic entity does not 
need facilitation, a diverse one—if it is to be united—does. 
Communicating among members 
We also have a commitment to being in communication with a lot of our 
member organizations.  And so, the primary job of the West coast and 
East coast coordinators is to maintain that relationship and be talking to 
people on either side of the country, and somewhat organizing, informing 
and motivating them to take action or participate in a phone call, 
participate in our assembly meetings [16-18]. 
 
                                                 
86 Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) refer to “brokering.” 




The above quote by NDLON’s development coordinator highlights the importance of 
support tasks by the coordinating unit but also points towards communication as an 
important aspect of facilitation. CAUSA’s coordinator explains her focus in 
communication and the challenges involved: 
I’ve been working to do more consistent communication with folks… It’s 
hard to know how much information to report back all the time… But 
people need to know, people are wanting to be informed as far as what’s 
going on. Also, just knowing what’s going on in other regions.  For 
example, Eugene people didn’t always know what was going on in 
Portland and stuff like that [21:10]. 
 
A staff person at CAAELLII’s coordinating unit points at how lack of communication 
may hinder unity: “sometimes there are problems in communication.  There’s a sense of 
not being a collective momentum [or of having] a collective goal” [24:23]. 
 
Communicating has been identified as fundamental in trust-building (Hardy, Phillips, 
Lawrence 1998) and sense-making (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005), and central to 
facilitation (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Indeed, by promoting communication between 
members within the network, facilitation helps generate unity by bridging diversity. Just 
as Luhmann (1986) points towards the substituting of social action by communication in 
complex social systems, Lyytinen (1987) suggests that strategic action is replaced by 
communicative action (Habermas 1984) as we move from hierarchies to clans (Ouchi 




Facilitating decision-making  
Managing decision-making is central to networks (Agranoff 2003, Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001, Huxham and Vangen 2000b). I find that decision-making is a specific 
instance of interaction of particular importance, which must be facilitated by the 
coordinating unit. By decision-making I refer to the moment a decision is made and the 
process preceding it. As I mention in the previous chapter, the superior decision-making 
body in NYIC, CAUSA, and CAAELII is the board. A secondary level of decision-
making is made by the coordinating unit regarding operative, tactical, and more executive 
matters. NDLON functions in a similar fashion but its decision-making structure adds 
one more level, the general assembly. Although these differences between levels are 
relevant, as I show further ahead, I find that decision-making at all levels in all four 
networks must be facilitated.  
An open decision-making process 
Open and inclusive decision-making—which Ospina and I (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 
2005) have already identified in the preliminary study—seems to be a shared 
characteristic of all four networks. As CAUSA’s coordinator says: “it’s nice if you want 
them [the immigrants] to be the face of the movement, but you should also be working 
at…giving them decision-making power” [21:64]. At NDLON, the “legal 
coordinator…creates a space where the [day-]workers can be part of that legal 
challenge…they join the lawsuit as plaintiffs. And [the] workers see themselves in a 
much bigger battle that’s not just happening locally, but nationally” [16:8]. At CAAELII, 




how the network comes up with its strategic issues: “The board…or director…will bring, 
you know, the issues…so we [the board] will pick two or three to work on” [26-22].  
 
Openness is important for managing the network because it respects diversity while 
making unity possible and avoiding the diverse autonomous and independent members to 
abandon the network. NDLON’s coordinator states how he thinks maintaining an open 
process is important for network management:  
I think the purpose needs to be very clear and also that is meaningful to 
members, and the other thing that I think is important is you don’t enforce 
it.  Because when you try to force it, then it won’t work.  The networks 
have to manage in a natural manner.  Like a funder all of sudden thinks 
that this is a fancy thing to do, and put the money in.  That… doesn’t work.  
It’s been tried over and over again. And it doesn’t work [30-38].  
 
Uniting around a common vision and meta-objective, diversity is welcomed by these four 
networks in the process of decision-making regarding lower-level issues, strategies, and 
opinions. Similar to Wheatley’s (1999) self-organizing systems approach to leadership, 
this requires embracing diversity and not demanding unitary positions or standpoints 
during decision-making.  As a staff person of NDLON-member IDEPSCA88 commented: 
“I think that [the diversity] is the richness, right?...everyone has their own different 
perspective [so] we do open dialogues where everyone proposes their view of the issue 
and we land in a common point where we are all comfortable” [27:8—own translation]. 
 
                                                 




Maintaining an authentically open process—which essentially implies reducing to a 
minimum what Bacharach and Baratz (1962) call the non-decision-making space—and 
acknowledging the contrary positions within the network strengthen everyone’s backing 
behind the final decision adopted. Garnering support for the decision made is obviously 
important since a decision produces change if implemented (Pfeffer 1992) and this will 
happen more readily if it has sufficient support.  
 
Now, keeping an open and participatory decision-making process seems contrary to 
prescriptions in the literature that call for reducing complexity in networks (Huxham and 
Vangen 2000a) and for maintaining stability in open systems through hierarchy (Katz and 
Kahn 1966; Kilduff and Dougherty 2000). However, in networks, joint decision-making  
may not be more efficient but may be more effective (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). The 
effectiveness of joint decision-making is due to the support it generates for the 
implementation of the decision made—especially as in networks implementation is often 
left to member organizations. Effectiveness of joint decision-making is also due to the 
fact that in networks, organizations are autonomous and the possibility of them exiting is 
real (Hirschmann 1970). Hence, it is better to allow for members to voice their diverse 
opinions—at the risk of producing a cacophony of voices (Gray 2000)—rather than 
having members exiting and abandoning the network. 
 
Closely related to the idea of maintaining an open decision-making, incorporating the 
member organizations’ constituents—in addition to including all the organizational 




situations of deadlock, the constituents get to decide the position the networks take. In 
cases of disagreement, as in deciding whether to support the DreamAct89, facilitating 
consultation with the constituency base helps reach agreements since ideological 
subtleties present among organizational representatives fade away in favor of the 
constituents’ real-life desires and needs. A NYIC program officer illustrates this with a 
real example:  
And we really thought that that [a modification introduced to the bill] 
really weakened and sort of really killed the authenticity of the bill … And 
so we needed to really make a decision whether or not we were going to 
withdraw…And after long discussions and meetings and conference calls 
and back and forth, and obviously in consultation with a lot of the youth 
that we met, we felt that we needed to still support it because at the end it 
did provide a path to citizenship for these kids and that [it] is what most of 
them really wanted, and that we could see other ways in trying to get 
financial support [9-39]. 
 
Similarly, NDLON includes plaintiffs in its legal challenges and does not act without the 
participation and support of the centers’ day-laborers, and CAAELII works with what its 
director calls a “multi-layered cake.”  CAUSA, by consulting with its constituents, 
reduced disunion among its members with regard to the McCain-Kennedy bill 90 since 
constituents, ultimately, bring decisions to a very concrete level. CAUSA’s former 
director explains: 
We recently had a discussion around the comprehensive immigration 
reform.  And we had a discussion around the Kennedy-McCain Bill.  
There was disagreement.  Some members of the coalition thought that it 
                                                 
89 A proposed bill that would allow immigrant students who have grown up in the U.S., graduated from 
high school, and have no criminal record, to go to college and legalize their immigration status. Right now 
immigrant (non-U.S. citizen) students aren’t eligible for government loans or scholarships to attend college. 
90 The McCain-Kennedy bill is the immigration proposal that comes from the Senate (as opposed to the 
House). It is preferred to the House bill (also known as the Sensenbrenner bill) since it allows a path for 




was meager.  It was like we weren’t getting anything.  But the good thing 
about a coalition that has a membership base, or has anchor 
organizations that have that base, is that the base dictates to the 
organization what the organization’s position should be [18:19]. 
 
Again, including more layers and individuals in the decision-making process increases 
the complexity of the network. However, in the long run, this inclusiveness allows the 
network to be better attuned with the constituents—hence maintaining legitimacy and 
relevance—and resolve disputes by grounding them in concrete problems experienced by 
the ultimate beneficiaries. 
Facilitating openness 
However, as the NYIC program officer’s quote below shows, open processes, if left 
totally unguided, may disrupt the work of the network:  
So what we've had to do was set up individual aside meetings because we 
also find that that can be really sort of interruptive, you know, to the task 
force and working group.  We want them to sort of open up and give their 
concerns but we're just so afraid that that's going to sort of sway other 
groups [9-32].91 
 
NDLON’s development coordinator also point towards the dilemma of how much to 
interfere or manipulate these processes: “how far do we go in terms of intervention 
                                                 
91 This may seem to point towards the creation of coalitions of individuals as conceptualized in behavioral 
theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963) in line with Murnighan and Brass’ (1991) proposition that initial 
coalition contacts are dyadic (in this case between the program officer and the different organizational 
representatives). This building of individual coalition was most clearly identified at NYIC. This may be 
because of its size, since, as Thompson (1967) proposes, when power is widely distributed an inner circle 
emerges to conduct coalition business. The inner circle in this case would include the program officer and 
the contacted influential organizational representatives. However, the existence of such a coalition would 
counter the statement that decision-making in these networks is open. But this does not seem logical 
because if a coalition dominates the network, those left outside would “exit.” Rather than pointing towards 
coalition-building of individuals, these informal dyadic exchanges promoted by the program officer 




whenever two organizations are going through hardship” [30:7]? CAUSA’s manager also 
pointed out the challenge between facilitating without enforcing: “being strategic in 
pushing towards the fine line between dictating what needs to be going on and having 
regions have a say in that” [21:25].  In a slightly different note, at NYIC, facilitating the 
process includes one-on-one consultations during preparation of meetings or when 
disagreements arise that may interrupt the process. A program officer explains: “I call 
them up before and I just feel them out and just see what your sort of thoughts are so I 
can be sort of mentally prepared for it. Because I hate being in a position where, you 
know, boom, and it comes down on me and I don't even know how to respond or react” 
[9-44]. 
 
The above quotes show that the openness does not mean that the process is unguided or 
left to develop absolutely anarchically. Facilitating becomes fundamental when processes 
are open and inclusive. Open and inclusiveness allows to tap on diversity, generate some 
unity around diversity, but may turn into disunity. The open process must be facilitated—
if it weren’t open it would be mandated, but, this would be unviable in a network 
composed of independent autonomous actors. As NDLON coordinator’s quote states, 
“the purpose must be very clear” but you “can’t enforce” the process. However, the 
tension between what constitutes facilitation and what manipulation or enforcement is 
present in these networks.  
 
Facilitating the process does not give the coordinating unit the control over the outcome, 




not predictable by anyone involved: it depends on all organizations involved (Huxham 
2003; O’Toole 1997). Indeed, networks have all the characteristics identified by 
Thompson (1967) that make the relationship between cause and effects uncertain: 
information is insufficient, they are highly dynamic, and outcome depends on behavior of 
others.  
 
Openness and participatory decision-making is important, but it can easily turn into 
disunity, especially during resource distribution92. While I was at CAAELII, its financial 
sponsor’s financial manager explained how lengthy the process could become when he 
had to decide on the grants’ re-distribution among the members: “we need meetings after 
meetings, among all [members and] it was very difficult for everybody to reach a 
decision” [26-13]. At NYIC, deciding who speaks at a rally or event may generate 
tensions, according to the network director, “because we can’t have an event and have 
everybody speak” [10-47]. Another NYIC program officer describes how these power 
imbalances were facilitated:  
There are organizations that are better, more experienced staff, they 
understand the politics better, they have better connections so they 
themselves make sure that their side of the story’s heard.  One thing that 
we do is before every time that we meet, when we bring everybody 
together, we make sure that we talk individually to each one [35-20]. 
 
A staff person of another network gave an additional example of how power imbalances, 
when not properly facilitated, may negatively influence the decision-making process: 
                                                 
92 This tension between creating value together and claiming the value created against each other is termed 




A lot of the people who are working here, a great majority are Mexican 
undocumented people.  And they tend to kind of overpower the voice in 
immigration reform efforts.  And I think sometimes it seems like [their] 
agenda seems to take up a lot of space [in the network].  Bearing in mind 
that they are really that guiding force too [24-15]. 
 
As shown above, facilitating decision-making becomes especially relevant during the 
distribution of benefits, since success may unite but may also divide—as Ybema (1996) 
states.  As far as decision-making is understood as a power game as opposed to, or in 
addition to, a functional prerequisite (Miller, Hickson, and Wilson 1996), power among 
parties within the network—and in particular during decision-making—is central to the 
task of network facilitation (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Gray93 2000; Huxham and Vangen 
2000b; Keast, Mandell, Brown, and Woodcock 2004; Tierney 1996; Vangen and 
Huxham 2004). Members will tend to strategically manipulate the game to their own 
advantage (Grandori and Soda 1995; Klijn and Teisman 1997). Indeed, Vangen and 
Huxham’s (2004) definition of the leadership activity “involvement” includes “managing 
power imbalances.”  
 
Facilitation is necessary to maintain an open and inclusive decision-making process but, 
looking back, activation also may play a role in maintaining the open process. Activation 
allows the network to have an open decision-making process since it guarantees a 
minimum unity by selecting and attracting members who are diverse but also united 
around the meta-goal an identity. Without a proper selection, it may be that an open 
decision-making process is unviable since: no matter how well and how much it is 
                                                 




facilitated, unity may not be achieved. On the other hand, a proper selection—together 
with facilitation aimed at maintaining and further building unity—allows opening up the 
decision-making process since a minimum of unity is already guaranteed. Killing finds 
(1988) that there must be a balance between scope complexity and organizational 
complexity (Alter and Hage 1993; Killing 1988)—an alliance cant be both scope and 
organizationally complex but must either be organizationally complex or have a complex 
scope. In these networks a similar rationale seems at work as controlling for unity around 
identity and meta-goal—first through activation and later through facilitation—allows for 
an open decision-making process among organizationally and culturally diverse 
members.  
 
The facilitation of an open decision-making process hints at several points. First, while in 
intra-organizational settings management is about decision-making (Simon 1976; Miller, 
Hickson, and Wilson 1996), it may be that in a network setting management is about 
facilitating decision-making, in that decisions are made not by the coordinating unit but 
by others. The coordinating unit facilitates rather than decides. The idea here is not to 
reduce uncertainty but instead to cope with it (Thompson 1967; Kilduff and Dougherty 
2000) by incorporating openness and inclusiveness as a programmed routine (March and 
Simon 1958). Second, the coordinating unit facilitates the process, and does not control 
the outcome. This does not mean that the process is left to develop freely; rather, it 
prescribes positive manipulation (Huxham and Vangen 2000b) and is similar to 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Thoret’s (1976) support routines: routines aimed at 




does not allow to closely determine the outcome of the decision-making process; this, in 
turn, does not allow to predetermine medium- to long-term specific objectives. This 
strategic indefinition may then have the same effect as “strategic ambiguity” (Davenport 
and Leitch 2005)—when strategy is defined ambiguously—in that it may allow to 
promote “unified diversity” (Eisenberg and Goodall 1997). By leaving future specific 
objectives undefined unity is more readily reached in diversity. 
Ratifying decisions 
Decisions must be ratified at some point. In networks decision-making is done mostly by 
consensus—in particular regarding major decisions—because, as explained by Agranoff 
and McGuire (2001), no legal mechanism exists to keep the non-agreeing independent 
actors together. This seems to reduce the number of options available to the network 
since, as in CAAELII’s case, they all come together “by choosing the issue that [they] all 
can work on” [26-24]. Similarly, at NYIC, on issues where consensus can not be reached, 
no position is taken.  
 
Although voting happened in NYIC’s board to formalize decisions, only NDLON seemed 
to use voting in actual decision-making. An organizer of NDLON-member CHIRLA94 
exemplifies this: “we usually have…ways of reaching resolution of problems…and 
whatever we all decide is what we do. Even if it may seem too little for some or too much 
for others, whatever we decide in a common agreement is what gets done” [29:20—own 
translation]. This counters the idea that decisions taken in networks are consensual 
                                                 




(Agranoff 2003). However, since voting happened only in NDLON, this singular 
exception may be because this network’s superior decision-making body is the assembly. 
The annual assembly at NDLON uses voting to ratify decisions given the large number of 
people—both member representatives and constituents—present in the annual national 
meetings. Moreover, the day-laborers, when organizing in centers, use voting as their 
decision-making tool. This voting culture, then, seems to have permeated to all levels of 
decision-making in NDLON. 
Summarizing facilitation 
In aggregate, an important leadership activity that emerged from my analysis was 
facilitating interaction, which involves communicating with, mediating among, and 
supporting members. This proved important since interaction of diverse organizational 
members must be aided if disunity is to be avoided and unity built.  
 
Decision-making, I find, is a specific instance of interaction which must be facilitated 
while kept inclusive and open. Decision-making must be kept open and participatory if 
the diverse autonomous and independent members are not to exit and abandon the 
network. An inclusive and open process, though, must be facilitated in order to avoid 
disunity due to power imbalances and disputes arising around, for example, benefit 
distribution.  
 
When ratifying decisions, consensus is the common mechanism, although voting is 
prevalent in NDLON as it has a culture of voting. Moreover, including constituents in 




inclusion of constituents in important and difficult decisions reduces overall 
disagreements since it grounds the decision in its real-life context, among the people that 
are most affected by it.  
 
Facilitation, then, seems very closely linked to structure; that is, interaction—and 
decision-making as a type of interaction—occurs in a structure, which it in turn reifies or 
modifies (Giddens 1984; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997c; March and Simon 1958; 
Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006). As Blau and Scott noted long ago, “in the course 
of social interaction common notions arise as to how people should act and interact” 
(1978, 213). Managing the structure becomes imperative since it limits network 
interaction and ultimately influences the outcome. 
Framing the structure: procedures and norms 
Procedures  
In my analysis, I identified a leadership activity carried out by the coordinating unit 
aimed at setting up and managing the procedures, and rules, norms, and values. All of 
which determine the structure. Structure is here understood as the stable patterns of 
behavior (March and Simon 1958) of all members of the network. Regarding the 
procedures, NYIC has set up a task-force multiple-tier structure to accommodate its large 
membership. The director explains: 
I think with the big coalition model, we just take anybody and everybody 
[but we don’t have a] feeling like, oh, ‘it’s this huge coalition where 
everything is geared towards the lowest common denominator.’ I think it’s 
how you function, how tightly you run your coalition, and every one of our 





NDLON and CAUSA have opted for regional coordinators, respectively at the federal 
and state level. In NDLON’s case, its development director justifies this territorially 
divided structure: “it’s just easier for them to communicate face-to-face and not always 
on the phone” [30-6]. This quote also points at how structure facilitates interaction.  
 
In addition, all four networks studied here have set up structures that vertically span from 
the network’s board all the way to the member organizations’ constituents (as mentioned 
previously with regard to decision-making). NDLON incorporates day-laborers 
throughout its structure: in its board, in its work, and in its annual assembly. NDLON’s 
coordinator justifies the porous vertical structure on the grounds of effectiveness: “It’s 
about sharing leadership with the people impacted.  If I were to speak on behalf of the 
day laborers, I will not be effective as they are when they speak on their own behalf” 
[17:14].  
 
CAUSA’s board is composed of organizational representatives but its working groups 
often incorporate constituents. As mentioned, the board incorporates immigrants in its 
major decisions—as in supporting or attacking the McCain-Kennedy bill. Its former 
coordinator justifies this verticality to ensure alignment between the network and its 
ultimate beneficiaries, the immigrants. This alignment in turn makes the network strong: 
“I think the reason why CAUSA’s strong is because it’s anchored in the immigrant 




working class people” [18:12 & 18:13]. Similarly, CAAELII’s director identifies his 
network’s “multiple layer cake” structure as this network’s main strength: 
The coalition …starts at this layer of executive directors …but they meet 
only once a year, like an annual meeting.  [And then] we have programs 
and projects together.  And those project coordinators come together on a 
monthly basis for the specific projects…  And then we go even deeper, we 
now take the community members of these different organizations to come 
together in the Leadership Program, together with some key staff, to come 
together.  So I guess it’s a multi-layered cake, which makes it richer, but 
also harder to bake… I think we are successful because we have deep 
connections in a lot of these communities [14-9 & 14-17]. 
 
The NYIC’s manager also argues that such an “organic” vertical structure helps avoid 
diversity translating into disunity. An integrated and organic structure, where the 
members are intertwined into the network at both the working group and board levels, 
may reduce disagreements between board and working groups. She puts it this way: “lot 
of the nitty gritty decisions get made at those working groups, but our board 
[organizational] members are in all of those working groups, and they participate in all of 
our active campaign areas” [10-7]. Such an organic or multi-tier structure increases 
complexity—just as an open decision-making process—but is beneficial in the long run. 
 
Setting the formal structure, the rules, and procedures for the network is what Kickert, 
Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997c) call framing. I propose that framing is important in 
generating unity within diversity. Just as diversity is facilitated, unity is framed. Framing 





Organizational structures, including routines and procedures, are one of the focuses of 
framing. The above quotes point towards the importance of managing the structure in 
sustaining the unity/diversity paradox. A proper structure (e.g. multiple tier for large 
NYIC, geographic subdivisions for dispersed CAUSA and NDLON), which is the 
platform for interaction, is important to ensure that interaction between diverse actors 
does not turn into disunity. Moreover, the organic vertical structures integrating the 
constituents reduces the chance for disunity by grounding disputes at a concrete level, as 
in the case of the DreamAct and the McCain-Kennedy bills. 
 
The structure is then a result of the procedures and rules such as working groups, 
committees, and interfaces,95 as well as “deep structures” (Bryson and Crosby 1992). The 
deep structure includes norms and values, that determine organizational culture, common 
frames of meaning-making, and identity—all essential components for building unity as I 
show below.96 
Rules, norms, and values 
All networks emphasized the aspect of generating common meaning-making frames of 
reference, values, rules, and culture. NDLON does not allow “swear words” [28:8], and 
CAUSA works “under a philosophy of César Chavez, [of] mutual respect; we have the 
                                                 
95 Huxham and Vangen (2000b) separate structure from processes; I consider structure to encompass 
processes, in their sense.  
96 Concepts such as culture, identity, values, norms, routines, and institutions are related and overlap. Even 
March and Olsen (2005), who contrast their neo-institutional perspective to the cultural perspective (and 
also to the rational-actor perspective), recognize the relation and overlap between norms and rules, with 




right to criticize and we do so, but our movement is guided by principles” [18:13]. As an 
NYIC program officer states: 
I feel like you develop rules of engagement…Like you have to develop 
rules so like, so that, you know, we have a decision- making process, we 
have our board, we have our task forces, we have other partners [9-36]. 
 
Framing such process rules and norms has to do with generating trust and safety spaces. 
“There’s going to always be problems, so you want to create an environment where 
people feel safe, that they can bring up their issues” [18:37], said CAUSA’s former 
manager. Similarly, a program officer at CAAELII mentioned: 
A lot of it is just having very personal dialogue and just the fact that 
they’re able to come together as a group of different orientations and 
learn about each others issues and struggles and see how they may 
conduct them.  I think that part of space is created kind of building those 
relationships, those trusts [15-10]. 
 
Indeed, Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence (1998) suggest that trust requires predictability 
and goodwill: the former arises from shared meaning and the latter from participation in 
shared meaning-making processes.  
 
Closely related to rules and norms, the culture of the network, made up of observable 
artifacts, values, and underlying assumptions (Schein 1992), helps frame unity. A value 
these networks seem to enhance is, as mentioned previously, that of diversity. At NYIC, a 
program officer stated: “we agree to disagree” [35-19]. Another program officer added: 
I think we're really diverse and we're really thoughtful about that… we're 
really conscious in making sure that there are people from all different 
communities on our board and on our working force, you know, our task 





Similarly, “CAAELII really is intentional about breaking down those barriers, exposing 
those cultural issues” [15-25], stated one of its program officers.  Enhancing the value of 
diversity not only unites, as a common value, but makes differences explicit and may aid 
to avoid disunity by making everyone aware of the difficulties ahead. Framing unity 
around this value is important to make explicit the implicit premise that diversity may, 
but does not have to, turn into disunity.  
 
Also related to culture, values, and norms, strong identities and vision play a fundamental 
role in these networks. CAAELII bases its organizing model on the pro-civil rights 
Highlander Training Center and its main meeting room was decorated following this 
reputable center. NYIC’s unifying vision is beautifully explained by its current director:  
I feel like every era really has certain sectors or certain kinds of social 
movements that lead change in that era, and I really think in this decade, 
and maybe into next decade, how immigrant rights gets defined really 
define basic civil rights, and what equity means in our society, just like in 
certain times, there was civil rights movement [10-2]. 
 
At CAUSA, a junior leader highlighted the “César Chávez Day” [22:3] which unifies the 
immigrant community. At NDLON, culture, art, and sports play a significant role in 
meaning-making. In fact, it was after a soccer match between two day-labor teams that 
the idea of setting up a national network first emerged. NDLON’s coordinator explains 
how the network generates the unitary identity: 
When you are there [soliciting work on the street]…people see you as a 
nuisance, as somebody begging for day work.  That’s the bottom line. 
Because people don’t see the Colombian, Honduran, or the Mexican.  




better with Mexicans.  And so the Colombians get along better with other 
Colombians.  That’s the reality that we face, but it has not been an 
obstacle for us organizing.  First of all, because you don’t address it like 
that, as a nationality issue. Look, the cops are coming. They [the cops] are 
taking the jobs away from you and you can’t feed your children.  And yes, 
there may be differences [between nationalities] but we address it by 
creating a soccer team.  On one [same] side we have Mexicans and 
Hondurans playing [30-32].  
 
During my observation of network collective events, chants and symbols related to 
common identities and values were continually used. CAAELII finished one of its 
meeting with the renowned “we shall overcome” from the Civil Rights Movement,  
NDLON repeated “un pueblo sin fronteras” [“a people without borders”] in its National 
Assembly, CAUSA shouted the “si se puede97” [“yes we can”] several times during its 
City Hall meeting, and NYIC chanted continually at their rallies, demanding immigrant 
rights.  
 
The idea of identity, as belonging to a certain group (Hogg and Terry 2000, Tsui, Egan, 
and O’Reilly 1992) is relevant here. Indeed, Foldy, Goldman, and Ospina (2004) show 
that cognitive shifts in social change organizations not only regard the problem and the 
solution but also affect how the group see themselves—and how others see the group, 
which is part of the focus of the activity of mobilizing.98  This is manifest in NDLON’s 
coordinator quote below: 
                                                 
97 Chanted by Cesar Chavez. 
98 Similarly, the literature on advocacy groups and social movements has distinguished between three core 
framing tasks (Pellow 1999): diagnostic framing, locating the origin of the problem; prognostic framing, 
specifying how the problem should be addressed; and articulating an identity component (Gamson 1990; 





When you develop a sense of unity based on culture among the day 
laborers…what you are doing is creating a sense of pride, a sense of 
identity and…when oppressed people gain that sense of identity and unity, 
then it is more difficult for unscrupulous employers and other law 
enforcement agencies to come and discriminate against that…because a 
lot of workers will stand tall [17:9]. 
 
As Tierney (1996) points out, the idea of identity is central to leadership. However, the 
distinction between network identity and immigrant (or day-labor) identity was not clear 
in these networks. Organizational identity (in these cases, network identity) as a separate 
identity of the general immigrant movement was probably not as identifiable as in other 
types of networks or organizations because of the direct mapping of the network identity 
onto the broader immigration movement identity. It is as if the networks were a vehicle 
for experiencing the immigrant (or immigrant day-laborer) identity. 
 
Ospina and Foldy (2005) find that social change organizations ground their strategic 
action on specific worldviews composed of values and assumptions. Similarly, I found in 
all four networks that maintaining open decision-making requires, in addition to setting 
the proper procedures, framing the necessary “social architecture,” such as symbols and 
values (Schein 1992). Such symbols and values help create sufficient unity and tolerance 
of diversity. More importantly, it aids common meaning-making, the cognitive “process 
of creating names, interpretations, and commitments” (Drath and Palus 1994, 9).99 
Generating common meaning-making is a central task of leadership (Drath and Palus 
                                                 
99 That meaning-making, cognition, and related terms are a debated arena is well-known. Different authors 
use different terms but with similar meaning, as Walsh (1995) shows in his  survey of different ways of 
referring to cognition: e.g., theories in action, cognitive maps, tacit understandings, givens, frames of 




1994; Feyerhem 1994; Schein 1992; Smircich and Morgan 1982), and that it is even more 
relevant in network fragmented settings is only expectable (Schaap and Van Twist1997). 
In fact, Gray (2000) suggests that a possible perspective in assessing a network’s 
performance is the amount of shared meaning created, and Agranoff and McGuire (2001) 
talk about groupware: when group development reaches mutual understanding and 
transcends immediate and interactive bases of coordination and communication through 
hierarchy. This is also similar to the concept cognitive embeddedness (i.e., structured 
regularities of mental processes) and cultural embeddedness (i.e., shared collective 
understandings) identified in informal networks (DiMaggio and Zukin 1990). The 
literature in public leadership has also highlighted the relevance of the organization’s 
institutional dimension, or norms, and its congruence with processes, values, and beliefs 
(Terry 1995; Villoria 2001). 
 
In fact, institutional theorists have also pointed to the importance of both formal and 
informal social norms, conventions, and rules (Douglas 1986; North1990)100. In 
fragmented settings such as networks, institutional uncertainty (Koppenjan and Klijn 
2004) is one of the difficulties that must be overcome since actors function with different 
rules and norms. Institutional uncertainty tends to increase in parallel to diversity, and is 
greatly affected by cultural and national diversity (Sauquet and Jacobs 1998). However, 
                                                 
100 It is important to point out that by meaning-making I refer to setting up the frames of references and the 
common perceptions (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997). I do not mean sense-making as the specific moment 
of comprehending a situation (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005) as it is often used in decision-making 
literature. It is rather setting up the values and procedures. It is about generating shared understanding 
(Dachler and Hosking 1995), being able of understanding together in general: it is not only about 




March and Olsen (2005) also point out how difficult it is to generate common institutions 
and maintain diversity. They point towards this tension as being one of the sources of 
problems in the European Union. Indeed, we may expect this same tension occurring 
among these interorganizational networks: common norms must be generated in 
fragmented settings but these usually undermine diversity. 
Summarizing framing 
All in all, framing is an important unifying activity. The question asked by Berry et al.  
(2004), “do shared core beliefs have a major impact on network stability and 
effectiveness?” (547), may be answered affirmatively: Partners need a shared sense of 
correlated fate to function (Gray 2000). First, framing is important in managing the 
unity/diversity paradox because it sets the platform for interaction. If adequately done, by 
setting the operating structure it allows for an interaction among diverse entities that does 
not turn into disunity, but rather unifies. Second, framing by generating identity and 
shared value for diversity build the unity pole. And precisely by framing not only a 
unifying identity but also the value for diversity, the network avoids the risk that Gray 
(2000) warns of: over-emphasizing one single interpretation—and hence decreasing 
diversity. Framing unity around identity and diversity does welcome a chorus of voices 
(Hirschmann 1970) as called for by Gray (2000). 
 
Framing involves setting up the organizational structure and procedures. Generating 
shared meaning-making is an important part of framing, where unity emerges by setting 
engagement rules, common norms, and a shared identity and vision. It also maintains 




indirectly, when the network builds the capacity of its member organizations—the 
leadership activity of capacitating.  
Capacitating: making the members’ capable 
Another leadership activity executed by the coordinating units, and relevant to the 
management of the unity/diversity paradox, is about making the member organizations 
more capable. CAAELII’s Apprenticeship Program was formed to “build capacity of … 
partner organizations to do community organizing within the social services framework” 
[15-4]. Similarly, an NYIC program officer points out the importance of capacitating 
members via training as they join the working group: 
It’s a very intense process.  We do a four-day intensive training and then 
monthly trainings with our groups, and then lots of other forms of 
convening in order to model and practice and share information and build 
their expertise [11-24]. 
 
CAUSA has its leadership development program, CAPACES, and NDLON actively 
supports member-to-member coaching and directly trains its members. All networks 
invested strongly in member development. I call these activities, capacitating: making the 
members more capable. 
 
Capacitating refers to the network strengthening in multiple ways the members and their 
staff. Referring neither to building the network’s capacity (Bardach 1998), nor to the 
network building the capacity of someone or something external to it, capacitating refers 




members’ power bases, as opposed to building the network’s own power bases. It 
generates “power for” (Huxham and Beech 2003b) the members.  
 
All networks spend considerable time capacitating, which occurs fundamentally in two 
ways: training or resource transfer. With training, via leadership and skills development 
programs, the member’s knowledge base is increased. Capacitating member 
organizations also occurs by transferring resources from or via the network to the 
members. So, one aspect of capacitating is to support member organizations to secure 
staff. Another way of capacitating the members is, obviously, by financial resource 
transfers for executing programs. Some task forces at NYIC, for example, “subgrant 
several groups or members… to do sort of an increased level of work in the task force” 
[9-30]. CAUSA’s former coordinator, similarly, explains such a resource-transfer: 
For example in Medford…the coordinator, he has his own organization 
but…he does part-time work for us, quarter-time [phonetic] work for 
CAUSA.  So we’re able to give them some money so that they can do 
that…So we’re helping sustain their organization with resources.  It’s like 
strategic investments, we’re making an investment in that organization 
because we trust that organization and we work with that organization 
[18:32]. 
 
Capacitating is distinct from building the network’s power, although building the member 
organizations’ power bases indirectly strengthens the network. NDLON’s development 
director aptly exposes the rationale behind the capacitating of organizational members: 
The power and strength of the national network is intrinsically tied to the 
power and the strength of each individual member, and that’s why… a lot 
of the work that we do focuses a lot on leadership development and 





Capacitating helps sustain the unity/diversity paradox since it aids interaction among 
partners and sets common rules. Training of member organizations also increases 
common meaning-making (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Weik, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld 2005) 
and is a vehicle for the socialization of common values (Longo 2007). CAUSA, for 
example, explicitly deals with differences among parties via training: “Yeah, we have 
[differences], and I think one of the ways that we dealt with that was through the 
emergence of this leadership development project called CAPACES, where we have been 
able to bring people together” [18:38]. Similarly, the director of NDLON-member Latin 
American Workers Project (PTLA) explains how training generates unity: 
When people from here go to Chicago, say, to a training workshop with 
network members, they share a process…when they say goodbye to each 
other…they resemble a groom and a bride [laughter] a strong spiritual 
bond is generated [28:7—own translation]. 
 
Furthermore, capacitating as a skill and leadership development tool also enhances two 
activities linked to the management of the outward cooperation/confrontation paradox: 
strategizing and mobilizing—as I mention in the next chapter. Capacitating 
organizational members allows for improved strategizing—deciding and planning the 
engagement strategy, as CAUSA’s former manager says: “we have a shortage of not only 
being able to negotiate but also a shortage of people strategizing.  People learning how to 
be analytical.  To be able to analyze the situation.  To be able to develop a strategic 
campaign to address that” [18:40]. 
 
Capacitating as a fundamental activity of network management has not been much 




suggest that the strategic center of a network needs to be a capability-builder. Agranoff 
(2003) has mentioned the importance of knowledge-sharing of networks (particularly in 
what he calls Development Networks), and Huxham and Beech (2003b) talk of “power 
for.” However, they do not explicitly refer to the network making the organizational 
member more capable. Even in the literature on learning alliances, it is an organizational 
partner learning from another organizational partner, an organization learns from another 
organization (Inkpen 2000; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria 1998): not from the alliance but 
through the alliance. This activity, however, may be specific to the immigration policy 
sector, where organizations are relatively weak and under-developed.  
 
Capacitating is important in generating unity in diversity not only because it is a vehicle 
for framing common rules and frames of reference but also because it directly affects 
how the members re-evaluate their membership to the network. The idea that in networks 
members have to gain something from part-taking is obvious. As mentioned in my review 
of the network evaluation and performance literature, one of the criteria used to evaluate 
networks is internal efficiency (Ebers and Grandori 1997). This criterion seemed already 
met by the successful advocacy actions of these networks; such a shared gain seemed, 
nevertheless, not enough. The collective gain has to be complemented by member 
organization-specific gains. As NYIC board president told me, networks have to give 
back results, such as training and resources, to member groups. Human and Provan 
(2000) also found that the network not only had to deliver general gains—which 
indirectly benefit the individual organizations—but also organization-specific 




benefits must be complemented by individual organization benefits. Just as in business 
alliances public gains—those that can only be tapped through the alliance—must be 
complemented by private ones (Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria 1998), in these networks, 
benefits for the cause via the network had to be complemented by direct individual 
benefits to the organizational members. 
 
Capacitating, as the other leadership activities, does have its perils and dilemmas, 
particularly with respect to resource transfers to members. While an organization-specific 
gain increases the members’ resource base, and thus their overall power, it may co-opt 
members by making them dependent, and thus decreasing opposition in the working 
groups. One NYIC program officer, who did not use grant-making in her working groups, 
told a colleague, who did use grant-making in his, why she thought her group was more 
“troublesome” than his: “you know why?  Because your groups are paid.  My groups 
aren’t paid” [9-80]. She believes grant-making and diverse opinions are negatively 
related. While Scharpf (1997) warns of networks cooperating under the shadow of 
market, hierarchy, or majority, which helps to deter opportunism, the fact that paid 
groups run smoother may point to the presence of cooptation. 
 
A staff of CAAELII exposed another problem of capacitating members via resource 
transfer: “usually it’s hard for me to get them [group members] to do things that are not 
related to funding or to money, if there’s no financial reward for their agency” [15-11]. 




given for participation: groups will not get involved in the network without individual 
organization-specific gains.  
 
Summing up, I have found that organizational member capacitating is a central leadership 
activity in all four networks. Capacitating is also another vehicle for framing, more 
precisely for common meaning-making, and is thus important for uniting diversity around 
purpose, identity, and the value of diversity. It also builds the networks’ unity by 
increasing the member’s payoff. Capacitating, though, may have a co-opting effect on 
organizational members and, conversely, may make members cooperate only when 
specific organizational gains are involved.  
BUILDING POWER BY UNITING DIVERSITY 
Although we have seen that the unity/diversity paradox exists in all four cases and have 
learned how it is sustained, it is yet unclear why the maintenance of this paradoxical 
tension is important for network success. My findings suggest that this paradox is crucial 
to build the networks’ power bases as well as their capacity to get action by members, or 
their “power to.” 
 
The four networks sustain the paradox of unity and diversity to build power to achieve 
their mission:  to be effective. According to NDLON’s coordinator, they organize to 
build power. In addition, an NYIC program officer summarizes why sustaining the 
unity/diversity paradox generates power: 
Well, I, I think it [sustaining the unity/diversity paradox] has [generated 




weaknesses and strengths together and sort of be able to welcome that – 
like one group may offer one particular piece to make this working group, 
you know, stronger, for example.  They're great mobilizers.  And then 
another group may be like totally legal-savvy, you know, and sort of 
understanding that perspective from the policy and then sort of having 
mobilization come together.  That really makes it sort of a powerful group 
to have all those types of resources there and available, and so working 
groups, we have groups that come from all different types of backgrounds, 
and I think that really makes us stronger to sort of be able to work with 
them [9-29]. 
 
Unity without diversity would not yield as much power, since the networks’ different 
bases would not be as potent, or, as a CAAELII program officer says, “we could do it 
[with less diversity]  but I don’t think it would have the same power ... So I think that 
there’s a power in that we’re able to bring such a diverse group together.  It’s hard, it’s 
really hard” [15-27 & 15-33]. A young board member of CAUSA-member VHCC101 
emphasized the idea of building power: “It is a collective work. It is the way to build 
more strength, more power” [22:17—own translation]. 
 
Unity in diversity builds power because isomorphism within the network decreases 
diversity, thus reducing non-redundant information and access to opportunities (Burt 
1992). In parallel, diversity without a minimum of unity to allow the network to tap on 
the different power bases does not create power. Hence, while unity builds “power to” 
(the ability to get action by members), diversity builds the power bases.  
 
                                                 




Power building through uniting diversity is done consciously by all four networks.  The 
unity/diversity paradox is essential for building “power to” and the different power bases, 
to manage the outer cooperation/confrontation paradox via mobilizing and strategizing.  
 
While keeping in mind the literature on power sources, power bases, and resources, I 
identified the following power bases in the data: knowledge, legitimacy, material and 
financial resources, and access. All four bases correspond to codes that emerged during 
the data analysis. 
Knowledge  
Knowledge has been identified as an important power base built by networks (Agranoff 
2003; Inkpen 2000). Both policy-specific technical knowledge and skills and know-how 
are here understood as the knowledge power base. Maintaining the unity/diversity 
paradox allows the network to benefit from what both unity and diversity can bring to the 
table. For example, the paradox is important in enhancing the network’s knowledge base 
as the different members bring their diverse experiences and put them in common. A 
junior leader of a member of CAUSA comments how diversity and unity improve the 
network’s decision-making: “Some people proposed one solution, others another, and a 
dialogue, a debate occurred. It’s what allows us to understand the reality better. 
Otherwise we all would have the same mindset and it would be useless” [22:18—own 
translation]. In the same spirit, a program coordinator at CAAELII explained why they 
needed diversity and unity:  
We can’t do it alone. The monster is too big, right? Therefore, the 




strategy…we need many ways of understanding the same thing…the 
analysis is then richer…more complete [23:18—own translation]. 
 
As an organizer of NDLON-member IDEPSCA said: “I think that [the diversity] is the 
richness, right?…everyone has their own different perspective” [27:8—own translation]. 
Besides different members bringing in diverse knowledge and skills that, united, increase 
the network’s overall knowledge base, another source of building the knowledge base is 
the constituency themselves as providers of information. An NYIC’s program officer 
stated: “the one most important thing is that they’re [the members are] the ones that give 
us the information, they’re the ones that have access to the community, so they give us 
that kind of credibility when we do go to the community to talk to them about these 
issues” [35-17]. In addition, the constituency as a source of information also builds the 
network’s legitimacy.  
Legitimacy 
Neo-institutional organizational theorists (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1983) argue that 
legitimacy is a driving force behind decisions, and Human and Provan (2000)102 
identified it as the main theme explaining network evolution and success. Legitimacy, 
another power base of the networks103, serves several purposes and is of many different 
types, depending on relative to whom the network has legitimacy. As I showed 
previously, legitimacy inwards—towards constituents, members, and potential 
                                                 
102 They distinguish between three types of network legitimacy: network as a legitimate mode of interaction 
(as cooperative interaction rather than competitive), network as form, and network as a specific entity. It is 
to the latter that I refer to. 
103 In the preliminary study Ospina and I performed, we identified credibility as a factor for network 
success (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005). In my data, just as Human and Provan (2000) found, interviewees 




members—helps in activating members, and is built up by fair, open, and participatory 
functioning, as well as success. The legitimacy we are referring to here—legitimacy built 
by uniting in diversity—is that of the network with respect to external non-members. The 
network’s legitimacy in its domain.  
 
Legitimacy due to the combined diversity and unity strengthens the network’s 
engagement, as a CAUSA regional coordinator straightforwardly states: “I think he [a 
congressman] needed to see that there was a support of other folks who felt that he was in 
the wrong place around this issue rather than me which would be in his eyes a given… 
because I’m a Latina” [19:25]. Similarly, CAUSA’s former director informs about how 
they include constituents when engaging their targets: “So say we met with a 
Congressman who doesn’t support immigration reform.  We would get a roomful of 
people and tell him why” [18:25]. As NDLON director states: “If I were to speak on 
behalf of the day laborers, I will not be effective as they are when they speak on their 
own behalf” [17:14]. Additionally, uniting a diverse group of people is a mark of power 
that legitimizes the network. “Now, mobilization isn’t the only indication of how strong 
you are, but it’s one [10-25],” says an NYIC’s director.  
Financial resources 
The unity/diversity paradox also allows the network to attract more resources because 
funders may prefer funding one large network rather than multiple small organizations. 
This is so because, as CAAELII’s financial manager told me, it lowers the “transaction 





However, the unity/diversity paradox is not exempt of perils, even when it is successfully 
maintained. A peril may be that the network is favored by funders, over its members, and 
hence the overall funding available for the cause is reduced. An organizer at NDLON-
member CHIRLA says: “what has happened is that foundations now say, ‘why do we 
have to give to so many organizations when we can give to the network?’ … but what has 
happened is that the funding has been reduced” [29:11]. Yan and Gray (1994) found the 
same problem, where a performing collaboration could eventually become a threat to the 
existence of member organizations, and Human and Provan (2000) found in the two 
networks they studied instances when organizational members felt that the network was 
competing against them. 
Access 
Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence (2004) find that political access is an important resource 
for institutional entrepreneurs who greatly benefit from subject position, which gives 
them legitimacy. I have found that access is an important power base, which in turn 
increases other power bases. Regarding the knowledge power base, the members supply 
vital access to policy-specific constituent-related information. Similarly, access becomes 
vital in getting out the message, as NYIC’s health program coordinator states: “you want 
one clear message from multiple messengers getting out there again and again in order to 
get social change” [11-46]. CAAELII’s director shows how access is built and used 
through the diverse membership: 
Well we have more leaders; we have more avenues to bring information 




leaders, students, teachers, staff.  Just for example, they were going to do 
adult education budget cuts.  In two weeks we sent to our congressional 
representative these 2,300 letters. They were overwhelmed [14-27]. 
 
At CAUSA, its director exemplified the increase in access gained by the network by 
having ROP—Rural Organizing Project, a rural Gay, Lesbian, Bi-, and Tran-sexual 
organization—as a member:  
ROP is strategic because like I said they’re doing work in rural 
communities where we may not have as many numbers.  So for instance in 
the state legislative session it’s not only for like mainstream political 
things…Just engaging the broader progressive community, which includes 
ROP, GLBT folks around immigrant issues is important.  Just because the 
immigrant community, especially in Oregon is to me it still feels like pretty 
invisible on the larger progressive radar screen [21:21]. 
 
A staff person of NDLON-member CASA-Maryland states how the paradox allows for 
increasing both the knowledge and access power bases: “unity gives us the experience of 
each of us. And above all, it allows to project ourselves nationally” [29:7]. 
 







These networks sustain the unity/diversity paradox to build power as the figure above 
shows. Power is built precisely by sustaining the paradox and avoiding having to reduce 
either pole. The paradox builds power and in particular the power bases access, 
knowledge, legitimacy, and resources. In turn the power bases strengthen each other: e.g., 
position allows the network to capture knowledge, and knowledge builds legitimacy. 
That networks sustain the internal paradox answers the secondary question how does 





8. THE OUTWARD MANAGEMENT OF THE NETWORK: 
CONFRONT AND COOPERATE 
The hardest thing about being an advocacy 
organization is that you're no good to 
anybody if you're someone's friend all the 
time. But you're also no good if you're the 
enemy all the time. You're just as irrelevant 
if you're in someone's pocket, as you are if 
you're on the outside constantly screaming 
and attacking them. 
Margie McHugh, former director of the New York 
Immigration Coalition. 
 
The other paradox that Ospina and I (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 2005) identified in 
previous work, and that I have analyzed in this research, deals with the outward work of 
the network: namely, confrontation and cooperation with external agencies. In this 
chapter, paralleling my secondary research questions, first I show how this paradox is 
present in all four networks. Then, I look at how it is managed: which leadership 
activities and power resources are used to manage it. Last, I explore how it contributes to 
the network’s effectiveness, and look at the interactions between the internal and the 
external paradoxes.  
COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION: THE ENGAGEMENT PARADOX 
According to Trist (1983), an organizational population becomes field-related when it 
engages with a set of problems which constitutes a domain of common concern.  
Constituting a domain in this sense is the immigration policy field, or at least the 
relational field between the network, fellow nonprofits, and the different governmental 




Farre 2005). All parties deal with a common set of problems, immigration-related issues, 
although the different actors come from and with different perspectives. The domain is 
uncentered (Trist 1983) since no constant referent organization exists, although the 
relevance of state actors in such policy domains is very high (Longo 2006). As the 
outgoing director of NYIC said in her farewell speech, government is such an important 
player for these networks’ purposes that they can’t afford not to play with it. Indeed, 
networks are also embedded in their environments (Mandel 1994; Parkhe, Wasserman, 
and Ralston 2006)—and thus constituting between the network and the domain a dialectic 
of parts and wholes (Astley and Van de Ven 1983; Marsh and Smith 2000). 
 
These networks combine both confrontation and cooperation with state actors in 
forwarding immigrant rights104. Whether it’s a senator or a mayor, the USCIS state 
branch or the education board, all networks use both cooperation and confrontation, albeit 
always deferring to the former whenever possible. CAUSA’s former coordinator puts it 
this way:  
It’s not always about bashing.  In fact, what we try to do is build 
incrementally…And if they, after that meeting, they continue to do that, 
we’ll do other actions.  Low-level actions that are building notoriety, 
press conferences, media work, getting the information out there to the 
community that this guy is not supporting it [18:25]. 
 
In one of the CAUSA acts I observed, in Eugene, Oregon, they had invited the mayor, 
and while the different speakers engaged in dialogue in a full Town Hall meeting 
                                                 
104 With respect to well known typologies of influence tactics, such as Yukl and Tracey’s (1992), 
confrontation includes “pressure” tactics, for example, while cooperation includes such tactics as 




regarding a Senate bill, CAUSA did not shy away from its position critiquing federal 
level policies and the thus-far meager local-level support. Similarly, NDLON invited 
governmental representatives of the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) to their Annual Assembly and, while engaging in open 
dialogue with them, posed their position with respect to some controversial governmental 
actions. In general, NDLON combines dialogue and meetings with legal litigation, 
marches, and boycotts. Its coordinator states: 
Before making a decision to demonstrate or to file a legal 
challenge against a municipality, we will always try to talk, but there’s 
only so much you can talk.  There is a moment, no matter how much you 
talk, still the day-laborers continue to be harassed. We come to the table… 
and we talk and things are going to be better and, blah, blah, blah, blah, 
and the next day the cops are still there harassing and ensuring that 
employers don’t pick the workers up.  So we honestly give that process a 
chance, but if it doesn’t work, we take it to the streets…For us there’s a 
message that is being more effective through talk than to 
be confrontational…So yeah, we prefer to collaborate rather than to be 
confrontational [30:27]. 
 
He explains the power of cooperation vis-à-vis confrontation in humanizing the 
perception of the day-laborers and balancing the playing field: “When you bring the cops, 
when they talk to the workers directly, the relationship changes—the only interaction that 
there is between cops and workers is when they come and harass them … they see each 
other face to face.  And that is power” [30:23].105 He adds: 
Sometimes we’re more effective doing that [cooperating] than telling 
people…“You don’t like immigrants because you’re a racist.”  The minute 
you do that, you start labeling people — you lose that opportunity of 
                                                 
105 This observation, moreover, agrees with Foldy, Goldman, and Ospina (2004) who observed social 
change organizations provoking cognitive shifts in external actors with respect to how they were perceived 




changing hearts and minds.  And sometimes you find in people who may 
have legitimate concerns about immigrants or about day laborers 
congregating in front of the property. Those are realities.  So I think that 
we have to be open-minded about those things because at the end, the 
change of hearts and minds is what’s going to make the neighborhoods 
better [17-42]. 
 
In Chicago, CAAELII also combines engagement strategies, dialoguing with senators and 
legislators, with direct opposition to them. Both poles of the paradox, cooperation and 
confrontation, reinforce each other and make the overall strategy more effective, as its 
director says: 
Right, well we’ve been successful because we’re not afraid to be 
confrontational.  You have to be confrontational if you have to, but 
probably it’s not our first choice.  We would go first with a cooperative 
advocacy approach, where we would voice our concerns and that you 
would also listen rather than publicly shame you, saying you’re not 
supporting us [14-46]. 
 
NYIC, similarly, while working with several departments of the New York City Mayor’s 
Office, such as Health or Housing, rallied at City Hall and wrote confrontational editorial 
letters. NYIC’s staff admitted working well with government since they not only were 
ready to give them credit, but also because they were a thorn in their thigh. These 
networks’ combination of cooperation and confrontation resembles Axelrod’s tit-for-tat, 
where cooperation is the first move but if defected, networks respond with confrontation. 
 
Such dual confrontation/cooperation behavior has been noted among environmentalist 
movements. “Consensus-based” environmentalist movements balance cooperation and 
confrontation with their opponents (Pellow 1999), and depart from Alinsky’s (1989) 




distinguish between three different types of engagement with the state: autonomous and 
confrontational, cooperative, and dualistic (Dodge 2006; Monpetit, Scala, and Fortier 
2004). The dualistic approach combines both the direct action (e.g. protest) with the 
cooperative deliberation.106  
 
In fact, the simultaneous existence of both confrontation and cooperation supports Scott’s 
(1992) statement that the non-confrontational notion of collaboration based on a cultural 
model, which believes that oppositional and confrontational behavior is an anathema to 
collaboration is erroneous. Confrontation, or the possibility of it, works as a regulator of 
cooperation (Luhmann 1995). The “shadow of confrontation” may well be necessary for 
cooperation. 
 
In addition to cooperation always implying confrontation, at least hypothetically, the 
nonprofit-government relationship inherently includes this tension (Frumkin 2000). Page 
(1999), in discussing the insider/outsider distinction—an insider is a nonprofit that has 
frequent contacts with government and is able to influence policy—concludes that if the 
distinction is valid at all, it is not binary. Groups use both strategies and, more 
importantly, the governmental counterparts understand this duality. As Frumkin (2003), 
paraphrasing Fukuyama, puts it, resolving the tension between nonprofit and the public 
sector would mark “the end of history” in nonprofit-public relations. (However, it is 
                                                 
106 The confrontation and cooperation also may occur within a given network, not only within the domain. 
In fact, Uzzi (1997) finds that the same individual may act both selfishly and altruistically with different 





worth pointing out that while Frumkin is referring to sector relations, Page and I are 
referring to interorganizational relations.)  
 
Several leadership activities and power resources are important in combining both poles 
of the cooperation/confrontation paradox, but perhaps more important is the fact that 
these are often enacted at different times or at different levels and points of interaction. 
The previous quotations have pointed how both cooperation and confrontation are 
applied in different moments: starting with cooperation and then moving towards 
confrontation if necessary. NYIC also combines different levels, as exemplified in the 
following statement by a NYIC program officer: 
We have like certain [governmental] staff that we are very cordial with 
and we talk with them and we have conversations with… Some of [them] 
don't have enough resources or enough support or the Mayor [is] not 
giving enough funding … So in our own relations with them, sure, we're 
cordial and polite and, and we are more collaborative but at the same 
time, sometimes bash their agency or their principal, their commissioner 
or chancellor or whoever to get the Mayor or someone on City Council to 
give more resources to help them out.  And I think it's kind of we're very 
frank.  Like we'll tell a unit director, you know, ‘tell us what you want, and 
just know that when we're bashing the agency publicly it's not about the 
working you're doing.  You're doing good work.’ [But] we want to have a 
public persona versus a private persona.  … You know, so there's different 
tones when you're talking to [9-62]. 
 
The NYIC staff member’s observations illustrates a difference between NYIC and the 
other three networks. Only NYIC confronts and cooperates with the same target—New 
York City municipality—at the same time. CAAELII cooperates with Congress and 
confronts the state USCIS office; NDLON cooperates with local police in one 




one senator and cooperates with another. CAAELII, CAUSA, and NDLON all confront 
and cooperate with different actors, or with the same but at different moments in time. 
NYIC both confronts and cooperates with New York City Mayor’s Office at the same 
time, but with different units within it. This may be so because of NYIC’s size and its 
proximity to City Hall given its regional focus on New York City. CAUSA and NDLON 
may not have such an intense interaction with any one group, and CAAELII may lack the 
size and capacity. NYIC, due to its size and proximity, does apply its paradoxical 
engagement poles of cooperation and confrontation at the same time with the same 
body—albeit at different units within it: e.g., cooperating with an officer in the 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) but confronting its 
Commissioner, or vice versa.  
 
The business literature observes a similar practice. Bengtson and Kock (2000), for 
example, suggest that in coopetition between companies, competition and cooperation, 
although interrelated, occur between different business units with different activities: e.g., 
confrontation with activities close to customers, and cooperation with activities far from 
the customer.  
 
The discussion above regarding the form and nature of the engagement paradox addresses 
the first secondary question with respect to the engagement paradox (what are the form 
and the nature of the cooperation/confrontation paradox in the context of network 
management?) The cooperation/confrontation paradox’s nature is different from the 




simultaneously and at the same level (the network) but regarding different dimensions. 
Recall how the networks were united around immigrant identity while diverse regarding 
member size. In contrast, the cooperation/confrontation paradox’s poles occur at different 
times or at different levels. The engagement paradox is diachronic or vertical in Ford and 
Backoff’s (1988) terms. The paradox’s poles either occur at different points in time or at 
different levels—i.e. cooperation with a public servant and confrontation with a 
commissioner. The paradox is perceived only by the outside observer, i.e. the analyst, 
because his or her thought structures automatically collapse these spatial levels and/or 
points in time. Collapsing time intervals or levels then generates the inconsistency (Ford 
and Backoff 1988), or mixed messages (Lewis 2000), of cooperation and confrontation. 
MANAGING THE CONFRONTATION/COOPERATION PARADOX  
To manage the cooperation/confrontation paradox, two activities seem extremely 
relevant. First, strategizing is fundamental to know when and how to apply one pole of 
the paradox or the other. Second, mobilizing is important since it builds up the networks’ 
power bases from the outside, which in turn are used to further mobilize, to strategize, or 
to directly engage with the external actor.  
Strategizing 
Thinking strategically, emphasizing future implications of present decisions (Bryson 
1995), and developing and exploring strategic alternatives (Bryson 1995; Mintzberg, 
Ahlstand, and Lampel 1998), is done by the coordinating unit of all networks. I call this 
leadership activity “strategizing,” since during the analysis it came up as an “in-vivo 




particular with respect to the cooperation/confrontation paradox. Strategizing involves 
both making the decision regarding the engagement, as well as developing the 
engagement’s plan of action.  
 
Strategizing is of utmost importance, as was visible after the recent spring 2006 U.S.-
wide demonstrations—greatly promoted and supported by the networks studied here—
aimed at affecting the congressional debate on immigration (explained in Chapter 5). 
Underscoring the complexity of and the need for strategizing, it is yet unclear whether the 
at-first-sight successful massive demonstrations in favor of immigrants have had a 
positive impact or have generated counter-productive sentiments in the eyes of the 
general public (Archibold 2006). 
Deciding the engagement mode 
Strategizing and internal network decision-making overlap (Miller, Hickson, Wilson 
1996) because deciding whether to cooperate and confront is part of strategizing.  While 
business may to a certain extent determine whether to “bridge” with its environment or 
“buffer” itself from it (van den Bosch and van Riel 1998; Vernis 2000), these nonprofit 
networks, due to their mission obligating them to influence governmental bodies, may 
only decide how to engage with them not if to engage with them. Deciding whether to 
cooperate and confront is a difficult choice, and is part of strategizing. As an NYIC 
program officer puts it: “That's hard.  It's an assessment that we need to do in terms of 
picking our battles.  There's a lot of battles, but we just have to really be strategic and 
smart about which one we're going to choose to actually really be out there” [9-63]. 




we have been unsuccessful getting you to hear our side, then we go to the stand where we 
have to be confrontational.  Or that sometimes we say it’s not worth destroying the bridge 
there” [14-47]. 
 
Similarly, at CAUSA, the current coordinator admits having picked up from the former 
coordinator a strategizing momentum: “I think one thing I’ve learned from Ramon [the 
former coordinator] a lot is learning to pick your fights” [21:45].  As she points out, being 
strategic is very important when resources are extremely limited and networks are 
overwhelmed by the magnitude and number of social issues that need to be tackled: “But 
CAUSA has stayed focused on certain issues, because that’s how we can have the most 
impact…being strategic about who we work with and [what] issues we take on” [21:18]. 
NDLON similarly finds itself having to decide what actions to carry out first. They 
usually prioritize anti-solicitation bills, local bills that prohibit day-workers to look for 
jobs, which affect workers the most. 
 
At NDLON, the development coordinator describes: “the leader encourages a lot to come 
up with strategies. … thinking strategically and critically about issues and figuring out 
what will have the biggest impact in the work that we’re doing” [16-28]. This quote 
points out the importance of strategizing in achieving these networks’ missions. The 
contradictions between the poles of the paradox (cooperation and confrontation) are of 
little importance, because what these networks have very clearly defined is their mission 
and purpose, which is what guides their choice of engagement. Being collaborative or 




The only non-negotiable is the mission for these networks; reinforcing this point, the 
NYIC director replied to me when asked if NYIC is a collaborative or confrontational 
network that that was a “silly question.” Unlike the unity/diversity paradox, which is 
sustained to build power, the cooperation/confrontation occurs as the networks try to be 
as effective as possible in fulfilling their missions. 
 
As is true for other leadership activities, strategizing is not untouched by tension. 
Different tactical approaches favored by the members may result in tensions or divisions 
regarding “how aggressive you want to be to a certain individual or body…What's the 
best way to sort of get about a certain bill maybe, but, you know, tactics are huge and its 
tough to really get [members] on the same page” [9-40], says an NYIC program officer. 
The network seems to overcome tactical differences among members by focusing on 
issues, which eventually is a strong unifying phenomenon. A program officer at NYIC 
comments: 
So even though everybody might have different ideas on how to attack the 
issue, we all understand that language access is needed. So what we do is 
we just say our main objective is to ensure that language access services 
are being provided by HPD [New York City Department of  Housing 
Preservation and Development], and we might differ on the “how” and 
that’s where we have discussions and so on, but what we try to do as the 
coalition is to help identify kind of like the bottom lines, meaning like what 
are the things that we’re not willing to move on and make sure that 
everybody expresses that [35-19]. 
 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter on decision-making in these networks, the above 
quote suggests that conflict is kept cognitive, rather than affective. The internal 




issues (Amason 1996).  While cognitive conflict in teams has been found to aid 
performance, affective conflict undermines performance. 
 
An organizer from NDLON-member CHIRLA107 reveals the same tension among 
members, the tension regarding how to engage with external actors generated between 
the more activist members and those less activist that receive governmental funding and 
demand a less confrontational stance: 
Some organizations in the network receive municipal funds. … Then they 
are not free anymore [since the City] requires you to be more conservative 
… and [the City] pays the programs. So that is the only conflict we have 
had [29:16—own translation]. 
 
In strategizing how to engage, a major issue is how to engage without further legitimizing 
or strengthening the opposing side. CAUSA’s coordinator puts it very descriptively: 
“And making sure that you’re not engaging in a way that further legitimizes [the system].  
It’s such a hard thing. Sometimes you can’t always tell what’s going on” [21-48]. 
NDLON’s coordinator also agrees with the difficulty in choosing among the engagement 
modes:  
There is a sort of a tension between taking a more confrontational 
approach and really standing up for workers’ rights when workers are 
being attacked directly.  And other groups thinking that’s only going to 
cause more waves.  We want to let it be quiet, see if it blows over.  And 
then sometimes that strategy just doesn’t work in the face of actual 
repression and oppression of workers. So I think the most important part 
though is involvement of workers in the decision-making process [30-29].  
 
                                                 




At CAAELII, a program officer also exemplifies such tension among members: “I think 
there are some parts, just like we have some agencies that are more inclined to be 
confrontational at first and there’s some that don’t want to be confrontational” [15-46]. 
Deciding between radical or incrementalist change (Price and Newson 2003) is for all 
networks an underlying dilemma in strategizing. NYIC’s health program coordinator 
spells out the dilemma: 
I think the process of selecting the vision for social change [is important]. 
I may have an idea around health advocacy, what we want to change in 
the system.  My orientation may be very pragmatic, very incremental.  I 
may be looking at the system as it exists and looking at how to change 
step-wise from where we are right now.  Someone else might come in with 
a much more revolutionary perspective and say let’s just completely 
ignore what we have right now and try to set up universal healthcare.  
What we really have in mind as an ideal for our vision [is important].  
They’re both very viable approaches to doing work [11-58]. 
 
Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995), from the business literature, suggest that networks 
that are not guided by a strategic center—either a coordinating unit or a central firm—are 
unable to meet demanding challenges. These authors highlight strategizing as a critical 
activity of the strategic center—interestingly they use the same term as my in-vivo 
code.108 Besides these authors, the literature on strategizing in networks is quite silent. 
Agranoff (2003) has pointed out planning as a main management task, and Huxham and 
Vangen (2000b), indirectly, point at this activity in their work on leadership, which they 
understand is precisely about setting and implementing the collaborative agenda. 
Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) have also highlighted in their later work the importance of 
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strategic learning in networks. From the business literature, Hakansson and Ford (2002) 
and Gadde, Huemer, and Hakansson (2003) also refer to strategizing in networks, but 
they are dealing with single firms influencing the network. Using also the organization as 
the unit of analysis, Grandori and Soda (1995) and Klijn and Teisman (1997) note that 
different parties try to strategically manipulate the transactions in the network.  
 
Strategizing is obviously also closely related to the extensive negotiation and bargaining 
literature. However, strategizing as I am using it in this study comprises two different 
levels while the negotiation literature tends to focus only on one. Strategizing is about the 
network’s internal decision-making regarding the external engagement of the network 
with an external actor. Strategizing, hence, includes both the network level decisison-
making as the domain level engagement.109  
Planning engagement  
Besides the decision-making component of strategizing, all networks also placed a great 
emphasis on analysis, planning, and strategizing in general. Timing the engagement’s 
implementation is a crucial component of strategizing: “We don’t win unless we have a 
real clear plan.  And it takes months, sometimes years to do it” [9-14], said a program 
officer at NYIC.  In fact, during a strategy meeting preparing for a local pro-immigrant 
public event, CAUSA members decided to send out a press release as late as possible to 
avoid counter-action by opponents. 
                                                 
109 We are aware that the negotiation literature in itself comprises many streams and subfields. Crump and 
Zartman (2003) highlight the following: coalition theory, decision theory, game theory, leadership theory, 





CAAELII also closely plans its actions. I attended a preparatory meeting to counteract a 
rally by the anti-immigration Minuteman Project,110 where the implementation strategy of 
the counter-action was developed in such a manner to have a maximum impact: “to push 
the…Republican congressman inside the suburbs [towards the choice of] either you’re 
with the Minuteman, who arranged this, or you are with us because you support diversity 
and you’re compassionate and that you are for immigration reform” [14-12]. In CAAELII 
planning and analyzing plays an important role as its director points out: “we’re 
…pragmatic about the situation like this.  So I think on analysis, this is very important in 
our work, reflection and analysis, so we do a lot of that so that we can see, okay, that 
didn’t work, but this time, and so we change it again” [14-55]. 
 
I also attended a strategy session at NDLON, where they had invited different allies such 
as American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund 
(MALDEF), and Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights (LCCR). In this meeting they 
discussed, among other issues, legal strategies to counteract municipal ordinances that 
were being passed to prohibit work solicitation in public spaces and that were hurting 
day-laborers. Strategies were analyzed and future effects of such strategies debated. 
 
Strategizing as I am referring to it is about the network influencing its domain, and 
primarily a state actor. From my data, this is a very important leadership activity for 
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managing the external paradox of combining confrontation and cooperation. Networks 
determine by strategizing if they are to confront and/or cooperate and how they are going 
to do this. Strategizing may be even of more relevance to immigration nonprofit networks 
trying to influence state actors since public sector organizations are usually far less 
capable of strategizing than private sector ones. Therefore, strategizing nonprofits have 
an advantage over public organizations, who are usually not as capable of responding to 
strategic moves (Moore 2006). 
Power and strategizing 
Power is also relevant in strategizing. Gray, in fact, points out the importance of the 
power to strategize (1989) in collaborations.111 In this sense, I found that the four power 
bases that the sustenance of the unity/diversity builds—legitimacy, access, knowledge, 
and financial resources (see Chapter 7)—are used in strategizing.  
Internal legitimacy 
Legitimacy affects strategizing. Despite the networks openly decide on which 
engagement mode to adopt, the network’s legitimacy in the face of its members allows 
for the network’s advocacy expertise to be accepted by the members. Given that the 
networks are, among other things, the advocacy tool of the member organizations, it is 
the networks that have the advocacy expertise, not the member organizations. Hence, 
when the coordinating unit facilitates a working group and proposes an engagement 
mode, internal legitimacy is necessary for the network’s recommendation to be taken 
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management through power: set goals, diagnose dependence, diagnose opposition and favor, identify own 




seriously regarding what strategy to adopt. An NYIC staff member explains this: “I think 
most of the groups that we work with trust us in trying to balance doing the appropriate 
level of hostility at times when you need to, and then giving the appropriate amount of 
credit when they [the state actors] deserve it” [10-35]. NDLON’s coordinator supports 
this by explaining how the network’s credibility allows them to suggest strategies:  
We do have the credibility with our member organizations, where I can go 
ahead and call them and tell them, ‘Look, guys. Come on.  There’s no way 
you’re going to get worker centers in the City of New York without 
creating alliances’ [17:46]. 
 
Similarly, CAUSA also often suggests the engagement strategy to members. Its former 
coordinator describes an instance where a member was overusing confrontation:  
They keep banging away and so some of us have had to get together with 
the leadership and tell them, “Look you guys are already there, so you 
need to pull back the gas pedal and look at it from this way.  So don’t be 
fighting anymore, because you’re already there, you don’t need to.  
You’ve got people where you want them.”  So now you have to shift your 
strategy… And this is not easy, because once you build enough power you 
become the power broker, or you have to work with power.  A lot of us are 
not trained to do that. 18:39  
Knowledge and skills 
The above quote also points towards the knowledge and skill base of the network. This is 
also of fundamental importance when strategizing. There is a clear lack of such skills in 
the immigration sector. CAUSA’s former cootdinstor explains: 
It’s all going to come down to negotiation and how you’re going to be in 
the best posture to come out with a victory for your community.  And 
sometimes you need to organize campaigns around that, around 
positioning. So we have a shortage of not only being able to negotiate but 





NDLON’s director also highlights the importance of knowledge and skills when being 
“clever on how to move in terms of changing hearts and minds:” 
This is really important because the minute that you have workers who 
understand the dynamic of power in the community, you’re going to have 
people who are really clever on how to move in terms of changing hearts 
and minds, and having more support for them [17-53]. 
 
A CAAELII program manager shows how important knowledge is to strategy by pointing 
at the need of having diverse perceptions of the same situation: “the different points of 
view on the situation are resources for our strategy” [23-18]. NYIC’s director always tries 
“to balance the politics and the policy piece with the real ability to leverage constituent 
involvement” [10-26] when launching an advocacy action; the “policy piece” is the 
content of the advocated policy, for which knowledge is essential. 
Access  
Access as a power base, as the above quotes show, also is of relevance when strategizing 
since, for example, it helps the network acquire knowledge, skills, and information. A 
NYIC program officer underscored their supporters in City Hall and their allies in the 
media as factors for a recent success with a municipal bill: “we won because we were 
effective …we were really smart…really being strategic who are our key players on the 
City Council, being out there mobilizing, knowing, you know, making this be an issue in 
every paper” [9-13]. The NDLON’s strategy meeting I attended—which I mentioned 
previously—included allies external to the movement—MALDEF, ACLU, and LCCR—





This power base, access, not only allows for better strategizing but may also limit it, since 
some actions may jeopardize relations with key actors: “we do try to have some political 
sensibility about it.  We don’t want to totally burn ourselves, because the result of that 
could be even worse as far as building long-term power” [21:56], recognizes CAUSA’s 
coordinator. Similarly, NYIC’s director explains:  
. . . you don’t want to antagonize them [government] so completely that 
they cut off communications with you on an issue that they’re working 
with you, but I think … we’re viewed as a pretty credible organization, so 
we’ve never really given them something that they don’t deserve, so I 
don’t remember it ever becoming really horrible [10-37]. 
Financial resources 
In addition, and understandably, financial resources are also important to strategize. 
Financial resources are essential in an unequal battlefield such as that of the immigration 
field. The financial resources base, then, strengthens both leadership activities necessary 
to sustain the engagement paradox: strategizing and mobilizing. NDLON’s development 
coordinator illustrates this point: 
Well, I think NDLON is currently in a really good position.  One, we were 
able to have a full time staff member dedicated to development and 
fundraising, and so I’m able to devote a lot of my time to that whole 
process and really thinking deeply about strategies and alternatives for 
future funding, which isn’t necessarily something that NDLON — that the 
national coordinator was able to do on his own.  And that’s been helpful. 
[16-49] 
 
Generally, in managing the outwards paradox of cooperation and confrontation, 
strategizing is fundamental since it determines which engagement mode to effectively 




bases such as legitimacy, knowledge, access, and financial resources. The other 
leadership activity important when engaging outwards is mobilizing. 
Mobilizing 
Mobilizing—behaviors used to develop commitment and support for network processes 
from external stakeholders—is about increasing the networks’ power bases that, often, 
are used to ultimately confront a target (Gray 1989). It is important to highlight here that 
I use the term mobilizing as the interviewees use it, not as Vangen and Huxham (2004) or 
Agranoff and McGuire (2001) do, in that it refers only to mobilizing external support to 
the network. Both pairs of authors above, and many others, include motivating network 
members as a component of mobilizing—I include member motivating in facilitating.  
Mobilizing allies 
According to CAUSA’s former coordinator, “building up the leverage is about power so 
what we do is then that we mobilize a community.  Then … we apply pressure through 
other ways, right” [18:26]. NDLON’s coordinator further explains this need for power:  
Sometimes it’s about balancing or creating a balance of power.  
What happens is that when you have Home Depot, you have the cops, and 
elected officials against the day laborers, the dynamics of power are 
always in favor of those people because they are very powerful in 
the community.  So yeah, so from time to time, what we do is, we bring the 
other members of the civil rights community to balance that power; to 
make sure that if we negotiate — we sit down to negotiate — it’s done 
from people to equals and not just from one side to the other [17:49].  
 
CAUSA’s and NDLON’s comments point towards one of the principal objects of 




bring in their power bases on the network’s behalf and balance out the playing field, or 
domain—as exemplified in the above quote.  
 
CAUSA, moreover, not only mobilizes potential allies, but also mobilizes the 
opposition’s potential allies. Mobilizing the opposition’s allies exerts pressure on the 
opposition. The following quote is by the former coordinator describing how and why 
they pressured a mushroom grower that did not respect immigrant workers by mobilizing 
the latter’s customers (the whole foods chain store Safeway): 
At one time 1,300 Safeway stores were boycotting those mushrooms.  [We 
managed that] through pressure.  We tell them, “Look do the right thing, 
buy your mushrooms from this [other] company, because these people 
aren’t treating farm workers like that.  But if you don’t, we’re going to tell 
your customers.”  And they [Safeway] know us [18:27]. 
 
A program officer at CAAELII stated, as one of the strengths of mobilizing via the 
network, the multiple relations that each network member brought: “They [the network 
members] have allies...strong allies on the democratic side” [23-31—own translation]. He 
then went on to describe in detail the different network members’ personal contacts with 
the politicians. In the same way, NYIC’s director explicates why to mobilize different 
actors within the administration: 
We talk to several people in the administration; somebody from the 
Mayor’s Office, somebody from the agency, council contacts, who might 
have someone over there, because they all have different systems, if you 
end up with an incompetent commissioner or something, that should not 





In addition to mobilizing allies, these networks also mobilize the media and constituents. 
The mobilization of media and people are a mark of the network’s strength. Put bluntly 
by an NYIC program officer: 
[The] first thing that city council member wants to see is how many people 
were there and did it get press coverage.  If it did not get press coverage, 
it didn’t happen.  … So that’s powerful.  And we also make sure that the 
city council members that we’re trying to lobby or push against, we have 
members from their own district [35-29]. 
 
Mobilizing in general, and when dealing with the media in particular, is closely related to 
strategizing: balancing “the politics and the policy piece with the real ability to leverage 
constituent involvement” [10-26] is fundamental, says NYIC’s director.  Strategy 
regarding the mobilization’s content is important, as is deciding when to mobilize, since 
mobilizing is highly resource-consuming. CAAELII does not think only about whether it 
will or will not mobilize the media; as its coordinator states, “[I had to think about how] 
to create a media strategy and how are we going to confront the media. And so that we 
were not just seen as shouting” [14-43]. 
 
Scholars studying social movements agree that successful advocacy requires getting an 
issue onto the media (Gamson 1975; Jacobs and Glass 2002). All four networks are 
extremely focused on using the media and are very skillful indeed—the spring 2006 
rallies regarding the immigration debate in Congress and their media impact serve as a 
recent example.  In fact, a nationwide strategizing meeting—which I observed—held by 




how to support the Senate bill, concluded with participants discussing the media strategy 
to be used112. Similarly, at one of NYIC’s rallies I attended, different media were invited 
and the rally was actually extended as an important TV channel was waited for.  
 
Along the same line of reasoning, NDLON’s coordinator also highlighted as a success 
factor their increasing ability to deal with the media: “[we’ve] been very effective 
in using media… the workers are very consistent with their message—we’re not 
criminals; we’re workers; we have families to feed, and that’s why we are here.  We’re 
not here to destroy.  We’re here to build” [17:27]. A CAAELII staff member also 
underscored the importance of the media and explained her work with it: “my other piece 
[of work] is communications where I just do internal communications to the press and try 
to get our name out in the press as much as possible.  So I [involve] the media as much as 
possible, maintaining our profile, doing special events” [15-3]. 
Mobilizing people 
In addition to mobilizing other actors and the media in support of their goals, networks 
mobilize the member organizations’ constituents. NDLON’s coordinator says: “we’re 
usually invited to go and give testimonies about the lives of day laborers and we’re 
invited to go and speak to churches, and schools, universities, etc., so what we do is… 
use Omar [a day-laborer] and we bring him and have him sing a song” [17:55]. 
Mobilizing member organizations’ constituents to partake in activities with the general 
                                                 
112 Moreover, and as an indicator of these organizations’ strategic ingenuity and access to information, they 
correctly predicted (several months in advance) that the 2006 State of the Union address by the President 




public or specific targets resembles Foldy, Goldman, and Ospina’s (2004) concept of 
cognitive shifts regarding the way in which the group is conceived by others. Going out 
conquering the “hearts and minds of people,” in the New York Times’ words (Downes 
2006), is ultimately important for these networks. In particular, for NDLON given that 
day-laborers are the subgroup among immigrants who are the “most hated,” as a recent 
New York Times editorial (Greenhouse 2006) points out.113 
 
Using constituents and people in favor of its causes, CAAELII managed to “force” a 
meeting with a congressional representative by having over 2000 people send him 
postcards: “We would force [certain congressional representative] to have a meeting with 
us... because we sent 2,000 postcards to him, a box of them.  So that was probably our 
power because we have deep community connections and support” [14-51]. CAUSA also 
uses constituents in its work. The most prominent example was the 2005 sixty-mile 
week-long march which mobilized over 3000 people. Along this same line of reasoning, 
NYIC director grossly determines the power of one of the network’s working groups 
according to, among other things, its ability to leverage constituents: “politics and the 
policy piece with the real ability to leverage constituent involvement, I think those things 
together define, more than anything, what we mean by the capacity of that [working] 
group” [10-26]. 
                                                 
113 Moreover, the projected image of the network positively feeds back into its identity, given the 




Mobilization, power, and strategizing 
Strategizing and mobilizing 
Power bases and both leadership activities, mobilization and strategizing, have a circular 
relationship. Power bases, together with “power to,” are needed to mobilize, and 
mobilization is, in part, about generating power, which in turn is needed to strategize. 
Strategizing and mobilizing also feed back directly into each other. NDLON’s 
development director explicates this: “I think NDLON is currently in a really good 
position. [We] have a full-time staff member dedicated to development and fundraising, 
and so I’m able [of] really thinking deeply about strategies and alternatives for future 
funding” [16:49]. As mentioned previously, CAAELII focuses on the strategic dimension 
of mobilizing. Similarly, CAUSA’s coordinator underscores the strategic component of 
mobilizing: 
When you’re doing coalition work, very especially working with a 
vulnerable community like the immigrant community, it’s important to 
identify who your strategic allies are and to not allow yourself to be 
wedged against them. Even in the face of some pretty intense things 
[21:20]. 
 
A program officer at NYIC exemplifies the importance of strategizing with mobilizing 
constituents and other people for their marches: 
So each rally or press conference we do is to help us move our policy or 
our goal forward and we’re very smart and not just having a rally just to 
have a rally.  Because they’re very time-consuming, takes a lot of 
planning, takes a lot of phone calls, it takes a lot of time to do.  So we 






Mobilizing is about building power. Gray (1989) has pointed this out and it is 
exemplified by my data. NYIC director stated: “just running programs will not build 
political power in your community…we think more about how do we put together 
enough of a critical mass” [10-27 & 10-56]. CAAELII’s director also emphasizes this:  
Probably after several efforts that we have been unsuccessful getting you 
to hear our side…we would find another ally, political ally, to help us.  … 
We’ve analyzed it, it’s not worth our time getting angry and pissing off 
this powerful political leader.  We find another ally because our belief is 
power is not static, it’s dynamic; someone else will have it [14-47 & 14-
48]. 
 
Mobilizing builds power by providing the network with knowledge from the allies 
mobilized. CAUSA’s alliance with the GLBT (Gay, Lesbian, Bi-, and Tran-sexual) 
movement is an example of how CAUSA learned strategies and tactics from mobilizing 
allies. A CAUSA founder says: “they gave us a beautiful strategy.  They helped us 
strategizing our plan that had an electoral component, a grass roots component, a media 
component, a poll room component, an electoral strategy.  When using that strategy we 
were able to defeat those [anti-immigrant] measures twice” [18:8]. Similarly, NDLON 
mobilized external organizations to help develop their overall strategy as mentioned 
previously, and a program officer at NYIC pointed out how this network sometimes 
mobilizes other “groups [that] may be like totally legal-savvy... understanding...the 
policy” [9-29]. A CAAELII organizer highlighted how mobilizing allies, constituents, 
and media increased the knowledge base: “we have more awareness in many levels; 





Apart from building the knowledge base, mobilizing yields also another power base 
necessary for engagement: external legitimacy. Involving constituents, having them talk 
directly to the target audiences, increases the networks’ external legitimacy. Recall how 
CAUSA “would get a roomful of people” [18:25] since the a congressman “needed to see 
that there was a support of other folks” [19:25]. As has been already mentioned, 
NDLON’s coordinator highlighted the superior effectiveness of an action when day-
laborers “speak on their own behalf” [17:14], and at NYIC a staff member told me: 
“mobilization isn’t the only indication of how strong you are, but it’s one” [10-25]. 
 
NYIC also builds legitimacy through mobilizing media, not only constituents. A program 
officer explains how they got a win, in part, because of their reputation of getting their 
message into the media: “We got the seven-million-dollar increase...Because I think we 
have the reputation–I go back to the reputation. I think we have a reputation of really 
getting it in the paper, especially, I think, press and mainstream press, and that we really 
do write up good press releases” [9-73 & 9-74].  
Drawing on power bases 
Mobilizing not only builds power to better engage in the domain and hence increase its 
effectiveness, but also draws on power. The networks draw on connections and 
relationships, or what I have called access, to mobilize. A CAAELII organizer illustrates 
this: “it’s a dance; many of [our] agencies are in politicians’ advisory boards, in State 




mobilizing allies is access through the relations given by the networks’ position in the 
domain. CAAELII’s director underscores this: 
Well we have more leaders; we have more avenues to bring information 
down to the community level.  Just for example, they were going to do 
adult education budget cuts, adult education budget cuts.  In two weeks we 
sent to our congressional representative these 2,300 letters, they were 
overwhelmed [14-27]. 
 
NDLON and CAUSA also draw on their access to different actors to mobilize support in 
favor of their causes. NDLON currently uses its access to the Los Angeles 
municipality—something unthinkable a few years ago—while CAUSA, as already 
mentioned, draws on the GLBT community in Oregon (because a leading organization in 
this area, Rural Organizing Project [ROP], is a member of its board). A NYIC program 
officer also told me how they used their access to the media to mobilize support:  “And I 
think we do a really good job on cultivating those key reporters, too.  We really cultivate 
them and, you know, pitch to them and say, ‘Hey, did you hear about this?’ and get them 
more enticed to cover our story” [9-76]. 
 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006), referring to the business sector, show how hub firms in 
loosely coupled networks arise to mobilize (Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006) and  
McGuire (2002) hypothesizes that network managers with low level of support from 
stakeholders will allocate a great share of their time to mobilizing. My data seems to 
support this, since mobilizing is a key leadership activity of these networks’ coordinating 
units, which are engaged in a domain which is not supportive of their aims. Mobilization, 




constituents, allies, and the media. Mobilizing both builds external legitimacy, 
knowledge, and access, and draws particularly on access. Mobilizing, then directly 
manages the cooperation/confrontation paradox by providing power bases for 
implementing either pole, or, for indirectly managing the paradox, by aiding strategizing. 
In addition, power also directly contributes to manage the cooperation/confrontation 
paradox. 
Power to confront and cooperate 
Building its “power to” and power bases is essential for the networks when we look at the 
extremely unequal domain they are engaged in. As CAUSA’s former coordinator puts it, 
referring to the immigrant agricultural workers of Oregon, “to come and exert that kind 
of pressure on an industry that has a lot of power, has a lot of money, has a lot of 
influence, [with] the lowest paid workers in America, that’s…the balance…  The playing 
field is unbalanced” [18:3]. It is this unbalanced field that partially explains why these 
networks are necessary, and why, by uniting diversity, they build power. CAUSA’s 
coorindator hints at the importance of the access, knowledge, and resource bases built by 
the networks:  
Especially in the immigrant community in Oregon there’s like plenty of 
situations you just can’t go into alone.  You need allies to do that. They 
bring different leverage that we might not have.  Different connections.  
Sometimes different messaging or a different way of framing things” 
[21:35 & 21:36].  
 
Along this line, the financial manager of CAAELII-member Chinese Mutual Aid 
Association emphasizes “power to,” the power of uniting diversity: “When we speak with 





In engaging with target agencies, and in sustaining the cooperation/confrontation 
paradox, networks make use primarily of legitimacy and knowledge. These bases in 
addition to enhancing strategizing and mobilizing, also sustain both cooperation and 
confrontation directly. External legitimacy—due to the diversity of the network or its 
previous record of success and actions—enhances both engagement modes, confrontation 
and cooperation. As mentioned, a threat of confrontation or an offer of cooperation is of 
no use if it is not credible. 
 
As already mentioned, one of NYIC’s strength when engaging in its domain is its 
“reputation of really getting it in the [news]paper” [9-73 & 9-74]. Similarly, at CAAELII 
a program officer told me: “most of those external agencies know who CAAELII is 
already.  So they know that when we say ‘CAAELII is here,’ CAAELII is here” [15-35]. 
NDLON’s coordinator also highlights as power the increase in legitimacy of the day-
labor movement (represented by the network) in the eyes of the general public:  
The work with day labor band, with the theater group, with all the things 
that have been done in the last ten years, at least in the metropolitan area 
of L.A., has made the public image of day laborers to change a little bit.  
And I think that’s another reflection of power [17:32]. 
Knowledge 
Similarly, the knowledge base, including skills and education, plays a central role in 
managing the cooperation/confrontation paradoxical tension. All networks do 
demonstrably work on increasing their knowledge base, particularly in documenting 
cases, experiences, successes, and abuses. While a staff member at CAUSA highlights 




“[We use] powerful stories, and lots of them, to prove our point… we have used that time 
and time again” [14-52]. All networks use documentation of experiences, mistreatments, 
and immigrants’ conditions. Generating the knowledge base this way, and formalizing it, 
demystifies “a lot of the negative stereotypes that exist” regarding the immigrants, as 
NDLON’s cooridnator says. It also strengthens the network’s legitimacy with respect to 
the State and the general public. The importance of having the necessary knowledge 
before engaging in either cooperation or confrontation is exemplified by the following 
experience narrated by a program officer at NYIC: 
We asked for a meeting with HPD [Department of Housing Preservation 
and Development] about a year and a half ago.  [Due to] inexperience on 
our side we went to this meeting kind of too quickly.  So we met with HPD 
and HPD went through the matrix and so on, but they pushed us further 
on our research and we were not ready.  So we decided to take a step back 
[35-15]. 
Managing the engagement paradox 
The figure below summarizes my findings regarding how the engagement paradox is 
managed, and offers an answer to my secondary question how do leadership activities 
help manage the cooperation/confrontation paradox? Power together with strategizing 
and mobilizing manage the paradox of engagement. As I explained, the paradox of 
engagement is sustained because it contributes to the networks’ effectiveness, which 
should help us respond to the secondary research question how does the power built affect 
the network’s effectiveness? The cooperation/confrontation occurs as the networks try to 
be as effective as possible in fulfilling their missions. Being true to their mission is the 





Although all networks apply both poles of the paradox similarly, a noticeable difference 
emerges. In the case of CAAELII, CAUSA, and NDLON, the two poles of the 
paradoxical tension are applied at different moments in time. In the case of NYIC, the 
poles are applied simultaneously but with different sub-units of the same actor, the 
municipal government. Such difference may be due to its narrow geographical focus, 
New York City, and its large size, which has allowed it to access many different levels 
and units of the New York City Mayor’s Office. CAAELII, despite being narrowly 
focused on Chicago, does not seem to have such an access—both due to its fewer human 
resources and the fewer contacts provided by its smaller membership.  
 




In contrast to the unity/diversity paradox, the external paradox’s poles are applied at 
different points in time or at different organizational levels or units. The two paradoxes 




attaining the mission, is clearly bounded by the policy context—in these cases, 
immigration—while the internal paradox is not given by the policy context but is inherent 
implied to networks.  
 
Furthermore, the interrelation between the internal and external paradoxes emerges from 
the above analysis. The previous chapter concluded by hinting at power as ultimately 
motivating the unity/diversity paradox: “power to” get action by members, enhanced by 
unity, and the diverse power bases provided by the different members. This chapter, on 
the other hand, shows how the external paradox requires power. It is the network’s 
“power to” and its power bases that conceptually link both paradoxes, then, since 
unity/diversity generate “power to” and power bases which are necessary engage with 
state actors—either cooperatively or confrontationally. But, as I show next, these two 
paradoxes are also interrelated in other ways. 
UNITING DIVERSITY TO POWER ENGAGEMENT 
As I showed previously, it is from the internal paradox, when unity is attained among 
diverse actors, that summative and multiplicative power can be generated. I have also 
shown how the power generated feeds the process of sustaining cooperative and 
confrontational engagement modes with external targets. However, other links between 
both paradoxes do exist. In fact, both paradoxes may reinforce each other, while in other 





It is well known that being under attack or in front of a common enemy may unite 
parties: Out-group conflict is associated with in-group cohesion (Astley and Van de Ven 
1983; Coser 1956). Something similar happens between these paradoxes. The external 
paradox’s pole of confrontation is related to the internal paradox’s unity. Confrontation 
strengthens unity among diverse network members. A member at NDLON observes: 
As a network of immigrants in this country we have to gain the strength, 
the political strength. Without a network, we wouldn’t be able to produce 
legislation nor demand improvements …The network identifies us as one 
day-laborers family sharing the same problem and needs and with the 
same objective: generate change, to transform the negativity that exists 
into positivity. We also identify as the modern slaves: what exists with 
day-laborers is a modern slavery and our minds are at abolishing that 
slavery [28-5].   
 
More graphically, a program officer of NYIC thinks unity occurs “probably when the shit 
hits the fan.… I'm sure post-9/11 there was some sense of unity … all these south Asian 
men deported, the INS looking for terrorists” [9-38].  
 
Moreover, the unity/diversity paradox allows combining cooperation and confrontation in 
creative and unexpected ways. The already cited CAAELII organizer explained how 
roles, as in “bad cop, good cop” (Page 1999), are divided between the members, Latino 
groups being more aggressive and Asian more dialogical, and how, occasionally, roles 
are inter-changed to improve their impact. 
 
Also, how well the internal paradox is sustained has an impact not so much on the 




The great thing about the coalition is that when our groups are behind us, 
we’re very confrontational and we, as you probably have seen in our 
media events, we go out and attack and make sure that those voices are 
being heard… On other issues we might not have the full support so what 
we try to do is bring everybody to the table to have the discussions in both 
sides of the issue to be heard.  And that’s when cooperation is our main 
asset [35-40 & 35-42]. 
Negative feedback 
However, the external engagement paradox may also undermine the unity/diversity 
paradox. More specifically, disagreement during strategy, on deciding which engagement 
mode to adopt, may prompt disunity. (Recall how diversity during strategizing or 
decision-making could turn into disunity.) An interesting example of initial diversity 
implying different engagement approaches generating disagreement happened at 
NDLON, as was mentioned previously: 
Some member organizations receive funds from the municipality… which 
makes them less free to act in the day-laborer’s defense [And the 
municipality] asks you to be more conservative, less liberal, to be more 
cautious, and deal with problems according to their solutions … and they 
[the municipality] pay the programs. I think that’s the only conflict we 
have had [29-16—own translation]. 
 
CAAELII and NYIC also have suffered how the confrontation/cooperation paradox, and 
how it is managed and combined, has affected their unity/diversity paradox. In NYIC’s 
case, it was disagreements regarding when to confront that transformed the diversity 
within the network into disunity. A program officer at NYIC explains: 
I mean, they represented the South Asian population, which we need, 
which is lacking…and we really wanted them to sort of be a part of that.  
And, but we just couldn't – they were too radical.  They were too militant 









The above figure summarizes the link between both paradoxes. The management of the 
paradoxes and their ultimate characteristics influence each other. The unity/diversity 
paradox and the power bases generated will influence strategizing and mobilizing. These, 
in turn, determine how the cooperation/confrontation paradox is managed. Ultimately, the 





I started this work by noting how networks have become a popular interorganizational 
governance mechanism. I also pointed out how they are difficult to manage due to their 
complexity, and that lack of leadership is one of the main causes for a network’s demise. 
Research has advanced in the last two decades regarding network management, but still 
has a long way to go, in particular with respect to management of networks rather than in 
networks. This research has taken a small step in this direction, in exploring and better 
understanding the management of networks.  
 
Using paradox to open up the black box of leadership activities in collaborative networks, 
this study of four pro-immigrant rights interorganizational networks114 ends with a 
summary of findings that address the nature, the management, and the implications of the 
unity/diversity and cooperation/confrontation paradoxical tensions. I then answer my 
general research question and outline further contributions of the research. I conclude 
with a discussion of the research’s limitations and propose an agenda for future research. 
THE FORM, MANAGEMENT, AND IMPLICATIONS OF PARADOX  
This research sheds light on the secondary questions posed in the methodology chapter. 
In order to enhance our knowledge of network management, I proposed to focus on 
secondary questions regarding paradox in networks. From the analysis and findings of the 
previous chapters, I answer why paradoxes arise, how they are managed, and how they 
contribute to the networks’ effectiveness. 
                                                 
114 The networks are: New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), Coalition for Asian, African, European, 
Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), and 




The form and nature of paradox 
My first secondary research asked: what are the form and nature of the diversity/unity 
and confrontation/cooperation paradoxes in the context of network management?  
 
Diversity and unity of the network are both necessary for network effectiveness, but 
diversity often undermines unity by generating conflict and hence, disunity. These 
networks are simultaneously both united and diverse. The way these networks manage to 
avoid diversity undermining unity is by generating unity around three things: a meta-
goal, identity, and the value of diversity. Maintaining diversity along organizational 
characteristics and culture, and other dimensions, while building unity around identity 
and experiences, the meta-goal, and the value for diversity, does not, however, resolve 
the paradox. The tension is still present in that the potential for diversity turning into 
disunity is always there: unity and diversity conform a management paradox in that they 
imply equally necessary opposing forces that generate a tension. I believe this paradox of 
unity/diversity partially explains the difficulties inherent in managing collaboration in 
networks (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Human and Provan 2000; Huxham 2003).  
 
The nature of the cooperation/confrontation paradox—the paradox of engagement—is 
different from that of the unity/diversity paradox. Unity and diversity occur 
simultaneously and at the network level, but regarding different dimensions. In contrast, 
cooperation and confrontation occur at different times or at different levels. The 
engagement paradox is diachronic or vertical in Ford and Backoff’s (1988) terms. This is 




points in time or at different levels—i.e. cooperation with a public servant and 
confrontation with a commissioner.  CAAELII, CAUSA, and NDLON all confront and 
cooperate with different actors, or with the same actor, but at different moments in time. 
NYIC both confronts and cooperates with the New York City Mayor’s Office at the same 
time, but with different units within it.  
 
Another issue that remains to be discussed is whether the networks recognized the 
paradoxes. All managers recognized using both confrontation and cooperation with state 
actors—such as the mayor’s office, a municipal commissioner, the local police agency, or 
a senator—but did not see it as paradoxical. These networks cooperated with and 
confronted state actors to be as effective as possible in fulfilling their missions. Being 
true to their mission is the guiding value, being consistent in the engagement strategy 
used with the government is not. The networks did not define themselves in terms of how 
they related to state actors, nor did they aim at being consistent in their engagements with 
the state actors. Rather, they focused on how to be most effective in achieving their 
mission, so the combination of both cooperation and confrontation is not perceived as 
paradoxical. The paradox is perceived only by the outside observer, i.e. the analyst, 
because his or her thought structures automatically collapse these spatial levels and/or 
points in time. Collapsing time intervals or levels then generates the inconsistency (Ford 
and Backoff 1988), or mixed messages (Lewis 2000), of cooperation and confrontation. 
 
However, the interviewees’ did experience a tension with respect to which engagement 




that between legitimating the system, yet affecting it; by cooperating with it, on one hand, 
and on the other hand having less effect by choosing to confront it, which excluded the 
networks from the system. All network managers and coordinating unit members felt this 
tension between affecting the system (and legitimizing it) and not legitimizing the system 
(and not affecting it).  
 
The unity/diversity paradoxical tension was recognized by all managers from all 
networks with the exception of NDLON’s coordinator. As mentioned previously, 
CAUSA's coordinator commented that “[Coalition work] is living in a state of constant 
tension” [21-43], and CAAELII's director said: "every day we have to face that 
contradiction, that paradox" [14-35]. Using as an example a specific taskforce where one 
important organization withdrew, a NYIC program officer stated how diversity “really 
makes things really difficult in terms of bringing that unity together” [9-79]. 
 
NDLON coordinator, on the contrary, did not see “diversity as being opposed to the unity 
part.” He points out that unity and diversity are not opposites and that diversity does not 
necessarily imply disunity. However, he does acknowledge tensions around achieving a 
unified advocacy strategy among the diverse members and around what issues to generate 




frame it as a unity/diversity paradox in order to make explicit that unity and diversity are 
not opposites115.  
The management of paradox 
The secondary question how do leadership activities help manage the unity/diversity and 
confrontation/cooperation paradoxes? aimed at looking at how paradox is managed and 
what differences may arise in leadership activities according to network and paradox 
type. 
 
Activation—attracting and selecting members—plays an important role in sustaining the 
unity/diversity paradox since it allows selecting and attracting members that are diverse 
along specific dimensions, but united around others. Activating happens either at the 
network level—for smaller size networks—or at the game level for larger networks. 
Activation is easier the greater legitimacy the network has in the face of potential 
members. Activation is also made easier if potential members perceive the possibility of 
meeting other organizations via the network.  
 
Facilitation is making peace among members, supporting member involvement, and 
communicating to and with members. A major component, if not the core, of facilitation 
is facilitating decision-making in the diverse networks, since these processes must be 
open and inclusive in order to avoid the “exit” of the autonomous members. Allowing 
                                                 
115 As Johnston and Selsky (2005) state, a paradox is an agreement among local interpreting observers that 
a certain duality of actual behaviors is inconsistent. NDLON’s coordinator is pointing out that diversity and 




voice rather than exit (Hirschmann 1970)  plays a fundamental role in networks and 
implies facilitating decision-making—reducing non-decision to a minimum (Bacharach 
and Baratz 1962)—rather than decision-making per se (Simon 1976). This is so since 
networks are made up of autonomous organizations, who, if when dissatisfied are without 
an option to voice their dissatisfaction, are free to exit (or abandon) the network. That 
coordinating units must facilitate decision-making, rather than make decisions, in turn 
has an important implication: the outcome of the decision-making is not controlled by the 
coordinating unit. Hence, managing networks requires coping with uncertainty rather 
than reducing it, as is the case in intra-organizational traditional management (Thompson 
1967).  
 
Moreover, decisions are taken consensually, although in networks where the maximum 
authority is the general assembly and a voting culture is prevalent, voting is customary—
as in the case of NDLON. Including constituents in decision-making seems fundamental 
since it ultimately reduces disagreements by grounding decisions in concrete problems 
and beneficiaries.  
 
Framing deals with setting up the organizational procedures, and is important in 
managing the unity/diversity paradox because it sets the platform for interaction. 
Common meaning-making is an important part of framing, where unity emerges by 
setting engagement rules, common norms, and a shared identity and vision. All members 




embraced this value. Framing, then, also maintains diversity by unifying around the value 
of diversity. 
 
I have found that building the organizational members’s capacity (capacitating) is a 
central leadership task in all four networks. Capacitating—a new construct that emerged 
during the data analysis—is also another vehicle for framing, more precisely for common 
meaning-making and is thus important for uniting. Attachment to the network by 
members is also enhanced since it provides the organizational members with specific 
individual gains in addition to the gains for the general cause. It also builds the networks 
power bases indirectly, by building its members’ capacity which, when united, increases 
the power available for the network. Capacitating, though, is not devoid of problems. In 
particular, it may have a co-opting effect on the members and, conversely, may make 
members engage in collective action only when specific individual payoffs are available.  
 
Strategizing also emerged as a new construct during the data analysis, particularly with 
respect to the cooperation/confrontation paradox. Strategizing involves both making 
decisions regarding the engagement, as well as developing the plan of action.  
Strategizing is aided by power bases such as legitimacy, knowledge, financial resources, 
and access, and has a circular relationship with mobilizing. 
 
Intrinsically linked with strategizing, mobilization is aimed at generating support for the 
network from constituents, allies, and the media. Mobilizing builds external legitimacy, 




the paradox of engagement by providing power bases used during cooperating or 
confronting, or during strategizing.  
 
Power bases also directly contribute to sustaining the paradox of engagement. Legitimacy 
enhances engagement modes, since a threat of confrontation or an offer of cooperation is 
of no use if it is not credible. Similarly, all networks explicitly work on increasing their 
knowledge base, particularly in documenting cases, experiences, successes, and abuses. 
This strengthens their engagement mode by providing evidence and arguments. 
 
In summary, I have identified six leadership activities that manage the networks’ 
paradoxical tensions (activating, facilitating, framing, capacitating, strategizing, and 
mobilizing). Four activities were previously highlighted by network management 
scholars, while two are new constructs (capacitating and strategizing). These leadership 
activities may be categorized as dealing with the network interaction or the network 
structure, and as involving either only the network or the network and its immediate 
environment (the network’s domain). Activating is aimed at the network’s structure—in 
that it rearranges the membership—and involves the network’s domain. Facilitating 
involves the network’s interaction, while framing deals with the network’s structure. 
Capacitating also regards the network’s structure, in that it deals with network members’ 
capacities. Mobilizing aims at building the network’s structure by increasing its support 
in the domain. Finally, strategizing aims at managing interaction—as the decision-




implementation of the engagement strategy (cooperation and/or confrontation) involves 
the network’s domain. The following table summarizes the categorization. 
 
Table XXV. Leadership activity categorization 
Involves actors from…  









The implications of paradox 
The final secondary questions deal with the implications of managing the paradoxes, 
namely: how does managing the unity/diversity paradox build the network’s power? and 
how does the power built affect the network’s effectiveness? Successful networks sustain 
the internal unity/diversity paradox to build their power and engage with state actors both 
through confrontation and cooperation to fulfill their mission and be effective. 
 
These networks sustain the unity/diversity paradox to build power. The power is built 
precisely by sustaining the paradox and not reducing either unity or diversity. The 
paradox builds “power to” (the ability to get action by members) through unity, and 
diversity increases the network’s power bases of access, knowledge, legitimacy, and 
financial resources. In turn, the power bases strengthen each other: e.g. access allows the 
network to capture knowledge, and knowledge builds legitimacy. The differentiation of 
power types and power bases is in itself one of the contributions of this dissertation. In 
network management research, few conceptualizations have attended the differentiation 




differentiate between “power to” and power bases. I further differentiate four power 
bases—financial resources, knowledge, access, and legitimacy.  
 
I have also detailed how the power affects the networks’ effectiveness. The power built is 
used to engage with state actors and advance the networks’ mission of furthering 
immigrant rights. The power is both used to strategize and mobilize, as well as directly to 
confront and cooperate with state actors.  
SUCCESSFUL NETWORKS: MANAGING PARADOXICAL TENSIONS  
In addressing my overall research question (how is paradox managed in successful 
networks?) the two paradoxes explored have helped to further understand network 
management. Sustaining the unity/diversity paradox generates power, which is used to 
manage the engagement paradox, cooperation/confrontation, hence increasing the 
network’s effectiveness. 
 
Figure XXV summarizes my findings, and clarifies how the two paradoxes are central for 
the networks’ action. The coordinating units of these networks sustain the unity/diversity 
paradox by activating and capacitating members, facilitating interaction, and framing the 
structure (procedures, rules, and values). When activating, the network selects and 
attracts members who share certain experiences, values, and principles, but who are 
diverse regarding other organizational culture and characteristics. The coordinating unit 




these members by framing common procedures, rules, and values. Capacitating is another 
vehicle for framing unity. 
 
The internal paradox of unity and diversity is sustained to avoid decreasing diversity 
(hence reducing the value added of networks), while not letting it turn into disunity. The 
paradox is sustained to build the network power: unity builds the “power to” of the 
network—unity increases the ability of the network to get action by members—and 
diverse membership builds the power bases used to engage with state actors. Without 
unity the network cannot use its power bases. The networks use access, knowledge, 
legitimacy, and financial resources, together with leadership activities of mobilizing and 
strategizing, to manage engagement with important state actors. These state actors have a 
great influence on the well-being of immigrants and, hence, on these immigration 
nonprofit interorganizational networks’ mission. The networks use the power built by 
sustaining the unity/diversity paradox to achieve their mission.  
 
Lastly, the management of the external paradox affects the sustenance of the 
unity/diversity paradox. Confronting an external actor may help unite the network, since 
outward conflict is related to internal unity. On the other hand, disagreements regarding 












The leadership findings are intended to contribute to the network leadership literature, but 
also may contribute to the leadership literature more generally, in particular to collective 
and systemic leadership which lack empirical studies (Hunt and Dodge 2000). However, 
an important difference with most systems and relational leadership literature is that the 
collective and the systems I am referring to are interorganizational. Both by situating my 
research at this level and by using an activities-based approach to leadership, I do not 
deny that individuals matter. But at the same time, the rest of the coordinating unit is 
extremely relevant, as are the other organizations. Moreover, two of the networks studied, 
CAUSA and NYIC, had changed managers a few months prior to my study, and no major 




FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS AND INSIGHTS 
The internal and external power “of” networks 
In addition to the above specified model, further insights may be deduced from my 
analysis regarding power. In particular, I have identified the relevance of another 
conceptualization of power not explicitly contemplated in my initial framework—which 
was composed of the network’s “power to” (ability to get action by members) and power 
bases. My findings point also to the relevance in network management of Luke’s three-
dimensional conceptualization of power: decision-making; non decision-making 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962); and managing meaning (Huxham and Beech 2002, 
2003b)116. These three dimensions of power respectively regard how decisions are made, 
around what issues are decisions discussed and made, and which assumptions of what is 
right and wrong are prevalent.  
 
As I showed, facilitating is about managing decision-making and non-decision-making, 
and framing about generating common meaning-making. The importance of facilitating 
decision-making in networks has been highlighted by several scholars (Huxham and 
                                                 
116 The first dimension is equivalent to the “pluralist” view of power in political science, while the second 
is similar to “elitism” (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Gray 1989; Hardy and Leiba O'Sullivan 1998). The third 
dimension focuses on the mechanisms that legitimate current order, on the deep structure (Bryson and 
Crosby, 1992) that legitimizes power through cultural and normative assumptions, on how conflict is 
resisted, and on how meaning is managed by those powerful in order to mask oppression and by those 
powerless in order to subvert it.  
Extending Lukes’ (1974) three dimensions, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) present a fourth dimension 
of power that conceives power as a network of relations and discourse. In this dimension, the pervasiveness 
of power makes it difficult to resist, since resistance tends to reinforce the current system (Hardy and 
Clegg, 1996). Pulling the strings of power does not necessarily produce the desired outcome, nor is 
responsibility clearly appointed (Lukes, 1986). Moreover, this dimension does not assume the researcher to 




Vangen 2000; Keast, Mandell, Brown, and Woodcock 2004; and Mandell 1994). 
Similarly, managing common meaning-making is also known to be important in networks 
(Koppenjan and Klijn 2004), since in networks the members’ frames of reference are 
quite different (Child and Faulkner 1998)—making formalized and rational decision-
making rules less effective (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974).   
 
This three-dimensional type of power, as I am using it here, still has the network as its 
unit of analysis—rather than using any of the organizations in the network as the unit of 
analysis—but deals with the network’s internal power dynamics. A major issue regarding 
power conceptualizations based on resource-dependence theory is that they are not 
behavior-friendly (Faulkner and De Rond 2000), and that they are incapable of 
explaining processes in the network. In this sense, Lukes’ (1974) three-dimensional 
model of power is far more helpful.  
 
That the internal power dynamics plays a fundamental role in network management and 
leadership has been highlighted by several scholars (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Crosby 
and Bryson 2005; Gray 1989; Tierney 1996; Vangen and Huxham 2004). My 
contribution has been to use this conceptualization of power together with two other 
conceptualizations, “power to” and power bases, in explaining network management. 
There is, indeed, a clear potential in using multiple types of power (Brass 1984; Brass 
and Burkhardt 1992; Bourdieau 1986; Luhmann 1995; Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 
2004; Perrow 1986) to better capture the complexity of networks. Luhmann’s distinction 




(Luhmann 1995). The way I am conceptualizing power here uses this same distinction: 
Luke’s three-dimensional power is applicable to internal network dynamics, and “power 
to” and power bases are relevant to the network when engaging with external actors. 117  
 
I believe joining both conceptualizations of power may further help scholars and 
practitioners to understand network management. Networks aim at building power, which 
means building the power bases and “power to,” the ability to get action by members. 
While the power bases are given by the network’s diversity, unity allows the network to 
get action by members (“power to”). However, the management of the network must also 
take into account internal power dynamics, in particular, decision-making, non-decision-
making, and meaning-making. As I have shown, these have an effect on the 
unity/diversity paradox and therefore ultimately affect the network’s power to engage in 
its domain. The figure below illustrates these two types of power. 
                                                 
117 It also complements yet another take on power, that of Huxham and Beech (2003b), which looks at the 
points where power is enacted at a micro-level. They find that power is exerted at different points. For 
example, points of power are the processes of setting the name of the collaborative; the process for 
determining who may be involved; the process for appointment of management team; key individuals such 









Theory must aim at explaining how and why things happen (Sutton and Staw 1995). In 
this sense, the previous chapters that presented the findings have attempted to better 
understand the how’s and why’s of network management by building on collaborative 
advantage theory (Huxham 2003) and public network management (Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001)119. By carrying out one of the first studies to explicitly use paradox—in 
particular the fundamental intrinsic tension of unity/diversity—as a research focus to 
advance the understanding of network management, two new constructs (strategizing and 
capacitating) are added to previous research, increasing comprehensiveness while 
maintaining parsimony (Whetten 1989). I have also described relationships between 
concepts and, enhancing Huxham and Vangen’s (2000b) work, I have specifically 
                                                 




explained the concepts and links in terms of power—in itself an under-researched theme 
in the collaboration literature.  
 
In addition, this work has bridged two streams of literatures, one originating in 
organization studies and another in political science—collaboration management and 
public network management—which so far have seldom spoken to each other. This study 
has drawn on the most salient works from both streams and has proven that they are far 
closer to each other than may seem at first.  Moreover, I have focused on the network as 
unit of analysis which has been recurrently called for by other network scholars, but thus 
far have not been attended (Berry et al. 2004; Mandell 1994). In addition, the research 
has looked at decision-making and meaning making in collaborative networks, two 
subfields in need of attention. The decision-making component addresses a negative gap 
in empirical work which has principally focused on white and male-dominant contexts 
(Miller, Hickson, and Wilson 1996). This empirical work breaks away from this trend 
since it has involved mostly non-whites and as many females as males. 
 
Lastly, this research aims at providing reflective practitioners with useful conceptual 
handles (Huxham 2003) for managing collaboration and collaborative networks. The 
model produced may help practitioners understand why network management is such a 
difficult task, provide them with a useful map to make sense of a complex reality, and—
although the model’s constructs are analytical—help them distinguish when to focus on 
one activity rather than another. In fact, one of the main strengths of using paradox in 




LIMITATIONS, GENERALIZABILITY, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Limitations and generalizability 
My research has certain limitations that arise due to methodological and design issues. 
The case selection was done following positive replication logic—when cases selected 
are all similar, positive instances of a specific phenomenon: interorganizational 
immigration networks in this study—and the program from which the cases were selected 
may have introduced some biases. In particular, the awardees of the program from which 
the sample was drawn—Leadership for a Changing World—were characterized by 
having strong strategic leadership and have an inclusive leadership style. This may 
undermine some aspects of the model. In particular, the facilitating and strategizing 
leadership activities identified may be due to the selection criteria of the program rather 
than a salient feature of network management. This does limit the generalizability of the 
findings, but not their validity. Indeed, I do not claim that this may be the only model for 
successful network management rather that it appears to be, logically and empirically, a 
model of effective network management.  
 
This research is a theory-building exercise rather than a theory-testing one. Limitations to 
generalizability of results must be discussed. Although this research aims at analytically 
generalizing results to a theory (Firestone 1993), it has focused on a particular 
population, and this has implications. While this research has been mainly interpretivist, 
in that it looks at the mechanisms (Lin 1998) by which network management occurs, it 




These findings are therefore applicable to the nonprofit sector, not business alliances or 
intergovernmental networks; to networks dealing with immigration policy; and to 
formalized action networks, as opposed to, say, policy networks or social networks. 
Future research ought to test the findings in other network contexts. Yet, at this point it is 
possible to speculate on the extent to which the findings have relevance to broader 
contexts. 
 
Regarding the paradox of belonging, I believe that, although entrepreneurial networks of 
immigrants do have their own specificities (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993), and the way 
in which the unity/diversity paradox is managed will vary according to the economic 
sector and policy field120, this paradox is relevant and applicable to all three sectors 
irrespective of policy field or network form. In informal business networks scholars have 
pointed to the peril of how over-embeddedness may diminish diversity of the network 
and hence reduce the availability of non-redundant information (Burt 1992) and how 
over-embeddedness may become overly costly (Uzzi 1997). Just as important 
contributions for management have come from the public sector (Kelman 2006), 
immigration nonprofit networks may be an excellent field to study relational leadership 
given their uncertain, complex, and hostile environment (Ospina and Foldy 2005).  
Moreover, Huxham and colleagues contribute to interorganizational collaboration 
literature in general by drawing on all sectors in their work. Similarly, my interest is in 
                                                 
120 I completely acknowledge that fundamental differences between policy fields and economic sectors 
exist: e.g. timeliness of outcome pressures, number of attentive stakeholder groups, and openness of 




managing interorganizational networks rather than any particular economic or policy 
sector.  
 
The cooperation/confrontation paradox may seem less generalizable to other policy fields 
or economic sectors, since advocacy networks in the nonprofit sector in general, and in 
the immigration subfield in particular, tend to have engagement with other external non-
member actors as the primary objective. However, the other sectors also deal with the 
duality of cooperation and confrontation as the literature on business coopetition and 
policy networks demonstrates (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). In addition, all 
networks that require engaging with its context—practically all—should be expected to 
have to strategize and mobilize to some degree.  
 
Lastly, although I have used literature from non-formalized or low formalized networks 
and social and policy networks, this study’s contribution is applicable to 
interorganizational networks that have an identifiable coordinating unit, strategic center 
(Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995), or network administrative organization (Human and 
Provan 2000). The model proposed is about leadership activities executed by the 
coordinating unit. This then limits the findings, at least to a certain degree, to a specific 
type of interorganizational networks.  
 
Related to the above point and as in Human and Provan’s (2000) study of legitimacy-
building in industrial networks, this research has primarily focused on the coordinating 




data collection method clearly produces a partial view of the networks, especially with 
regards to network-wide properties, such as the power bases: less so with regard to the 
leadership activities since the networks had a formalized coordinating unit and these tasks 
were mainly executed by it. Nevertheless, aimed at reducing such biases, the sampling of 
interviewees included board members and organizational members’ staff, and observation 
and document-analysis components were also included in the research design.  
Future directions 
The existence of paradox in immigration nonprofit networks cannot be reduced to the 
pair I have studied here. Indeed, network management “is living in a state of constant 
tension.” Moreover, tensions and paradox collapse and transform into each other, and are 
not independent of one another, as Huxham and Beech (2003a) have pointed out. 
 
Several important collaboration management themes are missing from this research: 
individual competencies, time, and trust. Although my approach has been explicitly inter-
organizational, a micro-level analysis of the coordinating unit may be an interesting 
complement to this research. The leadership activities I found cannot be uniquely 
attributed to a single individual or exclusively to the coordinating units. However, at the 
same time, the excellent and outstanding personal and individual qualities of all network 
managers studied are beyond doubt. In addition, the quality of the coordinating units, the 
entire team managing the networks, was also evident and continually highlighted by the 
network managers and the organizational members.  For example, how is leadership 




type of competencies do the network manager and its team have to possess? Matching 
collective and individual approaches is one of the major challenges—if not the major 
challenge—of  leadership studies in general, and of network leadership in particular. 
 
Regarding time, 6, Goodwin, Peck, and Freeman (2006) attempt to conceptually map out 
leadership activities along linear lifecycle models. This aspect should be given more 
attention. My approach here is not longitudinal so it cannot address the question of 
whether this model is specific to mid-age networks (ranging from 8 years [NDLON] to 
20 years [NYIC]). Further research addressing the following questions is welcome: are 
all leadership activities always equally important? Is activation more important during 
formation? Are the tensions always handled in the same way or are they dealt with 
differently according to the networks temporality? 
 
Another important time-related aspect is the formation of the networks. It is worth 
pointing out that all four networks were fueled initially by a real concrete challenge. 
NYIC arose to aid the legalization process following the 1987 IRCA. CAUSA was 
formed in 1995 to challenge a bill that would deny welfare to immigrants in Arizona, a 
bill similar to the one that passed in California a year earlier. In 1996, in Chicago, 
CAAELII also was formed to repel anti-immigration acts. Similarly, NDLON’s first 
action was to repel an anti-solicitation bill passed in Los Angeles. How does such a 
foundational imprint affect posterior network management? What are important aspects 




interorganizational networks is still needed—and such theorizing should be carried out 
using all leadership theories (i.e. LMX, systemic, transformational, charismatic…). 
 
Trust has also been missing. I have referred to it tangentially when dealing with unity, 
framing, and legitimacy, but due to the theoretical frame used and the silence in the data 
on this subject, trust has been largely absent. However, its relevance to the leadership and 
management of networks and collaboration is obvious and has been highlighted 
extensively in the literature. An obvious question would be: what role does trust play in 
the presented model? 
 
Far more issues regarding network management are still waiting to be researched. 
Although networks will remain complex creatures, more research and, in particular, more 
empirical and theoretical research will help improve our understanding of them and, 
therefore, their management. Theory-building on management of interorganizational 
networks is still necessary, as is research aimed at developing practice-oriented 
conceptual tools that may increase network effectiveness. I believe this dissertation is a 
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APPENDIX 1. OUTLINE OF PROPOSED RESEARCH WITH 
NDLON 
Researcher: Angel Saz-Carranza 
In further developing our model of social change leadership, and in addition to the 
Cooperative and Ethnography research opportunities, we are planning to interview some 
LCW awardees from group 3 and 4. These interviews will allow us to look across some 
of the organizations participating in the LCW program and expand and test some of our 
previous findings. 
  
Pablo Alvarado and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) are one of 
the selected awardees and organizations that are invited to partake in this ulterior research 
process. This document briefly outlines the focus of the research and the plan we would 
like to propose in order to carry out this research.  
Our research interests 
We are proposing Pablo Alvarado and NDLON to participate in furthering our research 
on social change leadership. In particular, we have two foci of interest, network 
management and Latino organizing, which we describe hereon. However, in the research 
process we will approach both sub-themes together 
Network management in the immigration sector 
This stream of research aims at being useful to practitioners by contributing to 
fundamental knowledge and to the arena of inter-organizational network management 
and collaboration. We inquire into the conflicting and contradictory, external and internal 




that the artful management of conflicting demands is key to leverage power, both 
internally and externally, which in turn is necessary for inter-organizational collaboration 
to be successful. We are concentrating in the immigration sector networks for the time 
being. We have already carried out some initial research with the New York Immigration 
Coalition (NYIC) and the Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latin Immigrants of 
Illinois (CAAELII), and plan to include, in the near future, the National Day Laborer 
Organizing Network (NDLON) and CAUSA. Moreover, this stream of research is part of 
a RCLA scholar’s (Angel Saz-Carranza) PhD dissertation. 
Organizing by Latino communities 
Twenty percent of the organizations and leaders selected as awardees of the LCW are 
working primarily with the Latino community in the USA. Most of these organizations 
work in advocacy and organizing, provision of services, including social and legal 
services, immigrant rights, training and education. These organizations play an essential 
role in helping Latino communities and immigrants to access services and resources and 
in advocating for rights related to jobs, health, environmental needs, housing and 
immigrant issues, At the same time, these organizations provide a great source of cultural 
identity, networking and kinship for the Latino community. By studying these 
organizations, we would like to understand how effective leadership develops among 
these groups.  In particular, we would like to highlight the common characteristics and 
differences within these organizations. In addition, we would like to understand the 
leadership style and the impact that these organizations have in the social and cultural life 
of their constituencies. Among other questions, we would like to address the following: 




organizations? What are the primary challenges faced by these organizations? What have 
been the main successes? In what way has the political culture from the immigrants’ 
native countries, influenced the leadership style of these organizations? What is the role 
of culture and identity in organizing and in defining leadership?  
What the research would entail & what we offer NDLON 
The research would be implemented by carrying out site visits and interviews over the 
next year.  All interviewees will sign a consent form, which guarantees the right to 
confidentiality and safeguards the interviewees and their organizations.  
 
Finally, RCLA offers the participating organizations specific by-products of the research. 
Should NDLON be interested in a specific topic or study, RCLA would be happy to help 
produce it—obviously, NDLON will receive a copy of all the research produced in which 









APPENDIX 3. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL  
• Pre-interview: 
o Get/try mini-disc. 
o Batteries (also for micro) & tapes (1/hour) 
o In-depth interview form with stamp– for all except award recipients. 
o Get forms signed by Amparo or Sonia. 
o Print protocols. 
o Ask about quiet room for interviews. 
o Ask about if everyone knows times etc… 
o Take snacks and water for between interviews. 
Introduction [5 min]:  
• Thank you for making time to work with me today.  
• Purpose of interview:  
o Encourage a broader conversation about social change leadership in US 
(LCW) 
o Draw out important lessons for others doing similar work—in particular, 
managing multiple demands in networks 
o Give you opportunity for reflection and learning  
• I must mention and go through with you some bureaucratic/technical aspects: 
o Forms: safeguard the interviewee; voluntary; confidentiality; recorded; review 




• In our conversation today, we’re going to be talking about a few specific dimensions 
of your work that Sonia Ospina and I identified in previous conversation that 
we’ve had.  The elements that we’ll be talking about are organized around the fact 
that NYIC is a coalition in the immigration sector. In particular, our focus of interest 
is network management. 
o Our preliminary findings suggest that the artful management of conflicting 
demands is key to leverage power, both internally and externally, which in 
turn is necessary for inter-organizational collaboration to be successful.  
o We are concentrating in the immigration sector networks for the time being. 
We have already carried out some initial research with the New York 
Immigration Coalition (NYIC) and the Coalition for Asian, African, 
European, Latin Immigrants of Illinois (CAAELII), and plan to include, in the 
near future, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) and 
CAUSA. Moreover, this stream of research is part of a RCLA scholar’s 
(Angel Saz-Carranza) PhD dissertation. 
• The interview: 
o Time permitting, our interview will have three sections. We’ll start with 
some opening questions about you and your work. Then, we will discuss 
challenges regarding the internal management of the network. We’ll finish 
up with some questions regarding your interaction with your 
external/target/public agency (e.g. USCIS).  




Part A121—opening questions [25 min.]: 
• I’d like to start by asking each of you tell me your name and title, and what is it 
about NYIC that you most value?   
 What’s do you see as special about your role or contribution to the 
organization? 
• Before we jump in and begin to explore issues of network management, it would be 
helpful to hear an overview of NYIC.  Can you tell me how your work is organized 
in general? 
 What does the network do? 
 What are the main activities it carries out? 
 Can you describe your day-to-day work? 
• Can you tell me how the network works in terms of who decides, who executes, who 
overlooks?  
• What do you think are the main strengths of the network? 
 Can you please give me an example when the network was successful?  
• What do you think are the main challenges to the way the network functions? 
 Can you give an example of when things did not turn out as expected? 
Part B—focusing on internal paradox [40 min.]: 
1-Nature of U/D122 
• What kinds of organizations are part of the network?  Who/what populations do 
they represent?  [Judge the degree to which it’s diverse/similarity.]  
                                                 
121 Keep in mind dual nature of workers. 




 How does an organization become part of this network? 
 What are the criteria (issue, region, scale, primary activity)?  
o Why is bringing such a group of organizations important? [Judge value added 
by diversity]  
 Do you think that the network promotes diverse membership? How?  
Can you give me an example? 
o Can you think of problems/challenges that arise when bringing together such 
different organizations?  
 Do you think there are some things that would be easier to do if there 
was less diversity in the network? 
o About what is there division/disunity? Among members on what action to 
take? Examples. [Actual antonym of unity.] 
• Can you tell me about a time when the members of the network were particularly 
united? 
 What did they have in common? [Describe this unity] 
o How does the unity add value to the network’s functioning? 
 How does the network promote unity among members?  
• What makes it difficult to maintain diversity in the network and to promote 
commonness among members at the same time? What are the challenges?  [Will 
inform w.r.t. perceptions] 
• What is the benefit of having a diverse and united coalition? 
2-U/D & dimensions 




o ...affect trust among members? 
o ...determine the leadership style in <the network>? 
o ...affect your membership? who is invited? and who leaves? 
o ...determine the way you make decisions? 
o …influence the way you set the objectives of <the network>? 
• How does maintaining unity and diversity at the same time, affect [power], ... 
 …decision making / non-decision making?  
 …meaning-making?. 
 …power over? 
 …power to? 
• How does maintaining unity and diversity provide [power bases].... 
 …resources? 
 …knowledge? 
 …positional resources (centrality/boundary-spanners)? 
 …authority? 
 …legitimacy? 
3-Managing U/D  
• How do you promote diversity and maintain unity at the same time the network? 
 Do you nurture and facilitate member interaction? How? Could you 
give an example? 
 How do you cultivate personal relationships? Could you give an 
example?  How much time do you dedicate to it? 




Part C—focusing on external paradox [40 min.]: 
4-Nature of C/C 
• In what ways does the network work/interact with the target/public/external agency? 
Give examples? 
o Are you by definition cooperative or hostile to the target agency? In what 
way? 
• Could you give examples of how you have somehow cooperated with the target 
agency? 
o Do you cooperate at all levels (individual, local, state, federal) with the target 
agency? Examples? 
o Do you formalize your cooperation with the target agency? How? Give 
examples? 
o Do you cooperate openly and publicly? How? Give examples? 
• If you disagree with the target agency, what do you do? 
 Can you give an example of how you have challenged/confronted the 
target agency? 
o Do you confront the target agency at all levels (simultaneously)? Examples 
o Do you confront the target agency openly and publicly? How? Give 
examples? 
• Are there times when you choose a collaborative vs. a confrontation approach?  
o Also, have there been times when you were in a confrontation relationship 
with an individual/organization, but then you changed your strategy to one of 




• What are the challenges in working with and against the target agency? [Will inform 
perception of tension] 
• What is the benefit of combining both confrontation and cooperation with target 
agencies? 
5-C/C & dimensions 
• How does both confronting and cooperating with the target agency affect your work, 
... 
o ...affect trust among members? 
o ...determine the leadership style in <the network>? 
o ...affect your membership? who is invited? and who leaves? 
o ...determine the way you make decisions? 
o …influence the way you set the objectives of <the network>? 
• How does both confronting and cooperating with the target agency affect [power]... 
 …decision making / non-decision making?  
 …meaning-making? 
 …power over? 
 …power to? 











• How do you combine confrontation and cooperation with the target agency?  
• Is credibility important to better confront and/or cooperate with the 
target agency? Can you give an example. 
• How is acting at all levels important to better confront and cooperate 
with the target agency? Examples  
• Is cultivating multiple relationships with other orgs important to 
better confront and cooperate with the target agency? 
Part D—other issues [10 min.]: 
Other paradoxes 
• Generating unity and diversity within the coalition and both confronting and 
cooperating with the target agency seem paradoxical, counter-intuitive, contradictory. 
Do you also find it paradoxical?  
• Can you think of other contradictory aspects of network management, of other 
paradoxes or other tensions? 




APPENDIX 4. POST-INTERVIEW LOG FORM  
[Fill after each interview.] 
Time of interview:  
Date:  
Place:  
• How would you characterize the relation between the interviewer and the 
interviewees?   
• How would you describe of the interview location? 
• How would you describe informal talks before and after the interviews? 
• Did you encounter any difficulties during the interview? 












Unity      
Disunity      
Diversity     
Similarity     
Confrontation     




APPENDIX 5. OBSERVATION LOG123 
[Fill after each observation and/or event.] 




• What is the physical layout of the place? 
• What is the general environment of the place? 
• How would you describe the interactions of people? 
• How did you feel before the observation? 
• What did you do before the observation? 
• Whom did you meet? What was the nature of the interaction? 
• What about the experience of being there drew your attention? 
• Is there anything else you would like to report that would be helpful to understand the 
context of the observation or to illuminate the analysis of the interview transcripts? 
• Who were present/invited to activity? (all/some members, eternal actors, target 
agency)? 
• Who spoke, facilitated, lead the activity? (all/some members, in terms of size, 
ideology, antiquity, language, ethnic background…) 
o Did this vary/rotate or it staid the same? 
• What type of slogans, songs, rhetoric were chanted/used? In what language? 
                                                 
















Unity      
Disunity      
Diversity     
Similarity     
Confrontation      





APPENDIX 6. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Data Type Network Date Sub-type 
Dale Interview CAAELII .10/OCT/05 Network manager 
Khem Group interview CAAELII .11/OCT/05 Network staff 
Diana Group interview CAAELII .11/OCT/05 Network staff 
Isabel Group interview CAAELII .11/OCT/05 Network staff 
Claudio Interview CAAELII .12/DEC/05 Network staff 
David Interview CAAELII .12/DEC/05 Network staff 
Gideon Interview CAAELII .12/DEC/05 Network staff 
Eugene Group interview CAAELII .13/DEC/05 Network member 
Seth Group interview CAAELII .13/DEC/05 Network member 
Guadalupe Group interview CAUSA .14/NOV/05 Network staff 
Aeryca Group interview CAUSA .14/NOV/05 Network manager 
Abel Group interview CAUSA .14/NOV/05 Network member 
Blanca Group interview CAUSA .14/NOV/05 Network member 
Lorena Group interview CAUSA .15/NOV/05 Network member 
Carmen Group interview CAUSA .15/NOV/05 Network member 
Oscar Group interview CAUSA .15/NOV/05 Network member 
Ramon Interview CAUSA .15/NOV/05 Network manager 
Aeryca Interview CAUSA .15/NOV/05 Network manager 
Amy Telephone Int. CAUSA .26/JAN/06 Network member 
John A Group interview NDLON .19/DEC/05 Network staff 
Pablo A Group interview NDLON .19/DEC/05 Network manager 
Omar L Telephone Int. NDLON .10/JAN/06 Network member 
Oscar P Interview NDLON .10/JAN/06 Network member 
Toni B Telephone Int. NDLON .11/JAN/06 Network member 
Carlos Interview NDLON .20/JAN/06 Network member 
Jose Group interview NYIC .27/SEP/05 Network staff 
Minerva Group interview NYIC .27/SEP/05 Network staff 
Chung Wa Interview NYIC .02/OCT/05 Network manager 
Adam Interview NYIC .18/OCT/05 Network staff 
Javier Interview NYIC .17/JAN/06 Network staff 
Marg Chin Interview NYIC .23/FEB/06 Network member 
 
Moreover, the interviewees used in the preliminary study (Ospina and Saz-Carranza 
2005) and used again in this research, were: 
Data Type Network Date Sub-type 
Chung W Group interview NYIC .04/APR/02 Network staff 
Sara M Group interview NYIC .04/APR/02 Network member 
Margie Group interview NYIC .04/APR/02 Network manager 
Veronica Group interview NYIC .18/APR/02 Network staff 
Helen Group interview NYIC .18/APR/02 Network member 
Margie Group interview NYIC .18/APR/02 Network manager 
Dale Group interview CAAELII .03/NOV/02 Network manager 
Mary H Group interview CAAELII .03/NOV/02 Network staff 




Dale A Group interview CAAELII .02/NOV/02 Network manager 
Daisy F Group interview CAAELII .02/NOV/02 Network member 





APPENDIX 7. LIST OF OBSERVATIONS 
Data Type Network Date Sub-type 
CIVITAS pilot-test Observation CAAELII .08/OCT/05 Network-wide meetimg 
Apprenticeship program Observation CAAELII .10/OCT/05 Constituencies training 
Leadership Curriculum 
Development Participation CAAELII .11/OCT/05 Network staff meeting 
Technical Curriculum 
Development Participation CAAELII .11/OCT/05 Network staff meeting 
Citizenship Curriculum 
Development Participation CAAELII .11/OCT/05 Network staff meeting 
Town Hall Meeting prep Observation CAUSA .14/NOV/05 Strategy meeting 
FIRM Steering Committee 
Meeting Observation CAUSA .15/NOV/05 Strategy meeting 
Town Hall Meeting Observation CAUSA .16/NOV/05 Rally 
Housings w/ RR Observation CAUSA .16/NOV/05 Working group 
CAPACES Program Observation CAUSA .16/NOV/05 Working group 
National Assembly Observation NDLON .27-31/JUL/05 National assembly 
Press Conference Observation  NDLON .31/JUL/05 Press conference 
NDLON strategy meeting Observation NDLON .19/DEC/05 Strategy meeting 
NYIC Annual PR Event Observation NYIC .01/DEC/05 PR Event 
Pro Immigration March  Observation NYIC .21/MAY/06 Rally 





APPENDIX 8. LIST OF DOCUMENTS ANALYZED124 
Network Document Date 
CAAELII CIVITAS Brochure 1-Jan-05 
CAAELII Campaign for Unitying Families 1-Jan-05 
CAAELII Break the chains leaflet 12-Jan-05 
CAAELII General CIVITAS material 1-Oct-05 
CAAELII Technical Curriculum 1-Oct-05 
CAAELII Ch Tribune Article--Minutemen 15-Oct-05 
CAAELII Minutemen media summary 15-Oct-05 
CAAELII ICIRR & AAAN report 23-Nov-05 
CAAELII Office Manager Job Description 28-Nov-05 
CAAELII Fundraising material  31-Mar-06 
CAAELII Webpage  
CAAELII Emails from multiple listserves  
CAUSA CAUSA's report on Immigrant Labor 1-Oct-98 
CAUSA Lynn's story of PCUN 1-Sep-01 
CAUSA Nomination to LCW 1-Jan-03 
CAUSA Freedom Ride DVD 1-Jan-03 
CAUSA Horizontal analysis Interview w/ Ramon Ramirez 26-Jul-04 
CAUSA Horizontal analysis interview w/ Larry Kleinman 3-Aug-04 
CAUSA Horizontal analysis Interview w/ Ramon Ramirez #2 3-Aug-04 
CAUSA Vertical Form PCUN 1-Sep-04 
CAUSA Ethongraphy Lynn 20-Apr-05 
CAUSA Projected budget 1-Jul-05 
CAUSA Email Ramon Ramirez 8-Sep-05 
CAUSA Media package 1-Nov-05 
CAUSA CAPACES' description 1-Nov-05 
CAUSA Eugene Meeting Outreach Material 15-Nov-05 
CAUSA Fundraising letter AS 1-Dec-05 
CAUSA Statesman article on Mexican Consulate 4-Dec-05 
CAUSA Meta ethnography by Carol Stack 1-Jan-06 
CAUSA Fundraising letter AS 1-Apr-06 
CAUSA Various campaign material  
CAUSA Webpage  
NDLON Music by Day Laborers Article 1-Jan-00 
NDLON Hisotrical summary of NDLON 1-Sep-01 
NDLON Day Labor in Cleveland 4-Nov-01 
NDLON Checklist for Centers 1-Jan-02 
NDLON Centers or streets 1-Jan-02 
NDLON GAO report  1-Jan-02 
NDLON NLDON's 2002 Assembly Summary 1-Sep-02 
NDLON NDLON's 2003 Assembly Summary 1-Sep-03 
NDLON NELP report 1-Mar-04 
NDLON NDLON's 2003-04 accomplishments 1-Aug-04 
                                                 
124 Dates are approximate since many of these internal documents did not have exact dates. Moreover, not 
all documents are listed individually and in some cases are grouped. Documents used in Ospina and Saz-
Carranza’s (2005) preliminary study were also used in this research. Lastly, Leadership for a Changing 




NDLON NDLON Outreach Material 1-Jan-05 
NDLON Several press releases for different events 1-Jan-05 
NDLON Violence to Day-Laborers 27-Jan-05 
NDLON Day Labor in NYC 17-Apr-05 
NDLON Call for Arizona Boycott 27-May-05 
NDLON Horizontal analysis Interview w/ John Arvizu 10-Jun-05 
NDLON Soccer tournement leaflet 13-Aug-05 
NDLON Horizontal analysis Interview w/ Pablo Alvarado 16-Sep-05 
NDLON Group 4 Awardee Portraits 12-Dec-05 
NDLON Webpage  
NDLON NDLON ethnography concept paper  
NDLON NDLON's principles  
NDLON Building community document / Best practices  
NDLON Polictical economy of day-laborers  
NDLON Civil rights handout   
NDLON Report by NDLON and U Maryland  
NDLON Myths NDLON - Valenzuela  
NDLON NDLON on Ordinances  
NYIC 2004 IRS form 26-Jul-05 
NYIC Housing Report 11-Oct-05 
NYIC Eduaction Issues outreach material 31-Oct-05 
NYIC Healthy Homes Report 17-Nov-05 
NYIC Heallthy Homes Outreach Materials 17-Nov-05 
NYIC Bloomberg response to NYIC electoral questionnaire 28-Nov-05 
NYIC Ferrero response to NYIC electoral questionnaire 28-Nov-05 
NYIC EP response to NYIC electoral questionnaire 28-Nov-05 
NYIC Socialists response to NYIC electoral questionnaire 28-Nov-05 
NYIC Annual Meeting documentation 29-Nov-05 
NYIC NYIC Immigration Debate Outreach Material 21-Dec-05 
NYIC Webpage  
NYIC Immigration News Newsletter  

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX 10. MOST IMPORTANT IMMIGRATION BILLS IN 
U.S.’ HISTORY 
Table XXVI. Overview of major US immigration legislation (Extendend) 
Historical 
Period 
Legislation/Year Major provisions 
Immigration Act 1875 Bars prostitutes and criminals 
Chinese Exclusion Act 1882  
Immigration Act 1882 Bars “lunatics,” “idiots,” and those “likely to become a 
public charge” 
Contract Labor Act 1885 Prohibits contract labor admissions 
Chinese Exclusion Act 1888 Extends Chinese exclusion 
Gilded age 
Immigration Act 1891 Creates federal immigration bureaucracy, introduces 
immigration head tax, and allows for deportation 
Immigration Act 1903 Bars polygamists and “anarchists” 
Gentleman’s agreement 1907 Limits Japanese immigration 
Immigration Act 1907 Increases head tax 
Immigration Act 1917 Imposes literacy tests and bars almost all Asians  
National Quota Law 1921 Limits immigration of each nationality to 3% of the 
number of foreign-born of that nationality living in the 
US in 1910 
Nationals Origin Act 1924 Limits immigration of each nationality to 2% of the 




National Quota Law 1929 Apportions quotas with respect to 2% nationality limit, 
as per 1920 census 
Immigration Act 1940 INS transferred from Labor to Justice Department  
Bracero Program 1943 Guestworker program with Mexico, British Honduras, 
Barbados, and Jamaica 
New Deal 
and WW2 
Act of December 17 1943 Repeals Chinese exclusion in favor of meager quotas 
War Bride Act 1945 Allows for immigration of foreign-born spouses and 
children of military personnel 
Displaced Persons Act 1948 Facilitates admission of European refugees 
Internal Security Act 1950 Establishes alien registry 
Immigration and Naturalization 
Act 1952 
Reaffirms national quotas, and adds exclusion criteria 
based on sexuality and ideology 
Refugee Relief Act 1953 Grants permanent residence to 214.000 European 
refugees  
40s & 50s 
Refugee-Escapee Act 1957 Grants special status to refugees from communist 
regimes 
Cuban Refugee Act 1960 Begins Cuban Refugee program 
Refugee Assistance Act 1963 Extends support for refugees 
Bracero Re-Authorization 1964 Terminates Bracero program 
Hart-Celler Act  Dismantles national quotas systems; establishes 
preferences criteria with emphasis with family re-
unification 
Indochina Refugee Act 1975 Begins Indochina resettlement program 
INA Amendments 1976 Sets limits per country  
Indochina Refugee Act 1977 Admits 194.000 refugees from Indochina 
60s & 70s 





Refugee Act 1980 Expands annual refugee admissions 
Immigration Reform and Control 
Act 1986 
Amnesty to 3 million undocumented; establishes weak 
employer sanctions; and introduces immigration anti-
discrimination agency 
Immigration Act 1990 Increases Annual cap to 675.000 
Personal Responsibility Act 
1996 
Limits immigrant access to public benefits 
80s & 90s 
Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Individual Responsibility Act 
1996 
Strengthens border enforcement; expedites deportation; 
establishes exceptions for non-citizens 
Patriot Act 2001 Confers vast and unchecked powers to the Executive 
branch suspending many civil liberties and removing 
immigrants’ constitutional protection 
Homeland Security Act 2002 Transforms the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) of the Department of Justice into the U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
2000-… 
Real ID Act 2005 Increases the necessary evidence required both to 
corroborate one’s identity and for states to issue a 
driver’s license. 




APPENDIX 11. SUMMARY OF CURRENT IMMIGRATION 
DEBATE IN THE U.S. 
The Debate Over Immigration Reform  
 Bill Passed in the 
House Bill 
(H.R.4437) 
Hurdles to Overcome 
in Conference 
Bill Passed by the 
Senate Bill (S.2611) 









in the House, 
Representative Mike 
Pence, proposed a 
separate bill that 
would allow illegal 
immigrants to 
become guest 
workers, but not 
permanent residents 
or citizens.  
This may be the most 
difficult issue to 
resolve. A path to 
citizenship is one of 
the center-pieces of 
the Senate bill, while 
some conservative 
leaders in the House 
have repeatedly 
expressed opposition 
to any proposal that 
allowing illegal 
immigrants to qualify 
for residency.  
Would give illegal 
immigrants who have 
lived in the United 
States for two years or 
more a path to 
eventual citizenship. 
Illegal immigrants 
who have been here 
less than two years 
would be required to 
leave the country 
altogether. They could 
apply for the guest 
worker program, but 
they would not be 
guaranteed acceptance 
in it.  
While rejecting "an 
automatic path to 
citizenship," Mr. Bush 
has said that 
immigrants should be 
given a chance to gain 
citizenship after they 
"pay a meaningful 
penalty for breaking 




In December, the 
House defied 
President Bush's call 
for a guest worker 
program although 
the separate bill 
recently introduced 
by Mike Pence, the 
leader of the 
conservative caucus 





Although the House 
bill does not mention 
a guest worker 
program, some 
conservative House 
leaders have shown a 
willingness to 
compromise.  
Creates a guest 
worker program with 
a path to legal 
permanent residence.  
Has called on 
Congress to pass a 
guest worker program 
for more than two 
years. Said that "to 
secure our border, we 








No such provisions 
in the House bill.  
Another issue that 
may be very difficult 
to resolve. Many 
House Republicans 
vehemently oppose 
the provisions in the 
Senate bill that would 
bring 200,000 foreign 
workers into the 
country each year.  
Negotiations in the 
Senate bill have 
reduced the number of 
foreign guest workers 
to be admitted 
annually to 200,000 a 
year from 320,000.  
Although President 
Bush has not 
supported a specific 
number of guest 
workers to be 
admitted annually, his 
strong support of a 
guest worker program 
aligns him with the 













within three to six 
years.  
The Senate and the 
House bills agree on 
the need for an 
electronic system to 
verify employment 
eligibility. Some 
details still need to be 
worked out.  
The legislation would 
require employers to 
use an electronic 
employment 
verification system 
that would distinguish 
between legal and 
illegal workers.  
Mr. Bush has also said 
that employers should 










Makes it a federal 
crime to live in the 
United States 
illegally. Individuals 
who help illegal 
immigrants to enter 
or stay in the country 
would also face 
criminal penalties.  
This is another issue 
where the gulf 
between the two bills 
is vast. One area for 
compromise is that 
some conservative 
House leaders have 
signaled a possible 
willingness to remove 
the provision that 
would expose existing 
illegal immigrants to 
criminal penalties.  
Mandates penalties for 
smuggling aliens, but 
offers exceptions for 




medical care and 
housing. Also, illegal 
immigrants convicted 
of a felony or three 
misdemeanors would 
be deported.  
Said that "it is neither 
wise nor realistic to 
round up millions of 
people, many with 
deep roots in the 
United States, and 






construction of "at 
least two layers of 
reinforced fencing" 
as well as "physical 
barriers, roads, 
lighting, cameras 
and sensors" along 
approximately 700 
miles of the U.S.-
Mexico border.  
The bills essentially 
agree on the need for 
fencing, but differ on 
the length: the House 
calls for 
approximately 700 
miles while the Senate 
calls for 350.  
The bill initially 
called for limited 
"double- or triple-
layered fencing" but 
as the debate 
progressed, the Senate 
added provisions for 
350 miles of border 
fencing and 500 miles 
of vehicle barriers 
between the United 
States and Mexico.  
Although he did say 
that "walls and patrols 
alone will not stop" 
illegal immigration, 
Mr. Bush later 
traveled to Arizona 
and declared that he 
supported fencing 
some but not all of 
America's 1,950-mile 




Hires more Border 
Patrol agents "as 
expeditiously as 
possible." Nearly 
12,000 Border Patrol 
agents currently 
stand guard. Hires at 
least 250 active duty 
port of entry 
inspectors for each 
of the next three 
years.  
The two bills 
essentially agree on 
the need to bolster 
border security, but 
many details need to 
be settled.  
Increases the number 
of Border Patrol 
agents by 2,400 each 
year through 2011 to 
the current force of 
11,300 agents.  
Called on Congress to 
provide funding for 
large increases in 
manpower and 
technology at the 
border. He said that 
"by the end of 2008, 
we will increase the 
number of Border 
Patrol officers by an 
additional 6,000" and 
to help with the 
transition "up to 6,000 
Guard members will 
be deployed to our 
southern border."  





APPENDIX 12. NETWORK MEMBERS 
Coalition for Asian, African, European, Latino Immigrants of Illinois 
Arab American Action Network 
Bosnian & Herzegovinian American Community Center 
Cambodian Association of Illinois 
Casa Aztlan 
Centro Romero 
Chinese Mutual Aid Association 
Centro Sin Fronteras 
Chinese American Service League 
Erie Neighborhood House 
Ethiopian Community Association of Chicago 
Haitian American Community Association 
Heartland Alliance/El Centro de Educación y Cultura 
Indo-American Center 
Instituto del Progreso Latino 
Korean American Community Services 
Korean American Resource & Cultural Center 
Korean American Senior Center 
Lao American Community Services 
Midwest Asian American Center 
Vietnamese Association of Illinois 
 




Central American Resource Center (CARECEN) 
Centro Laboral de Graton 
Centro Legal de La Raza (Oakland) 
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) 
Iglesia San Pedro 
Instituto de Educacion Popular del Sur de California (IDEPSCA) 
Malibu Community Labor Exchange 
Pomona Day Laborer Center 
La Raza Centro Legal - San Francisco Day Laborer Program 
Day Worker Center of Mountain View  
Colorado 
El Centro Humanitario de Trabajadores 
Chicago 
Union Latina de Chicago  
Maryland  
Casa of Maryland 
New Jersey 
Casa Freehold  
Viento del Espiritu 
New York 




Coalicion Hispana de Ossinin 
The Hispanic Resource Center 
The Hispanic Westchester Coalition 
Neighbors' Link 
Proyecto de los Trabajadores Latinoamericanos (PTLA) 
Workplace Project  
North Carolina  
North Carolina Occupational Safety  
Health Project (NCOSH)  
Oregon 





Gulfon Area Neighborhood Organization (GANO)  
CTIWoRC (Proyecto Defensa Laboral) 
 
New York Immigration Coalition 
Advocates for Children of New York, Inc. 
Afghan Communicator 
Alianza Dominicana, Inc. 
American Committee on Italian Migration 
American Friends Service Committee 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee-NY 
APICHA 
Arab-American Family Support Center 
Asian Americans for Equality 
CAIR-NY 
Casa Mary Johanna 
Catholic Charities Archdiocese of New York 
Catholic Charities Department of Immigrant & Refugee Services 
Catholic Charities Department of Social Development 
Catholic Charities Diocese of Rockville Centre 
Catholic Charities-Diocese of Brooklyn & Queens 
Catholic Family Center 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. 
Catholic Migration 
Center for Immigrant Health 
Center for Independence of Disabled In New York, Inc. 
Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc. 
Center for Women in Government and Civil Society 
Central American Legal Assistance 
CARECEN 
Chinese-American Planning Council Inc. 
Church Alive Development Corp. 
Church Avenue Merchants Block Association 
Circulo de la Hispanidad, Inc. 
Citizens Advice Bureau 
City Bar Fund of the City of New York 
Coalition for Asian American Children & Families 




Comprehensive Development, Inc. 
Coro 
Cornell Migrant Program 
Council of Pakistan Organization 
District Council 37-Citizenship Committee 
Doctors of the World 
The Door 
Education & Assistance Corporation 
Emerald Isle Immigration Center 
Fifth Avenue Committee 
Forest Hills Community House, Inc. 
Gay Men’s Health Crisis 
Goddard Riverside Community Center 
Greater Upstate Law Project 
Harlem United Community AIDS Center 
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 
Helping Honduras 
Hispanic Federation, Inc. 
Immigration Advocacy Services, Inc. 
Independent Press Association 
Intercommunity Centre for Justice and Peace 
Interfaith Refugee Ministry 
International Center 
International High School 
International Institute of New Jersey 
Jacob A. Riis Settlement House 
Jewish Community Center of Staten Island 
Johnson, Murphy, Hubner, McKeon, Wubbenhorst & Appelt, P.C. 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP 
Korean Community Services of Metropolitan NY, Inc. 
Latin American Integration Center 
Latino Commission on AIDS 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
Learning Leaders 
Lexington Vocational Services, Inc. 
Literacy Assistance Center 
Long Island Immigrant Alliance 
Lutheran Family and Community Services 
Make the Road by Walking 
Medical & Health Research Association of NYC, Inc. 
Midwood Development Corp. 
Migration Policy Institute 
My Sisters' Place 
NALEO Educational Fund 
Nassau County Coordinating Agency for Spanish Americans 
New Immigrant Community Empowerment 
National Coalition for Haitian Rights 
New York Asian Women's Center 
New York Association for New Americans 
New York Civic Participation Project 
New York Lawyers for Public Interest 
New York Legal Assistance Group 
New York State Defenders Association, Inc. 
NYU School of Medicine Center for Immigrant Health 





Polish and Slavic Center 
Project Reach Youth, Inc. 
Refugee Women Council 
Riverside Language Program 
Romanian Information and Referral Center 
Sanctuary for Families 
Selfhelp Kensington 
South Asian Youth Action 
The 1199 SEIU Citizenship Program 
The Door-Legal 
UJA-Federation of Jewish Philanthropies 
Union Settlement Association 
UNITE Immigration Project 
United Neighborhood Houses 
Voices for Change: Immigrant Women & State Policy 




Community Alliance of Lane County 
Juventud Faceta 
Portland  
American Friends Service Committee 





Organización de Comunidades Indígenas Migrantes Oaxaqueños (OCIMO)  
Latinos Unidos Siempre  
Mano a Mano Family Center  
Salem/Keizer Coalition for Equality Scappoose 
Rural Organizing Project 
Woodburn 
LUChA 
Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN) 





Figure XXVII. CAUSA’s multiple linkages (source: own) 
 
 
